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ABSTRACT 
Distributed systems can be defined as systems that are scattered over geographical distances 
and provide different activities through communication, processing, data transfer and so on. 
Thus, increasing the cooperation, efficiency ,and reliability to deal with users and data 
resources jointly. For this reason, distributed systems have been shown to be a promising 
infrastructure for most applications in the digital world.  
Despite their advantages, keeping these systems secure, is a complex task because of the 
unconventional nature of distributed systems which can produce many security problems like 
phishing, denial of services or eavesdropping.  Therefore, adopting security and privacy 
policies in distributed systems will increase the trustworthiness between the users and these 
systems. However, adding or updating security is considered one of the most challenging 
concerns and this relies on various security vulnerabilities which existing in distributed 
systems. The most significant one is inserting or modifying a new security concern or even 
removing it according to the security status which may appear at runtime. Moreover, these 
problems will be exacerbated when the system adopts the multi-hop concept as a way to deal 
with transmitting and processing information. This can pose many significant security 
challenges especially if dealing with decentralized distributed systems and the security must be 
furnished as end-to-end. Unfortunately, existing solutions are insufficient to deal with these 
problems like CORBA which is considered a one-to-one relationship only, or DSAW which 
deals with end-to-end security but without taking into account the possibility of changing 
information sensitivity during runtime. 
This thesis provides a proposed mechanism for enforcing security policies and dealing with 
distributed systems’ security weakness in term of the software perspective. The proposed 
solution utilised Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP), to address security concerns during 
compilation and running time.  The proposed solution is based on a decentralized distributed 
system that adopts the multi-hop concept to deal with different requested tasks. The proposed 
system focused on how to achieve high accuracy, data integrity and high efficiency of the 
distributed system in real time. This is done through modularising the most efficient security 
solutions, Access Control and Cryptography, by using Aspect-Oriented Programming 
language. The experiments’ results show the proposed solution overcomes the shortage of the 
existing solutions by fully integrating with the decentralized distributed system to achieve 
dynamic, high cooperation, high performance and end-to-end holistic security.  
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Chapter One  
Introduction  
 
This chapter presents a brief introduction to security and privacy concepts in terms of 
the distributed system. It also provides introductions about the solutions components 
to address these security and privacy challenges, access control and cryptographic. This 
chapter highlights the current problems of distributed systems’ security and motivation 
of this research. It also presents the programming paradigm, Aspect-Oriented 
Programming (AOP) the tool that we used to modularize the privacy and security 
concerns for the proposed solution. The chapter also outlines the project’s aims and 
objectives, novel contributions, and finishes with the thesis structure.   
1.1 Distributed System Security Challenges and Solutions 
 
Coulouris [1] defines a distributed system as “one in which hardware or software 
components located at networked computers communicate and coordinate their actions 
only by passing messages”. Systems that are scattered over geographical distances and 
provide different activities through communication, processing, data transfer etc are 
called distributed systems [2]; for example, web services offering to deal with a huge 
distributed system as single resource. There are many different concepts associated 
with distributed systems, including distributed file systems, distributed object-based 
systems, distributed Web-based systems etc. All of these systems have been built to 
fulfil the following objectives [3] : 
• Transparency  
• Openness 
• Reliability  
• Performance  
• Scalability 
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This thesis starts with the focus on the security of distributed systems based on how the 
system face different types of threats.  These threats could be in the following forms:  
 Interception: An illegal attempt by unauthorized parties trying to access the 
service or certain data to make copies or just corrupt the information, thus 
disabling the system or service [4]. 
 Interruption: Destroying the Services or data and converting it to be 
unavailable, unusable, Examples of interruption threats include denial of 
service attacks, deletion of data, and corruption of data [5].  
 Modification: Manipulating and changing the data in an unauthorized manner, 
thus changing the service to perform a different function from that  originally 
intended [5].  
 Fabrication: Generation of additional data or activity that would normally not 
exist. Examples of fabrication include adding an entry to a password database 
and replaying previously sent messages [6]. 
Besides these threats, there are different types of attacks that may cause serious 
damages on the systems workings like attacking the distributed system channels. For 
example, eavesdropping [7] when the attacker obtains copies of the transmitted 
messages, thus sniffing some sensitive information. Denial of Service [8] when the 
attacker floods the system channel with messages that can cause the service to stop.  
To address all the above security issues, security and privacy concepts must be adopted. 
Although, these concepts are presented as the non-functional side of the distributed 
system, however the naturalism of the functional side (sending, receiving and 
processing) needs to adopt these concepts to save the information. According to the 
definitions, all distributed entities will be working together as one entity to accomplish 
the required tasks, thus sharing same data between them while preserving the locality 
for each individual entity. For example, the function performance of a machine relies 
on the results of sub-functions performance on the other machine e.g. Web Service 
Composition (WSC) [9]. This cooperation makes the data vulnerable when an 
unauthorized entity obtains access to sensitive information.  
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To investigate the security issues in distributed systems, there are three main 
fundamental security dimensions which should be applied to measure the strength of a 
system’s security and the defense against different types of attacks. These dimensions 
are as shown in the following: 
1. Confidentiality  
The method that shows the ability to protect information from disclosure or exposure 
for those who are not authorized to access it [10]. In other words, this concept ensures 
that the access to the information is limited to authorized people only, who can handle 
and change according to the level of authorization [11]. There are some measures used 
to protect the confidentiality of information that are as follows: 
o Information classification 
o Secure document storage. 
o Application of general security policies. 
o Education of information custodians and end users. 
Confidentiality can be compromised by the loss of a laptop containing data, a person 
looking over our shoulder while we type a password, an email attachment being sent to 
the wrong person, an attacker penetrating our systems, or similar issues [10]. 
2.  Integrity 
It is the ability to prevent information from modification or deletion by an unauthorized 
party [12]. This might include the unauthorized modification or deletion of data, or it 
could mean an authorized, but undesirable change or deletion of data. To achieve 
integrity, we might need to have the methods to protect against the unauthorized 
modification to data, but also need the ability to reverse authorized changes that have 
to be undone [10]. 
3.  Availability  
The ability for the authorized user to access the data when they need it without 
interference or obstruction, and the systems that provide this can appropriately resist or 
recover from attacks [11].  
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In order to deal with all these listed security issues in distributed systems, one needs to 
consider different types of cryptography and access control mechanisms.   
1.1.1 Cryptography 
 
A mechanism used to convert the plain file into unreadable file, thus transferring data 
safely between system channels in a way that the attacker cannot understand [13]. In 
addition, cryptography will prevent any unauthorized system entity from displaying the 
data. 
 
1.1.2 Access Control  
 
One of the accepted security solutions is Access Control (AC), it’s a mechanism that is 
used to protect the information by controlling who can access the information, or even 
pieces of information, and where and when [14]. In addition, AC will give the authority 
to the authenticated person, or machine to perform one of the actions read, write or 
delete and this will be different in regards to the type of authority that the authenticated 
person has [15].  
1.2 Privacy Preservation  
 
Privacy preservation is an essential concern especially for applications that deal with 
sharing data such as healthcare, security, financial and other applications that deal with 
sensitive data [16]. Many governments, corporations and organizations desire to create 
an interface that amalgamates data sources to achieve a high level of knowledge base 
to reach accurate results and make a right decision [17]. The aggregation of data sources 
however will put the privacy of the data stored in these sources in a precarious position. 
Many methods, algorithms and models can be used to achieve privacy for applications 
that share their resources; however, the most important two main methods used for 
enforcing privacy are anonymity and cryptography [18].  
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1.3 Aspect-Oriented Programming  
 
Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) is a software paradigm, that supports separation 
of concerns (SoC) [19], which play a major role in software evolution. In computer 
science, SoC is the procedure of separating a computer program into distinct features 
that overlap in functionality as little as possible. SoC can be achieved through 
modularity of programming and encapsulation with the aid of data hiding. Researchers 
have explored many methodologies in order to assess the reusability of Object Oriented 
(OO) software systems. AOP aims to modularize crosscutting concerns in an 
application, which can not be modularized using traditional approaches such as Object 
Oriented Programming (OOP). By using an aspect oriented approach, concerns like 
security and privacy can be isolated, resulting in the increased maintainability and 
reusability of the system [20].  
1.4 Motivation 
 
Dealing with the naturalism of the distributed systems is still an open challenge, 
because of the variety of requirements, environments, ability of expanding, updating, 
loosely–coupled problems and more. Indeed, all these problems represent the 
functional side of the distributed system; however, non-functional concerns like 
security and privacy protection will add more load to facing the above challenges. 
Adding privacy and security concepts to network system applications will increase the 
trust between the user and these applications, leading to an increase in the number of 
users willing to use them. Unfortunately, obtaining privacy and security assurances in 
a distributed system remains difficult; typically, in some places in distributed 
applications, there are no trusted relationships among participants of the networked 
system. Nonetheless many distributed systems need to be trusted because they handle 
sensitive and private data, such as clinical data, financial information, business-to-
business transactions and joint military information [21]. 
The proposed solution deals with decentralized distributed systems(DDS), in which 
each individual node within the system works autonomously. Each node has both 
statuses (client and server) at the same time, so can send requests and receive requests 
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or response as well as perform its own function. The features of these systems are that 
sometimes there are no direct connections between nodes, so if a node sends a request, 
this request might do a multi-hop between different nodes to reach the right process. 
Furthermore, the processing of the requested task might require some nodes to process 
the task, called processing nodes, and data might be transmitted between some 
intermediate nodes which work as bridges to deliver data to the intended nodes, called 
bridges (hop) nodes. However, security concerns have emerged as a consequence of 
this topology like cooperation will be restricted or sometimes impossible, because 
according to the security concepts, data transmitted between system nodes might be 
restricted, especially if these nodes have different levels of security. One of the most 
widely accepted security models is based on a multi-level security system, in which 
system nodes will be classified according to their security clearances, and provides the 
authority to access data only if the latter has an appropriate classification. Keeping the 
cooperation principles with these systems is extremely difficult, because messaging 
between nodes which have the same security clearance might be impossible if data 
needs to transmit between some intermediate nodes which have been classified with 
greater security clearance.  
One of the main concepts in distributed systems that adopt multiple-level security 
policy is to prevent data transmission from high clearance entity to lower 
clearance [22].    However, in some urgent cases, there is allowance for the data to 
transmit from a high security clearance point to a lower one after review of the data by 
security guard device or a human resource, to ensure there is no spill of sensitive data 
from high to low. This operation requires the use of specialized devices or Meta 
software between these nodes to work as security guards. Indeed, the last solution 
should be done after clustering the system nodes into sub clustering. Each one holds 
the same security clearance nodes, the nodes within the same cluster are connected in 
low security measures, and the data transmitted between the clusters will be controlled 
by security guards. This process is inadequate to deal with the systems that have 
dynamic naturalism as well as facing any incident change during running times, e.g 
updating security methods, auto-reclassifications of nodes and information. 
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1.5 Aim and Objectives   
 
The aim of this study is to propose a security mechanism that can achieve security 
concepts for the decentralised distributed systems that works dynamically in real time, 
while preserving the performance of the whole distributed system network.  
To achieve this security system, the proposed solution should be able to fulfil a high 
level of cooperation through allowing bidirectional connections between nodes, which 
might have different levels of security clearance, and in addition, eliminate the need to 
use Trusted-Computing Based (TCB) [23], which sometimes represents one of the 
major working conditions with systems based on the Multi-level Security System. The 
proposed solution should also allow software to be more flexible and able to be 
understood by separating the security concerns into distinct parts which makes it easy 
to understand and execute, and separates the security from the core functionality. 
Moreover, the system should permit data sharing across system sites while at the same 
time preventing the sites from sharing private data directly, and keeping the data in a 
protected environment during transmissions and sharing processing. 
The main objectives of the thesis are as follows: 
1. To perform detailed background research in the area of distributed system 
security. 
2. To research literature in the field of Aspect-Oriented programming with 
security solutions, access control, cryptography and intrusion detection.  
3. To research literature in the field of security solutions based on MLS without 
using AOP.  
4. Based on our investigation, we identify the challenges, which surround the 
distributed system security. In addition, Identifying the gaps in the existing 
solutions, that proposed to address the security challenges in research area. 
5. To develop an integrated security solution called 3AC_AOP which is a 
combined between three components; access control models, cryptography and 
data sanitization to ensure high integrity and confidentiality of the data 
forwarding and processing through the distributed systems entities. 
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6. To propose a technique for automatically reviewing the data that are transmitted 
between nodes that have different levels of security clearance. 
7. To propose a dynamic technique that improves the performance of the data 
transmission and processing, and is integrated with the AOP technique. 
8. To perform extensive evaluation of the 3AC_AOP by checking that all 
constituent techniques work successfully. 
9. To compare 3AC_AOP against existed solutions, to measure the success and 
performance of 3AC_AOP. 
 
1.6 Contributions and Novelty  
 
This work introduced several novel approaches; in an attempt to tackle this, firstly, the 
work considered the implications of introducing end-to-end security [24] into systems 
designed without it. Point-to-point security is relatively straightforward, but gives a 
significantly weaker result, since it assumes the trustworthiness of all intermediate 
nodes [25]. As we will see in the literature review, some progress has been made on 
how to achieve security and privacy concepts by solving a specific problem, but 
questions remain, especially about the generality of these solutions. The contributions 
and novelty of the thesis are as follows: 
1- Access control model. 
This thesis presents an access control model modularized in both Object-
Oriented Programming (OOP) and AOP. This model is a composition of three 
access control models: 
1- Attribute –Based Access Control (ABAC). 
2- Identity-Based Access Control (IBAC). 
3- Multi-Level Security (MLS).  
All these models are gathered to form a powerful model, starting from ABAC 
as the abstract level of the model and IBAC as the intermediate level, ending 
with MLS as a core level. 
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2- End- to- end security 
The proposed solution deals with end-to-end security after detection of the 
security requirements to accomplish this task. We have combined between 
access control policies and cryptography algorithms to ensure the security and 
integrity of data transmitted between system nodes as well as processing data 
inside the authorized node. 
 
3- Privacy-preservation methodology. 
The proposed solution allows each node to follow the privacy-preservation 
methodologies of dividing the files according to the sensitivity level of the 
information. This division will be translated to aspect pointcuts and advices in 
order to integrate it with the access control model. 
 
4- Domination relationship  
The proposed system has employed a domination relationship, which represents 
a special case in MLS systems in order to achieve high cooperation between 
system nodes. This relationship works from high to low level by granting a high 
security clearance node to send a request to low-level nodes to perform certain 
missions on certain data. This supports the concept that not all information in 
high-level nodes is classified as being high sensitive.   
 
5- AOP security guard 
Adaptation of the domination relationship between system nodes requires 
filtering data between nodes. This thesis presents a novel approach of injecting 
security guards between system nodes called AOP security guards. This guard 
is a bidirectional automatic guard injected between nodes which have different 
security clearance levels. This side of the proposed solution is based on dynamic 
aspect-oriented programing, to arise only if data is forwarded from high to low 
level node, and in cases of processing only.  
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6- Dynamic Multilevel Security System Clustering 
In chapter 6 we present a brief explanation about how we can utilize AOP to 
create a dynamic clustering between the nodes in the distributed system. This 
clustering is based on different security levels in which the neighbour nodes 
within the same level will be in the same security cluster in real time. Thus, 
decrease the cryptography processes between individual nodes and make it 
between clusters. 
 
7- Designed to face incident changes of access control policies 
The proposed solution is designed and developed to face all changes of access 
control policies that might occur during runtime when data is processed or 
transmitted between system nodes. Although the changes of the policy may 
impact on the information and thus cannot guarantee the response of the sent 
request, the proposed methodology guarantees the proper response, even if 
changing policies by keeping the source node ID and applying data sanitization 
methods on the receipt data.  
 
  
1.7 Outline of the Chapters  
 
This thesis is divided into 7 chapters, each covering a specific area of the project work. 
The following outline sections provide an overview for each of the chapters to guide 
the reader through the report.  
Chapter 1 Introduction: This chapter outlines the fundamental elements of this work 
firstly, starting with a brief introduction of these elements following with a short 
clarification of the problem and motivation, followed by aims and objective of this 
research. The novelty and contributions part are also presented in this chapter. Finally, 
this chapter finishes with the thesis structure section. 
Chapter 2 Background: This chapter deals with the proposed system’s elements in 
detail. In fact, there are three main pillars that the proposed system is based on. These 
11 
 
pillars are access control, cryptography and Aspect-oriented programming (AOP). 
With access control, the author presents this part through dealing with some main 
access control models like RBAC, MAC, and DAC. We are dealing with ABAC, IBAC 
and MLS which are considered as the basis of the proposed system. In the cryptography 
part, we deal with cryptography algorithms of types symmetric and asymmetric. The 
final part of this chapter is focused on aspect-oriented programming, through 
highlighting the components of this language tool, how it works, and how to apply it to 
the code body. 
Chapter 3 Related Works: This chapter navigates with three main security fields that 
have been designed and developed by Aspect-oriented programming languages. These 
fields are access control, intrusion detection, and cryptography. Although these files 
share the same concept of ensuring the security in application systems, they differ on 
the technical side of how to apply to these systems. This chapter has concentrated on 
the varieties and methods which have adopted AOP as a tool to insert the security and 
privacy concept on different systems. 
Chapter 4 Proposed System: This chapter focuses on the proposed solution by dealing 
with access control model, cryptography model, and AOP security guard model. All 
methodologies, algorithms, and designs are presented in detail to show the benefit of 
using these models and what are the positive impacts of aggregating all these models 
to produce a powerful security and privacy model.  
Chapter 5 implementation of the proposed solution: This chapter details the technical 
side of the proposed solution. It starts with a clarification of the distributed system that 
has been adopted, on which to apply the proposed solutions. Afterwards, we explain 
how to convert access control models from Object-Oriented programming to be treated 
as pointcuts and aspect advice with Aspect-Oriented Programming, followed by the 
cryptography method and AOP guard.  This chapter includes snapshots of the original 
code and of AspectJ codes for all methodologies, as well as many algorithms which 
give the proposed solution more generality if we try to apply them by using different 
programming languages. 
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Chapter 6 Evaluation and comparing with existing solutions: This chapter shows the 
evaluation results of the proposed solution. Both OOP and AOP are used as a base for 
comparing the run time performance. Finally, this chapter finishes with comparing 
studies between proposed system results, and existing system. 
Chapter 7 Conclusion and future works: This chapter covers the whole project and 
reviews the findings. It also outlines future work that can be done to improve the 
project. 
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Chapter 2  
Background 
   
This chapter provides a background of the fundamental elements which represent the 
infrastructure of the proposed system. Firstly, this chapter begins with the environment 
that we used to apply the proposed solution which is distributed systems and especially 
decentralized distributed system (DDS). The second part of this chapter focuses on 
security and privacy methodologies, starting with a brief explanation of the security 
concepts and ending by dealing with the most accepted solutions of security, which are 
cryptography and access control. With cryptography, this chapter presents the main 
algorithm types, and with access control models presents the main access control 
models as well as a detailed explanation of the access control models which are the 
basis of the proposal access control model. Furthermore, the data sanitization method 
is presented in this chapter. Finally, the aspect-oriented programming is explained in 
detail including most topics related to this powerful language tool.  
2.1 Distributed system  
 
Many definitions have been used to define distributed system concepts, the most 
acceptable to the author is the definition by A. Tanenbaum and M. Steen [26] when 
they defined the distributed system as: 
“A distributed system is a collection of independent computers that appears to its users 
as a single coherent system.” 
This is exactly what the thesis is based on. Each node (machine, computer) is a fully 
autonomous node which has the ability to run and implement its own function 
independently, in addition to communicating with other nodes in the system. The 
intercommunication between system nodes enables the users of each node to feel that 
he/she works with only a single system. In practice, there are various layers between 
the user and the system being worked, these layers are called middleware and will be 
hidden from the users, making these systems relatively more easy to use [26].  
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In spite  of the fact that each machine in a distributed system is an independent machine, 
this does not prevent the fact that some distributed system’s machines are controlled 
by the same server to act and use the facilities of the connected machines to achieve 
the system goals. This will create a kind of confusion over the concept of independence, 
and these systems are called a centralized distributed system. Some distributed systems 
however, have enjoyed high independence though their machines have been designed 
to hold both statuses (client/server) all together, to create what is called a decentralized 
distributed system. There are four fundamental objectives which should be available in 
distributed systems and these are: resource accessibility, transparency, openness and 
scalability [26].  
2.1.1 Types of distributed systems 
 
1. Distributed computing system 
This type of distributed system is used to handle complex tasks because of its high 
performance systems.  The computational task will be divided into sub tasks and each 
will be processed by one or a group of machines to achieve a high level of efficiency 
[27]. For example, cluster computing networks, where each connected node within the 
clustering has the same operating system and shares the hardware, in order to create a 
high or super speed local-area network however, with grid computing, which is the 
second example of distributed computing, the structure is quite different. The 
individual nodes or groups will be constructed as a federation of computer systems in 
which each system might follow different domains, and thus might be dealing with 
various hardware and software [26].  
2. Distributed information system 
This type is utilizing the distributed computing systems to control and run data 
resources between the communication machines. Indeed, it is a combination of   
software that runs the data and hardware that runs the data storages and 
telecommunication  network [28]. All these fundamental elements are gathered to prop 
up the cooperation, coordination, decision making and more distributed system 
objectives[29]. Generally, these systems represent the backbone of our digital life by 
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controlling most applications around use in automated or even manual processes; for 
this reason human resources are considered as a component of these systems associated 
with data, software, hardware, process and networking [30].   
 
2.1.2 Naturalism of Distributed System   Communications   
1. Decentralized Distributed System  
It is a distributed system in which the control and management will be distributed over 
nodes [30]. Decentralized systems provide a high level of autonomy for the system 
nodes to deal with their own data and software, without taking into account the impact 
on other system nodes. In other words, each node or a certain group of nodes will be 
under their own responsibilities, and own business destiny; for this reason, these 
systems are considered of high reliability. Moreover, DDS are more flexible and 
scalable than centralized distributed systems and any fault in any system node will not 
stop the whole system working [31]. The most observed example of these systems is 
unstructured peer-peer network such that each node within the network has connections 
with one or some nodes (neighbours). Some algorithms are used to control sharing files 
and searching tasks between the peers, and the data and queries will be flooded between 
the distributed peers to accomplish a specific task. Enforcing security policy over these 
systems is a major mission, facing scale-up problems, and autonomy for each node to 
change and update their software and policies will demand the security procedures to 
keep up with the changes. Figure 2.1-B- shows an example of these distributed systems. 
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Figure 2.1. A- Centralized Distributed System, B- Decentralized Distributed System 
2. Centralized Distributed System. 
Contrary to the Decentralized Distributed System, these systems show more 
dependence on a central controller [31]. It is most popular because it is the easiest to 
be controllable, manageable, and maintainable because running and controlling tasks 
will be located in the central core. Many websites and enterprises adopt it, for example 
Facebook, Twitter and some other chatting applications in which there are servers 
controlling the communications and messaging between clients. A simple example of 
this type is a socket program (client-server) and multiple clients with one server, in 
which the server works as a communication bridge to satisfy the required messages and 
communication between clients. Applying security within these systems will be easier 
if comparing with the decentralized one, because the majority of these policies will be 
held in the server and the clients should follow any changing or updating in future.  
Figure 2.1A shows how the terminals are connected with the central point, to control 
the messages and communication services. 
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2.2 Distributed System Security 
In order to increase the trustworthiness between distributed system nodes and the users 
within the distributed system, the availability of security principles should be 
considered. Although adding a security represents the most challenging task because 
of the difficulty of controlling and running different security policies throughout the 
distributed system’s nodes. Security concerns in distributed systems have two main 
parts. The first part concentrates on securing the communication channels between 
system nodes. The best mechanism to deal with this part is to use cryptography 
algorithms to ensure the integrity of data transmitted between communication channels. 
The second part is the authorizations, in which accessing data resources will be granted 
only to the nodes which have the right authentication to use these resources. The 
mechanism that is used to deal with this part is called access control, and the access to 
data resources will be controlled by different access control policies. Recently, the 
research direct to the way that use cryptography to enforce access control or mixing 
between them[32], [33]. 
Instead of cryptography algorithms, access control models are the most popular 
solutions to deal with distributed system security, but this will add extra heaviness upon 
the system as well as the variety of applying these solutions on distributed systems. For 
this reason, many different access control models and various cryptography algorithms 
are adopted just to decrease the negative impact of using these optimal security 
solutions. In different sections within this chapter we deal with access control and 
cryptography in more detail, to prepare the entry to the design chapter which shows 
how we adopted these solutions to enforce security and privacy concepts in distributed 
systems. 
 
2.3 Cryptography 
 
Cryptography is a mathematical method applied to a plain text (clear, organized text) 
to transmit it to a cipher text (unclear, disorganized text). Cryptology is classified into 
two subjects. Cryptography which deals with designing of the cryptosystem, and in 
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contrast cryptanalysis used to break the cryptosystem [13].  One definition of 
cryptography [34] is “Cryptography is the hiding of and exchanging of information or 
data which is not in readable form over a public or private network”. In my opinion, 
we partially agree with this definition when the author said exchanging the information 
would  make it unreadable. However, to say “hiding of” does not make sense, because 
to hide anything we need a cover, and the cover must be clear and as visual as possible 
to prevent the phishers from doubting that there is something which has been hidden 
by this cover; this is what is called Steganography.  
The historical background of cryptography dates back centuries to when Julius Caesar’s 
letters were encrypted, by writing D for A, E for B and so on. After that, the Arabs 
generalized the idea to monoalphabetic substitution [13]. In the past the main reason 
for using this art is to protect the transmitted messages between sender and receiver 
from any kind of attacker or eavesdroppers especially in military cases.  
Presently, the main reason is still with an additional extra motivation to face the 
challenges of data protection in WWW. We have listed some objectives that cryptology 
includes to create them: 
Confidentiality: is to ensure data remains private and the eavesdropper cannot 
understand the content of it. This principle, applied to both transmitted message and 
stored data is to protect them from illegal access [35].  
Integrity: To ensure that the receiver will receive the message without any modification 
and alteration which can happen through message transmission [36].  
Authentication: To ensure that information came from the authenticated party. In other 
words, the receiver will recognize that the information is coming from the expected 
source and not from somebody else. This possibility is equivalent to a signature 
[35][36].   
Non- repudiation: It proves that the sender has really sent the message that the sender 
denies having sent [35][36]. 
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2.3.1 Type of Cryptography Algorithms 
 
There are two main common types of cryptography 1) Secret Key Cryptography which 
is also known as Symmetric Key Cryptography and 2) Public Key Cryptography which 
is also known as Asymmetric Key Cryptography. In the next subsection, we will 
discuss each type individually and review the advantages and disadvantages of each.  
1. Symmetric Cryptography     
What distinguishes this type is both sender and receiver sharing the same key. In other 
words, the sender encrypts the message by using a key and sends the encrypted message 
to the receiver, which in turn decrypts it by using the same key. This type is known as 
a classical cryptography in which the key may be identical or there may be a simple 
transformation to go between the two keys [37]. 
 Given an alphabet A we define A∗ to be the set of all strings over A. In order to define 
a cryptosystem, we require a collection of sets: 
                 A = plaintext alphabet                        A′ = ciphertext alphabet 
                 M = plaintext space                            C = ciphertext space 
                 K = (plaintext) keyspace                    K′ = (ciphertext) keyspace 
Where M is a subset of A∗, C is a subset of A′∗, and K and K′ are sets which are 
generally strings of fixed finite length over some alphabets (e.g. An or A′n). A 
cryptosystem or encryption scheme is a pair (E,D) of maps 
E : K ×M−→ C 
D : K′× C −→M 
such that for each K in K there exists a K′ in K′ such that 
D(K′,E(K,M)) = M 
for all M in M. We write EK for the map E(K, ・) :M→ C and similarly write DK′ for 
D(K′, ・) : C →M. With this notation the condition on E, D, K and K′ is that DK′ ◦EK 
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Indeed, Symmetric key algorithms are quicker than asymmetric key algorithms and 
most commonly used for encryption [36].  It is easier however to break  them than the 
asymmetric ones. Moreover, there is a problem of the distribution of the symmetric key 
to be shared between Alice and Bob [38]. To solve this problem, a trusted key 
distribution center (KDC) has been suggested to manage the key distribution process. 
Figure 2.2 shows the symmetric Cryptography and Key Distribution.    
 
 
 
Figure 2.2.Symmetric Cryptography and Key Distribution 
2. Asymmetric Cryptography  
Also known as public key cryptography, this refers to the concept of this kind of 
cryptographic algorithm which depends on key pairs: one public key and one private 
key; both are required for the encryption and decryption process respectively[36][38]. 
Diffie and Hellman in 1976 came up with this method to fill the weakness gaps of 
symmetric cryptography, which are the distribution of the key and the concept of a 
digital signature [39]. 
The principle of this type of cryptography is: the sender encrypts the message using the 
receiver public key (published key), while the receiver decrypts the message using his 
private key (hidden key).  The mathematical definition of this type is: 
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DEFINITION 
1. A set K called the key space whose elements are called keys. 
 2. A rule by which each k ∈ K is associated with a trap-door one-way function Ek with domain 
Mk (the plaintext space) and range Ck (the ciphertext space). 
 3. A procedure for generating a random key k ∈ K together with a trap-door d for Ek and the 
inverse map Dk : Ck −→ Mk such that Dk(Ek(m)) = m, for all m ∈ Mk [40].  
Figure 2.3 shows Asymmetric Cryptography and Key Distribution. 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Asymmetric Cryptography and Key Distribution 
2.4 Data Sanitization  
 
Data sanitization is a method used to clean and remove data that has been classified as 
highly sensitive from the documents, to produce clean documents which can be 
released after making sure the documents are free of sensitive information. Data 
sanitization has different shapes and methodologies even if all sharing the same 
objectives, and is how to keep sensitive information on the safe side. Some of these 
methods are implemented normally, like when someone has a document which includes 
sensitive information, he/she would use a correction ink or any bold dark colour pen to 
strike off the sensitive information characters before sending to publishing. These 
methods are however not 100% practicable because, by using some chemical liquid, 
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the receiver can just clean the covering bold to distinguish the original information. 
The best way to solve this problem, is to do what we mentioned, as well as using sticky 
tape over the data without sending the original, but photocopy the result document and 
send the cloned version. In this case, the secret risk to discover the sensitive data will 
be minor especially if we use a very dark colour pen [41]. 
In a digital world, data sanitization has sanitization methods not too much different 
from the manual ones but it’s a more difficult task. Redaction, which is one of the 
computational sanitization methods and provides a way to sanitize information in 
different aspects, for example in the context of security protection using cryptography 
algorithms to protect the information [42]. In the context of privacy preservation using 
anonymity methodologies, as well as data masking, has been adopted in Oracle 
Database since 11g as shown in Figure 2.4, or can erase data from a hard disk as well. 
Similarly, as in manual methods however, there are some anti-sanitization methods 
used to retrieve sensitive information after sanitization is done. Unfortunately, some 
software products’ features can be used as a tool to recover (anti sanitization) the 
sensitive information after sanitization. For example, about what happened in May 
2005 when a US military report was talking about the death of an Italian secret agent 
called Nicola Calipari [43]. This report had been published after the name had been 
sanitized using commercial software and the publishing version was PDF format. 
Unfortunately, the publisher after a while discovered that the black portion (an agent’s 
name) can be removed by just copying this part and pasting into the word processor.  
For this reason, dealing with such software should be more careful to discover all 
powerful and weak points before using this as a reliable sanitization software [44]. 
 In the proposed solution, a sanitization method has been adopted to do the filtering and 
removing of sensitive information from the data which has been transferred to the node, 
classified as lower than the sender nodes.  
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Figure 2.4. Data anonymization   
2.5 Privacy 
 
Privacy enforcement is an essential issue especially for applications that deal with 
sharing data such as health care, security, financial and other applications which deal 
with sensitive data [16]. V. Safanov [45] used the common definition of privacy, 
“Privacy is the ability of an individual or group to keep their lives and personal affairs 
out of public view, or to control the flow of information about themselves”. He 
considered that privacy is one of the main pillars of trustworthy computing (TWC). 
Many governments, corporations and organizations wish to create an interface that 
collects databases to achieve a high level of knowledge base to find accurate results 
and help in making a right decision [17]. The aggregation of databases however, will 
put the privacy of data stored in the database in a precarious position. Many methods, 
algorithms and models can be used to achieve privacy for applications, which share 
their resources. The most important two methods used however for enforcing privacy 
are anonymization and cryptography [18]. The highlight topic that privacy preservation 
revolves around is Privacy Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP), which is a method for 
for publishing data in an untrusted environment, while at the same time keeping it 
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practically useful while individual privacy is preserved [46] [47].  Figure 2.5 shows 
data collection and data publishing in database system. 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Data collection and data publishing [48]  
 
2.5.1 Tables and Attributes  
 
A database can be represented as a table or collection of tables which either have a 
relationship between them, or are stored separately in a storage device. These tables 
have the ability to save the information in different files and formats. The dominant 
purpose of a database table however is to store binary information. The attributes 
(columns) of database tables are the linchpin which is surrounded by privacy issues. 
All the privacy preservation methods agreed to divide the attributes of the table into 
four different types of attributes, taking into consideration the probability of all of these 
types not being present in the same table.  
Identifiers (I): There are some attributes that fully and distinctly lead to identify a 
person. These attributes, also called identical attributes, include SSN, passport number 
and full name; such attributes are removed before publishing. In some cases, [49], more 
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than one identifier is required to uniquely identify the individual. For example, the 
name “John Smith” is a popular name and appears hundreds of times in the searching 
of public telephone directories in a certain city, however, combined with a telephone 
number, the individual can be more easily identified uniquely [49]. 
 Quasi-identifiers (QID): Types of attributes used with some extra knowledge to do 
some statistics, analysis and linking process with the anonymized table in order to 
uniquely identify individuals. These attributes are not less dangerous than the 
identifiers, because they are used to narrow the range of searching and thus, release the 
information for individuals or groups. Example of these attributes are, postcode, 
gender, age, religion and so on. Sweeney [49]’s study showed 87% of the US 
population can probably be directly identified by using only the QID ( zip code, gender, 
age). The major dilemma here is the data publisher’s decision to establish which 
attributes should be treated at quasi-identifiers, because adding too many attributes will 
impact the data utility, while too little will increase the risk to the privacy of the 
individuals [49].  
Sensitive attribute(S): These attributes have a sensitive value for the individuals, for 
example, diseases, salary and so on [50]. 
Non-sensitive attributes (NS): after having classified the table into identifiers, quasi-
identifiers and sensitive attributes, the rest of the attributes represent the non-sensitive 
attributes [51]. 
For the general form of PPDP, the data publisher has a table of the form 
D( Identifiers, Quasi-identifiers, Sensitive-attribute, Non-sensitive-attributes) [52].  
 
 
2.6 Access Control Models 
 
Access control (AC) which may also be referred to as authorization, is a mechanism 
used to coordinate and control the interactions between the users and data resources in 
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a way that only authorized users are allowed access to these resources [53]. Access 
control has been broadly used to organize the dealings with different sides in our life, 
for example controlling the access of employees to their offices within enterprises when 
the employer’s ID card represents the access clearance of the employers and so on. In 
a context of computer and system application, access control represents the backbone 
of much security software such as in database management systems, where the need 
for access control is essential to give authorization for the user to access only what they 
are allowed to access, otherwise the access will be denied. In some systems which are 
based on working on sensitive data, like the healthcare system, access control is very 
important to preserve the privacy of patient's records and thereby increase the 
recommendations of the system. By using user name and password or sometimes with 
more security steps, the user can have access to data resources to do his/her own 
authorization actions, according to access control policy [54]. 
There are many access control models that have been used in past decades and 
currently. In this section we will discuss briefly the main access control models: Role-
Based Access Control (RBAC), Discretionary-Based Access Control (DBAC), 
Mandatory-Based Access Control (MBAC), and finally we finish this section with 
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) and Identity-Based Access Control (IBAC) 
which represents the pivot of the proposed work. 
2.6.1 Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)  
 
RBAC is an approach based on restricting access to data resources according to the 
roles of the user, which gives him/her a privilege that authorizes them access to the 
permitted resource only. The user’s role is the main concept of this model and can be 
seen as a user’s job within an enterprise or organization. Giving permission by 
assigning privileges to the user is totally based on the user’s job duties or qualifications. 
Roles is the intermediate layer between the users and data resources [55]. Permission 
is updatable by increasing or decreasing the limitation according to changes in users’ 
roles. Roles can be seen as a group of transactions associated with data items in which 
each role is assigned by an individual’s organisation membership. The RBAC concept 
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can be represented as a many-to-many relationship between subjects and data 
resources [56].  
What distinguishes this model from another is it is the easiest way of achieving integrity 
and availability of the system by explicitly controlling access to resources, as well as 
how access can occur [57]. RBAC was founded to decrease the administration 
difficulties which occur when dealing with large and commercial organizations, when 
sometimes using DAC or MAC may not be an appropriate option to apply access 
control policy [58]. Hu Vincent and others described RBAC in detail through present 
RBAC terminologies which are Object, Operations, Permissions, Roles, User, Group, 
Constraint, Session and Role Hierarchy.  Objects, user(s), permissions and roles 
represent the pillars that the model is based on, and the rest of the terminologies are 
used to organize the model working [59].  
For example, in the context of the organization, when the user U tries to access an 
object O to do a specific operation OP, then the procedure will take these steps: 
1- U will open a session with the role in order to map him to his assigned roles  
2- Roles will assign u to a certain privileges pr. 
3-  According to this assignment, will detect U’s permission and the ability to 
perform   the operation op upon objects. 
Figure 2.6 shows the interactions of RBAC’s components.  
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Figure 2.6. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)[60] 
2.6.2 Discretionary Access Control (DAC) 
 
DAC is one of the common access control models. This model adopts an object’s 
ownership relation in which the owner of the object is responsible to grant access 
permissions to the subject, thereby the subject with a given discretionary access to a 
data resource has the ability to pass the access to another subject [56]. Many operation 
systems have adopted this principle of access control model like UNIX, Windows2000, 
and FreeBSD. In fact, this mode is based on implementing the Access Control Matrix, 
which can be seen as a three-dimensional matrix where rows are subjects, columns are 
objects and the mapping between them represents the permission that the subject has 
over the object [57]. Despite the high reliability of DAC, the latter may be vulnerable 
to an intensive risk, coming especially from the user. For example, the user can violate 
the other’s right, like the classical “chmod 777” which gives permission to anyone in 
Unix/Linux system. Moreover, the problem of transactive read access, when a user A 
has a permission to read a user B’s file because the latter has gave him this permission, 
there is not 100% assurance that user A is trusted.  In other words, user A can copy a 
file’s contents  and save it in a different name, thus giving the other  user a right to 
access this file, considering that user A is the original owner [58].  
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Finally, this model is not designed for dealing with big systems which have large 
numbers of users and objects, the Access Control Matrix will be huge and this leads to 
the system maintenance becoming enormously difficult, because it deals with a large 
number of users having varying access rights to their own resources [57]. 
 
2.6.3 Mandatory Access Control (MAC) 
 
MAC is widespread in systems which have adopted Multi-level Security access control 
as a working base. Basically, this model is associated with the Bell-LaPadulla Model 
[61]. This model restricts the access allowance based on the subject’s clearance and 
object’s classifications. In other words, the security for both subjects and object will be 
divided into four main levels: Top-secret (TS), Secret (S), Classified (C), and 
Unclassified (U) in which TS > S > C > U [1]. The security level which is related to a 
subject is called clearance and that which is associated with objects is called 
classification. Accessing from subjects to objects will be controlled in a way that 
prevents a low level subject from viewing a high-level object, thereby preventing 
information from spilling [58] 
Data flow in this model is one-directional from low level to high level and not vice 
versa. In this model users have no authority to organize the access to data like DAC, 
but the security policy of this model is totally controlled by the security policy 
administrator [62]. In our view, the strategy of the inventory dealing with data by only 
a security policy administrator will increase the reliably of the system.  Through 
restricting the access law to one person, this is better than scattering this law between 
different system users, which may lead to a rise in tangling as well as exposing the data 
to illegally disclosed risks. 
The main principles of this model can be seen through two properties [62]:   
Simple Security Property: restrict reading by a subject s to an object o only and only if 
the security level of subject is greater than or equal to the security classification level 
of an object, SL (s) ≥ SL (o) where SL=Security level. 
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*-Property: restrict writing by a subject s to an object o only and only if the security 
level of subject is lower than or equal to the security classification level of an object, 
SL (s) ≤ SL (o). 
For more information about this model, the reader can see the Multi-level Security 
section, where this model is discussed in more detail. 
2.6.4 Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) 
 
ABAC is the model where the direction of accessing rights to the data resources is 
totally restricted to the attributes of objects (requestor), subjects (distention), service 
and sometimes even the attribute of system environment [56]. The National Institute of 
Standard and Technology (NIST) SP 800-162 [59] has defined Attribute Based Access 
Control (ABAC) as: 
“ Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC): An access control method where 
subject requests to perform operations on objects are granted or denied based 
on assigned attributes of the subject, assigned attributes of the object, 
environment conditions, and a set of policies that are specified in terms of 
those attributes and conditions ”  
Given the importance of this model in the proposed system, we will be dealing with it 
in more detail than others because it is the kernel of the proposed system. The core of 
this model incudes some categories used to classify model attributes see Figure 2.7, 
these categories are [63]:  
User Attribute: this is the attribute related to the subject, and may include name, 
age, office number, job title…and so on. In fact, these attributes are divided into 
two sets, static attribute like name and gender, and dynamic attributes like age, 
office number, job title and so forth. 
 
Object Attributes: Attributes of data resource of the system. May include the 
attribute of meta-data of the objects like the file creator, modify date, file size 
and so on, or the attribute of the contents like the columns address in database 
tables.  
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Environmental Attributes: These attributes come from measuring the state of 
system environments currently; for example, CPU usage, day of the week, 
current time and so on. 
 
Connection Attributes: these attributes express the current connection session 
of the user like IP address, physical location. 
 
Administrative Attributes: Attributes have been set manually by an 
administrator. These attributes will be enforced to the whole system, for 
example a threat level, minimum trust level and the like.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7. Attribute-based access control model[59] 
Other aspects of the component of the model are [62]: 
users (U), subjects (S), objects (O), user attributes (UA), subject attributes (SA), object 
attributes (OA), permissions (P), authorization policies, and constraint checking 
policies for creating and modifying subject and object attributes. In which U associates 
with a set UA and S is created by U to do some actions in the system. Each S in turn is 
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associated with a set of SA. O is the data resource which needs to be protected, Each 
O is also associated with OA. Giving P from the system administrator to the subject to 
access required objects is totally dependent on the relationship between these two 
components and what the matching level of their attributes are.   
2.6.5 Identity-Based Access Control (IBAC) 
 
IBAC is an access control model which is used to restrict access to the data source only 
to the authorized user or group of users who have the intended identity. The identity 
here means the id of the user or job title or what service provider, or anything that 
makes the user unique from other users or group of users; different from other groups 
if we take the nature of the work as a basis for identification. IBAC has been defined 
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in source: SP 800-53; 
CNSSI-4009 as [64]: 
“Access control based on the identity of the user (typically relayed as a characteristic 
of the process acting on behalf of that user) where access authorizations to specific 
objects are assigned based on user identity”  
In the proposal system we used Identity-Based Access Control (IBAC) as the second 
layer between the Attribute-based access control (ABAC) and multilevel security 
(MLS) to achieve a high level of accuracy through directing data to the intended nodes 
only in distributed application environments. 
2.7 Multi-Level Security (MLS) 
 
Despite many of the security policies having been suggested in the past and present, 
the Multi-Level Security (MLS) policy remains the pioneer in terms of its adaptation 
by the highly sensitive system. The Department of Defence (DoD) in U.S [65] has 
adopted this type of security policy for having a high capability to deal with both the 
data on one side and the users on another side. MLS systems depend on data by giving 
it different labels according to its degree of sensitivity, and users through giving them 
different clearances according to their sensitive position within the enterprise. Through 
these divisions, access to the data will be restricted according to the data and the user 
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who wants to deals with it. Therefore, even the functions (read/write) will be restricted 
according to users' classifications. 
According to DoD and some other organizations which adopt MLS, the user will be 
assigned to one of the four clearances (Top Secret, Secret, Classified, Unclassified); in 
contrast, data will be assigned to one of the four labels (Top Secret, Secret, Classified, 
Unclassified). The general idea of these classifications is that each user who has a 
specific clearance can have access to the data which has the same level or lower. The 
function of this access is (read/write) in the case where user and data have the same 
level, and moving to read only in the case where a user has a higher level than data, as 
shown in Figure 2.8. 
 
Figure 2.8. Function permissions between the users and data in MLS  
 Although this type of security policy is popular among other policies, this does not 
prevent the presence of a dark side. Indeed, there are many problems that can be 
represented through restriction of data flow between systems entities and poor data 
integrity; there is no 100% guarantee that the data will not be leaked, as well as the 
possibility of attacks (i.e. Trojan horse)[65]. In this chapter, we review MLS models, 
deal with the classification of DoD for both data and users, and discuss the drawbacks 
of these models and what is the most acceptable solution.  
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2.7.1 Security classification and clearance  
 
As we mentioned before, the object side of the MLS models will take one level of 
security (T, S, C, U). Sometimes the unclassified level does not appear in security levels 
set on the ground, in that if the information does not occupy any from the first three 
security levels, we already consider it as unclassified. The simple hierarchy of security 
levels is shown in Figure 2.9. The arrows in the Figure refer to the direction of data 
flow of MLS: form “low level” to “high level” and not vice versa. 
 
Figure 2.9. Security and Classifications Levels 
The Government of Canada (GOC), see Table 1 has classified information in a sensitive 
category, where an unauthorized reveal can be defined in terms of national injury, and 
applying the Protected type where the injury is defined according to a person or 
organization [66].  
Table 1 GOC information Sensitive [66]  
Information Sensitivity Classified 
(i.e. National 
interest)  
Protected 
 (i.e. Individual or 
Organization) 
Unauthorized disclosure 
could cause exceptionally 
grave injury 
Top Secret Protected C 
Unauthorized disclosure 
could cause exceptionally 
serious injury 
Secret Protected B 
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Unauthorized disclosure 
reasonably expected to cause 
injury 
Confidential Protected A 
 
Clearance Level refers to the trustworthiness level which has been given to a person 
with a security clearance, or a computer system which processes classified information, 
or a storage device which has been physically secured for storing classified 
information.  
Classification level refers to the level of sensitivity of information. These levels will be 
associated with the information in different formats like document or computer files. 
Disclosure of this information could cause a national disaster, according to the 
sensitivity level of this information.    
Security level is a term referring to either a clearance level or a classification level [67] 
The sensitivity of the information will be labelled and mapped to an appropriate 
domain, which represents the security level of the object. Domains can be broken down 
by caveats, which are levels of sensitivities restricted to access by specific groups or 
categories. According to GOC, domains are classified as Top Secret, Secret, 
Designated and Unclassified [67]. 
2.7.2 Bell-La Padula Model  
 
This is a distribution of a “mathematical model of security in computer systems”. In 
the early seventies of the last century, Len La Padula and David Elliot Bell were asked 
by the MITRE Corporation to produce a report entitled “Secure Computer Systems”. 
They produced a security model called after them:  the Bell-La Padula model [67]. This 
model is widely used in MLS systems, because of its potential to cover the 
fundamentals of the access restrictions that are used in MLS systems [68].  
The basics of the Bell-La Padula model’s working falls into two terminologies: subjects 
which represent processes and programs (active elements of the system that execute 
actions), dealing with objects which form information resources like files, I/O devices, 
messages and so on. Both subjects and objects carry security labels, in subjects these 
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are called clearance levels and in objects they are called classification levels of 
information. Permissible access is controlled by the relationship and the matching 
between subject’s clearance and object’s classification, therefore the access matrix will 
show how the subject is allowed to get the object according to the level matching 
relationship [69].   The operations which are to be applied by subjects to objects is 
called the access mode and include {read, write, execute, append}. MLS access 
restrictions are enforced by the Bell-La Padula model, through implementing the 
following properties and rules:   
 Simple Security Property: 
An access mode {read} can only be done if a subject clearance is higher than or equal 
to the object’s classification. For example, a subject with a Classified clearance cannot 
access (read) an object with a Secret or Top-Secret classification. This rule is called 
“No read-up” [70] 
 *-Property: 
An access mode {write} can only be done if a subject’s security clearance is lower or 
the same as the object’s classification. It is a way of preventing write-down actions 
happening when these are allowed. For example, a subject with a Top-Secret clearance 
cannot write an email to an object with a Secret classification. This rule is called “No 
write-down” [71]. 
Now both properties are obvious: the simple security property prohibits users from 
reading data with classification over the top user’s clearance “read-up”, at the same 
time it prevents “read down” which means reading data which has the same 
classification or lower than the user’s clearance [68]; while *-property will restrict the 
higher clearance users from passing their sensitive data (high classification) to the users 
who don’t have  suitable clearance [68]. Enforcing these two properties will help to 
protect systems from a Trojan horse, such as leaking information or OS viruses [71].  
The two principles “No read-up” and “No write-down” can be represented by the 
domination relationship as follows [72]:  
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We call class A as dominating Class B if the security clearance of Class A is greater 
than or equal to security clearance of Class B.  
We call class A as being dominated by Class B if the security clearance of Class A is 
lower than security clearance of Class B.  
Figure.2.10 shows the accessing operation from subjects to objects using different 
security levels. 
 
Figure 2.10. Information Flow and Domination Relationship in MLS [60]. 
Although both properties are used in BLM, both properties are also in need of support 
by two extra rules and properties, to control the data flow between MLS system 
applications. These properties are: 
Strong Tranquility Property: which mean no changing of security label will happen 
during system work [73]. 
Weak Tranquility Property: which mean no changing of security labels in a way that 
are inconsistent with the defined security properties [73].  
2.7.3 Biba Model 
 
 Sometimes the security model focuses on one of the security principles (validity, 
confidentiality and integrity) at the expense of the others. For example, BLM 
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concentrates on confidentiality at the expenses of integrity, because there is a “No write 
down” rule but no “No write up” rule. In this case for example, the subject with a Secret 
clearance can write to a Top secret classification object; therefore, this may lead to 
corrupting the system object if the lower subjects try to distort higher security 
objects [74].  
The Biba model addresses this problem by using two simple rules: 
 
 Simple Integrity Axiom:  
A subject with a specific clearance cannot read data at a lower classification level. This 
is called “No read down”. This will protect the integrity of the system through restricted 
access of the subject to information at a lower integrity level1 and thus prevent bad 
information from moving up from lower integrity levels [74]. 
 *Integrity Axiom:    
A subject with a specific clearance cannot write data at a higher classification level. 
This is called “No write up”. This will protect the integrity of the system through 
preventing passing information up to a higher integrity level [74]. 
2.7.4 Lattice –Based Access control  
 
This type of access control is used to control the security in complex environments. 
There are lower and upper limits implemented by the system to organize the 
relationship between the subjects and objects. Depending on the need of the subject, 
the lattice model allows reaching the higher and lower data classification of the object, 
and the security clearance that is assigned to the object. Access operations are based on 
two bounds, greatest lower bound (GLB) and least upper bound (LUB) which are used 
by the subject to access the object on their lattice position[75].  
                                                          
1 Integrity level is a terminology which has two meanings: integrity level of a subject which means the 
trustworthiness level of the subject and integrity level of an object meaning the trust level that can be 
assigned on the information stored in the object [74] 
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2.7.5 Restriction Marking  
 
In order to strengthen the restriction and make the subject achieve the appropriate 
objects only, some organizations have introduced new markings to classify their 
subjects and objects more deeply.  These markings play an important role associated 
with the hierarchical security levels to customize the general meaning of MLS’s 
concepts. In the following we review some of these markings and show how they affect 
the accessing restriction, while at the same time keeping the main principles of MLS 
rules. 
 Compartments     
This is additional marking associated with the security level for both subjects 
and objects. For example, if a file with a specific security level has one or more 
compartments, in addition the subject’s security level must meet the file’s 
security level, and the subject should include the same compartments of the file 
to achieve full accessing, or otherwise the subject won’t be able to read the file 
[68]. This type of marking is used widely in the relational directed graph called 
a lattice [68]. For example, suppose we have two objects Obj1 and Obj2, both 
have a security clearance Secret and Top Secret respectively, and let C have a 
compartment set  such that C={Black, White, Grey}; the  data flow between 
system and object must be treated with the flowing formula: 
Let AB is a data flow relationship, such that we say that information is 
flowing from A to B and this is accomplished if Bcompartments  subset of 
Acompartments as illustrated in Figure 2.11. 
“Need-to-know” (NTK): is the ability applied when the subject has been granted access 
to a piece of information to perform some processing on it. This concept is enforced 
with Mandatory or Discretionary Access Control [76]. 
“Right-to-know” (RTK): is the general ability of a subject to get partial or total access 
to a specific object, according to matching between the subject’s clearance and object’s 
classification. This concept is widely used with Mandatory Access Control [76]. 
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Figure 2.11. Compartments in MLS  
 
2.7.6 Reference monitoring  
 
This is a concept based on the relationship that allows system entities called subjects 
to make reference to other passive entities called objects, depending on the access 
authorization between both. A security kernel is used to prove the concept of reference 
monitoring through ensuring that every change comes on authorization, or any 
reference by subject to object must go through Reference Monitoring [78]. T. Jaeger 
[79] defined the reference monitoring concept as: a design requirement used to organize 
the referencing mechanism in the system and control the accessing between subjects 
associated with specific authorization levels and the ability to run some operations 
(read, write… ) on the objects within the system, as illustrated in Figure 2.12 
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Figure 2.12. Reference Monitoring 
 
2.7.7 Trusted Computing Based  
 
This is a collection of all security and protection mechanisms within a computer system 
and this includes hardware, software, controls and processing; all these elements are 
combined to be responsible in enforcing the security policy over the system [78]. The 
TCB is responsible for satisfying both integrity and confidentiality of security 
requirements as well as monitoring four fundamental system functions [80]: 
 Input/output operations: is a monitoring of I/O operations through previewing 
the outermost and determining which appropriate security protection it may 
need.   
 Execution domain switching: is monitoring of different invocations between 
entities working in different security domains. 
 Memory protection: is a memory reference monitoring in order to ensure 
integrity and confidentiality of storage device. 
 Process activation: is a monitoring of different system processing actions like 
registration, process status information and access file lists as these activations 
are considered vulnerable points in multiprogramming environments. 
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2.7.8 Multi-level Security Problems 
 
Despite precautions taken by MLS systems, this does not however guarantee 100% that 
the information will not be leaked. Indeed, these systems may be suffering from some 
intended or non-intended misuse which leads to serious ramifications through 
threatening national security in terms of the government’s systems, or lost files or even 
breakdown of systems at the level of enterprises.  In fact, most of these disasters (so to 
speak) are caused by data flow between system entities or sometimes any flaw in the 
system software, even if it is tiny, which may put the whole system under threat.  In the 
following, we will review some of these problems briefly, and we will be concentrating 
on the cross domain problem as representing the heart of the proposed system. 
1. Covert Channel 
In the DoD Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria, the  “Orange Book [81] 
defines the covert channel as “any communication channel that can be exploited by a 
process to transfer information in a manner that violates the system's security policy”. 
It is a mechanism of information flow by channels that were not designed for 
communication and not controlled by the security policy of the system, and thus may 
allow data flow from high to low level [82].  
For example, a low level subject creates a file F1 at its own level. If a high level subject 
has access to this file it either upgrades the security label of the file or leaves it the 
same. If a low level tries to read the file, this case has two probabilities, 1) success, for 
disclosing the high level action if the latter did not change the file security level, thus 
one bit of information will flow from high to low, or 2) failure if security upgrade has 
been applied to file.  
There are two types of covert channel [83]:  
 Storage channels involve the direct/indirect writing of object values by the 
sender and the direct/indirect reading of the object values by the receiver. 
 Timing channels involve the sender signalling information by modulating the 
use of resources (e.g. CPU usage) over time such that the receiver can observe 
it and decode the information.     
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There are some channel terminologies related to covert channels, like a side channel 
where the sender leaks the information unintentionally and only the receiver wants the 
communications to succeed. The steganography channel is a collusion between sender 
and receiver to hide the communication in a way that the observer cannot realize 
whether the communication has happened or not. Finally, a subliminal channel, where, 
using a cryptography algorithm in a covert channel, in this case, the communication 
will be undetectable [84]. 
2. Polyinstantiation 
This problem arises when the low level has knowledge about the high level. For 
example, let’s suppose that a high-level object tries to create a file with the name salary, 
and an object with low-level security try to create a file with the same name. In this 
case, if the MLS system prohibits the low object to do this, then it will cause leaked 
information, because the low object will know that there is a file called salary in the 
high object; at the same time if the system allows the low user to create the file, then 
we have a problem, two files have the same name [82]. 
3. Cross-Domain  
Before talking about cross-domain we need to understand what is the information 
domain? The Information domain can be described as a silo or system entity which has 
information labelled by a certain security level [85]. Cross-domain security deals with 
data transformation between system entities which have in advance been assigned to 
varying security, authority and mutually trusted levels [86]. For example, at the 
enterprise level, cross-domain flow arises when the manager shares information with 
the heads of departments, and the latter share this information with employees. This 
problem worsens when there is a need to share information between networks related 
to different organizations or even governments. This sharing between different security 
levels exposes the information to risk, through increasing the likelihood of sensitive 
information being spilt to a specific destination with a certain security level which is 
not allowed to obtain that information.  
A trusted solution for this problem is called the Cross-Domain Solution (CDS), which 
has been defined clearly by the Committee on National Security System (CNSS) in 
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Canada as “A form of controlled interface that provides the ability to manually and/or 
automatically access and/or transfer information between different security 
domains” [87].   
CDS falls into three types:  
 Access Solution 
This is represented as a subject’s ability to access to read and manipulate information 
from domains which have different security levels. The ideal solution is to prevent the 
overlap data between different domains preventing information spill between separate 
domains [67]. 
 Multi-level Solution  
This is different from above solutions which are based on domain separation. In this 
solution, all information will be stored in one domain, and dealing with these data will 
be controlled by using Mandatory Access Control (MAC) [67].  Applying this solution 
is expensive.  
 Transfer Solution: 
This is the ability of information to transfer between varying domains with respect to 
data sensitivity and security policy of domains, in order to prevent violations even if 
by accident [67].  
2.7.9 Guards 
 
A guard is described as a combination between hardware and software used to ensure 
security of data transfer between different information domains. The main function of 
the guard is to do an inspection upon information to prevent leakage of sensitive 
information to a wrong domain [85].    
 Low to high guards Sometimes called a one-way filter in which the data is 
transmitted in one direction only, from the domain classified as low to the other 
domain classified as high. The working of this type of guard totally depended 
on the concept of the Bell-La Padula model to prevent the spill of information 
45 
 
in the high domain. This is achieved through applying “read down”, write up” 
policy. Thereby, the users cannot read information from a domain classified 
higher than their own, simultaneously they cannot write information to a 
domain classified lower than their own. The way that information flows from 
low to high however will not guarantee the integrity of the data being 
transferred. This type of guard is popular in the environments that do not need 
periodic checking of file integrity in case of file manipulation or corruption. For 
example, weather data which is desired by a pilot or ship at sea, at the same 
time this data is frequently updatable, there is no need to check the integrity 
each time [85].  
 
 High to low guards as with the previous guard, this is a one-way data 
transmission, but in this type the information is being transmitted from the 
domain classified as high to the domain classified as low. This guard is quite 
complicated when comparing with the low to high guard. Many precautions 
need to be taken into account to prevent the likelihood of disclosing the 
sensitive data from high to low domain. For this reason, some other auxiliary 
processing is required to address this problem, like using human review to 
ensure that the information is free from any sensitive information, or using data 
sanitation methods or sometime there is a need to use both. Indeed, this type of 
guard has been designed to ease transmission of unclassified data from a high 
domain to a low domain [85]. 
 
 Bidirectional guards in this type of guard, the data will be allowed to transfer 
in both directions from high to low and from low to high simultaneously. This 
guard in much complex than the others, because it needs to gather conditions 
and restrictions for both the previous types to create a balance and controller 
for the data flow between different domains. To achieve this, some security 
components are required to be embodied in this guard, like virus scanners, 
intrusion detection devices, file type checkers, trusted operating systems and so 
on [85]. 
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2.7.10 Types of Data Transfer Review Process 
 
In this section we concentrate on the main types of review and monitoring data transfer 
between different security domains. 
1. Human Review  
This is the most reliable and simplest review process which has adopted human 
resource. In this process, the human operator will be within the domain that is classified 
as higher to observe and filter any data flow from high to the low domain. The human 
operator is responsible for ensuring the integrity of information, by performing the 
required sanitation process or security insurance, at the same time he/she works as a 
judge to approve or deny the transmission as shown in the Figure 2.13 [67]. 
 
Figure 2.13. Human Review 
 2. Automatic Review 
This type of review process has a mode to address the human limitation. Human senses 
have limitations to observe the contents of some digital multimedia, like audios, videos, 
images all of these media and more, which make content inspection by humans to be a 
mission which is almost impossible. There are many features belonging to this review 
model like being fast, scalable and consistent and also which has the ability to check 
the data flow is free from obscene language, and steganography in media files in 
context of data flow from low to the high domain; while at the same time preventing 
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sensitive data from being disclosed from the high to the low domain as illustrated in 
the next Figure 2.14. This mode of review is ideal for the static environment with 
structured, high volume and traffic data flows. 
 
 
Figure 2.14. Automatic Review 
 
3. Hybrid Review  
This mode of review is designed to deal with an environment which has adopted a 
dynamic, high volume, high traffic and unstructured data flow. To address all of these 
issues, human review and automatic review are grouped to achieve high data flow 
integrity. Instead of rejecting the content by the automatic filter because of unintended 
error, the content will move to the human operator for more inspection and to see if 
they can correct the error to approve or reject the content as the final decision, as shown 
in Figure 2.15. 
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Figure 2.15. Hybrid Review 
2.8 Aspect-Oriented Programming  
 
Software developers had realized that there are some problems and concerns that are 
not well identified or executed by traditional programming methodologies. Moreover, 
some concerns do not represent the functional objective of application software, for 
example, bank applications offer to their clients some services (functions) like “online 
money transactions”, “withdraw”, “ display statements” and more other functions. All 
of these functions embody the base of the service interfaces that the service providers 
(bank application) offer to the client by their service interfaces. However, there are 
some  concerns that non-functional tasks must be associated with the functional tasks 
to enhance the system working through, for example, coordinating the access to the 
system operations, adding security to the application system, updating a specific 
function in the system and so on. Adding or updating these concerns in system 
applications represents a difficult task for system developers because they need to track 
all program code to detect where these concerns methods should be inserted. At the 
same time, they have to define which piece of code needs to be applied for different 
policies. All of these concerns accumulate in the problem of scattering and tangling of 
system software.  
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A widely suggested but underused solution to these problems is that of Aspect Oriented 
Programming (AOP). AOP represents a high-level mechanism that deals with 
modularization of crosscutting concerns [88]. “It is a technology for separating 
crosscutting concerns into single units called aspects.” Each aspect is used to add a new 
behaviour to the methods or constructor or field through calling or execution of 
additional code [89]. Adding aspects of a program helps to cut across the OOP part by 
using aspect elements such as join points, pointcuts and aspect advice. All of these 
components establish the ability to change the behaviour of the program to meet user 
requirements, and at the same time supporting software developers by representing 
software code at a high level of abstraction, making it easier to modify and update. 
Figure 2.16 illustrates how a security and logging concerns crosscutting the main code 
and how this crosscutting modular by using AOP technology. 
 
Figure 2.16. OOP and AOP Development 
 
To understand AOP more clearly we will explain the main AOP terminologies:  
1. Concern: A concern is a specific purpose, goal, concept or area of interest [90]. 
As stated by Laddad “A credit card processing system’s core concern would be 
processing payments, while its system-level concerns would handle logging, 
transaction integrity, authentication, security, performance, and so on” [91]. 
2. Cross-cutting concerns: Many such concerns – known as cross-cutting 
concerns– tend to affect multiple implementation modules [91]. As defined in 
[16] cross-cutting concern is a behaviour that may across a scope of piece of 
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the software. It may be simple behaviour running in some software classes or it 
may be more complicated through applying restrictions that totally affect the 
software working. From a technical point of view, a typical software system 
contains some core concerns and system-level concerns [90]. For example 
cross-cutting concerns are “security (authorization and auditing, logging and 
debugging, synchronization, persistence and more. 
3. Aspect: The modular representation of a cross-cutting concern. A concern may 
cross-cut one or more components; security and logging are examples of cross-
cutting concerns [92]. An aspect defines a pointcut and advice, and is compiled 
by the aspect compiler, such as the AspectJ compiler, in order for concerns 
(both dynamic and static) to be woven into existing objects (to interweave). 
Through separating aspects, crosscutting relations can be handled easily [90].  
4. Join point: A join point is a point where a concern will cross-cut the main code. 
Join points can be at method calls, functions, constructors etc. Join points are 
defined generally, and useful for identifying problem points in code [93]. A 
specific join point is a precise execution point in the program, for example, a 
method in a class. We take join points to be an abstract concept; for our purposes 
it’s not necessary to define them precisely [90]. 
5. Pointcut: Tells the aspect compiler when it should match a join point [93]. 
Essentially, it is a structure for the capture of join points. In contrast, a point-
cut needs to be defined in an aspect [90]. A pointcut represents the specific 
aspect implementation that will be associated with a specific method [92].  
6. Advice: The actual code that will be executed when the control flow reaches 
the join point [92]. In AOP you can specify the advice code to execute before, 
around or after the join point. 
7. Weaver: The engine that weaves aspects along with their respective functional 
components. There are two main weaving kinds: Static and Dynamic. In the 
next subsection, we will expand on the main differences between them [94].  
In the following Figure, we put all AOP terminologies together to be clearer and we 
will talk in semi detail about these terminologies in AsepctJ section. 
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public aspect HelloAspectExample
{
pointcut update(): call (public 
String Hello (String));
before(): update(){ 
      
  //Do Something
}
}
public class SayHello {
 
 public String Hello (String x){
   return ("Hello "+  x);
}
 public static void main (String arg[]){
   SayHello greeting = new SayHello ();
   String Greeting= greeting.Hello("Bob");
System.out.println(Greeting);
}
}
Advic e body des cribe s  what 
advice  s hould do
Advic e
Join point 
Pointcut s elec ts  jo in point in the 
clas s
Advic e do  
tas k 
before  
call 
me thod
/ /  Ase pct Clas s
/ /  Application Class
 
Figure 2.17. AOP example 
Because of the importance of the various kinds of weaving used throughout this report, 
we discuss them in more detail in the next subsection. 
 
2.8.1 Static and Dynamic Aspect Oriented Programming  
AOP provides two kinds of weaving; static weaving and dynamic weaving. In the 
following we discuss each type separately.  
 
1. Static Weaving  
Static weaving consists of combining the aspects’ and components’ functionality prior 
to application execution. This combination consists of inserting calls to advice in the 
component’s code. It causes little performance penalty because all the code is combined 
and statically optimised before its execution. Since the application is woven at compile 
time, any functionality to be adapted at runtime requires the application to be stopped, 
recompiled, rewoven and restarted from scratch, often losing persistency in the process. 
For this reason, this kind of weaving is not used in applications that require a high level 
of runtime adaptation; dynamic weaving is used instead [94].  
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2. Dynamic Weaving  
As explained by Fletcher and Akkawi, “Dynamic weaving achieves the separation of 
concerns by separating the properties of the system such as logging, security, 
scheduling, etc., from the functionality of the system, it then weaves them together at 
run time to achieve the overall application system in order to achieve dynamic 
adaptability at run time”. During run time the aspect will be added or removed 
dynamically without the need to recompile the code each time [92]. For example, 
“dynamic weaving has been used in handling Quality of Service (QoS) requirements 
in CORBA distributed systems, managing web cache pre-fetching, balancing the load 
of RMI applications, and changing the control policy of distributed systems” [95]. 
 
Figure 2.18. Static and dynamic weaving through program execution. 
Both static and dynamic weaving can be adopted in a software system simultaneously, 
but with weaving applied at different times: static weaving at compile time and 
dynamic at running time as shown in Figure 2.18 Dynamic aspects may be more 
appropriate for a software program under development, because it offers to the 
developer the ability to measure and debug a program's behaviour without needing to 
change the source code after each execution or debug cycle. However, if the program 
has been designed so that no runtime adaptation is required, it is preferable to change 
the dynamic aspects to the static aspects to provide a higher level of performance at a 
run-time [95].  
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Sometimes the program developer needs to identify a specific condition, modifying 
any existing join points or debugging any pieces of the program that come in contact 
with the aspect before execution. Weave-time declarations give the opportunity to 
achieve this. Figure 2.19 shows the relationships between these concepts in an AOP 
system [96]. 
 
Figure 2.19. Generic model of an AOP system [96]. 
2.8.2 AspectJ  
In this section we will consider AspectJ, which represents a platform for AOP 
implementation using the Java programming language. Originally developed at Xerox 
PARC [97], AspectJ offers a simple approach for dealing with aspect oriented 
extensions in Java by providing obvious modularization of cross-cutting concerns [98]. 
It works as a pre-compiler that generates class files that can be adopted by Java byte-
code programs, as shown in Figure 2.20. By using AspectJ, the potential to modify and 
update application software has become possible without needing to change the 
application source code [97], [98]. It also provides further benefits, so there’s no need 
for the end user to install anything special to run the programs except the Java Virtual 
Machine and AspectJ tools [97]. In Java there are also two further interesting 
approaches for applying AOP: JBoss AOP and AOP Spring. Moreover, AOP is used in 
many other languages, including AspectC for C, Aspect C++ and FeatureC++ for C++, 
and Sprint .Net for the CLR languages [99]. “AspectJ adds to Java just one new 
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concept, a join point, and a few new constructs: pointcuts, advice, introduction and 
aspects” [20]. 
For the work described in this report, we use the AspectJ Development Tools for 
Eclipse (AJDT) [100]. They constitute an open source Eclipse Technology Project that 
provides the required tools to develop and run AspectJ applications. We discuss the 
AspectJ concepts briefly as follows: 
 
Figure 2.20. a) Java compiler without Aspect, b) java compiler with aspects. 
 
 Join Points  
Consider the following Java class:  
class Coordinate  
{  
private int x, y;  
Point(int x, int y) { this.x = x; this.y = y; }  
void setX(int x) {this.x = x; }  
void setY(int y) { this.y = y; }  
int getX() { return x; }  
int getY() { return y; }  
} 
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If any code calls a method such as setX(5) the program will match the name of the 
method and type of argument (int). If the matching result is true then the output is 
(private int x =5). This happens for all methods and constructors in a Java program and 
follows the base: “When something happens, then something gets executed”[101]. 
OOP provides several kinds of “things that happen” which we refer to as join points. 
Join points consist of things like method calls, method executions, object instantiations, 
constructor executions, field references and handler executions [101], as shown in 
Table2. 
Table 2 Join points [102].  
kind signature this target args Bytecode shadow 
Method-execution  method  ALOAD_0  
or none  
Same as this  Local vars  Entire code segment of 
method  
Method-call  method  ALOAD_0  
or none  
From stack  From stack  Invokeinterface, 
invokespecial (only for 
privates), invokestatic, 
invokevirtual  
Constructor-
execution  
constructor  ALOAD_0  Same as this  Local vars  Code segment of <init> 
after call to super  
Constructor-call  constructor  ALOAD_0  
or none  
None  From stack  Invokespecial (plus 
some extra pieces)  
Field-get  Field  ALOAD_0  
or none  
From stack  none  Getfield or getstatic  
Field-get  Field  ALOAD_0  
or none  
From stack  From stack  Putfield or putstatic  
Advice-execution  None  ALOAD_0  Same as this  Local vars  Code segment of 
corresponding method  
Initialization  Correspond
ing  
constructor  
ALOAD_0  Same as this  Complex  Requires in-lining of all 
constructors in a  
given class into one  
Static-initialization  Typename  None  None  None  Code segment of 
<clinit>  
Pre-initialization  Correspond
ing  
constructor  
None  None  Local vars  Code segment of <init> 
before call to super, this 
may require in-lining  
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Exception-handler  Typename 
of  
exception  
ALOAD_0  
or none  
None  From stack  Start is found from 
exception handler table.  
(only before advice 
allowed because end is  
poorly defined in 
bytecode)  
 
 Aspect Advice  
Code that is written in the aspect class and modifies the behaviour of the Java class at 
a certain join point. The general form of an AspectJ advice is:  
[strictfp] AdviceSpec [throws TypeList]: Pointcut {Body}  
Where AdviceSpec is one of   
 
 before( Formals )  
 after( Formals ) returning [ ( Formal ) ]  
 after( Formals ) throwing [ ( Formal ) ]  
 after( Formals )  
 Type around( Formals ) 
 Here Formal refers to a variable binding such as those used for method parameters, 
of the form Type Variable-Name, and Formals refers to a comma-delimited list of 
formal [74]. Figure 2.21 shows the applying of aspect advices on a method.  
 
Method (….)@ around
@ after
@ before
 
Figure 2.21. AspectJ Advices 
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2.9 Summary  
This chapter has covered the background information about the fundamental 
components of the proposed system in order to clarify the main objectives and 
motivation when we deal with these components in the following chapters. It has also 
reviewed the security and privacy preservation challenges that might face any system 
developers when trying to apply these policies upon their system. Access control has 
obtained the largest amount of explanation in this chapter because it represents the core 
of the proposed as well as dealing with all sides that revolve around the access control. 
Besides concentrating on ABAC and IBAC as the first and second layer of the proposal 
system, this chapter presented the MLS model (third layer) in depth, by dealing with 
topics which are related to MLS like, compartments, Trusted-Based computing, 
domination relationship, reference monitoring and security guards. All these titles open 
the gate to understanding the proposed access control model. 
Cryptography algorithms, privacy preservation and data sanitization are also presented 
in this chapter and we will show how to employ them to support the model in         
chapter 5. Finally, the last part of this chapter details the suggested programming tool, 
Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) through dealing with all topics which are 
associated with AOP.  
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Chapter 3  
Related Works  
 
This chapter provides a review on enforcing Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) in 
three objects: Access Control (AC), intrusion detection, and cryptography. We will be 
concentrating in depth on using AOP in AC models through exploring how we can 
exploit AOP to modules of different access control models. This will be done by 
separating these models from their core system in order for the easiest system to work 
as well as to increase the modularity, manageability, and flexibility of the system. At 
the end of the access control section, we will focus on applying AOP to deal with the 
systems that are based on the Multi-level security or (authority) concept, through using 
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) or other similar models. We will review the gaps in 
these models and look at what ways can be used to enhance these systems, and this will 
be work’s contribution. This chapter presents some current methodologies which are 
used to apply access control models and deal with the MLS system without using AOP.  
 
3.1 AOP and Access Control  
 
Access control and other security solutions, which are considered as a non-functional 
service, are used to increase the reliability of the software by applying security 
concepts. The aim of this section is to review the capacities of using Aspect-Oriented 
Programming to modules and separates these non-functional services from the system 
code, thereby getting rid of scattering and tangling problems which arise when mixing 
between functional and non-functional service codes in the same program body. We 
will deal with some proposals, methodologies, and ideas that have leveraged AOP 
language to enforce Access control models in their systems. Regardless of the date of 
publishing these papers and the proposed ideas, this study focused on the objective of 
using AOP in such a way that we don’t need to change the original code of the software, 
and therefore will not insert additional burdens on the system working. The following 
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subsections are divided according to access control model used to be modularized by 
AOP: 
3.1.1 AOP with General Access Control Models. 
 
This subsection deals with different types of access controls (not the main AC models) 
which are been designed under the fundamentals access control conditions and 
according to the system requirements.  
K. Chen et al. [103] Proposed Fine-Grained Access control for web applications 
supported by aspect oriented programming, the Model-View-Controller (MVC) and 
Apache Struts framework have been adopted to structure the web application (see 
Figure 3.22). Their model depends on the interaction between a user and a web 
application through a sequence of access tuples of three main elements: < user, 
function, data > which means a user request to execute the function on a specific type 
of data object.  
Their dealings with AOP fell into three stages: 
 
1- Choosing the pointcuts: by selected Action class in Struts framework to be a 
target to aspect pointcuts because Action class is the class that is dealing with 
the user request and intermediate result as well as the response.   
2- Constricting the Aspects: the constriction of their model concentrated on 
dividing the aspect code into two parts: generic part realized by abstract aspects 
and rule specific part realized by concrete aspects.  
3- Aspects factory: they built different authentication codes to be available to all 
aspects in their framework to be like a factory of authentication objects and 
called AAAspectit. Afterwards, building two access control aspects called pre-
checking dealing with common access cases, while post-filter uses it if the 
access constraint needs to refer to data attributes.  Finally, they employ the AOP 
advice to enforce all the above policies.  
 
 K. Chen et al. [104] leveraged AOP technology to develop a privacy-ware Access 
Control framework through modular privacy preferences of the person (PII) available 
to the aspect responsible, in order to protect the personally identifiable  information 
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(PII) from unauthorized access. Their proposal extended from [103] by utilizing inter-
type declaration of AspectJ as 
 
 
 
Figure 3.22. Struts-Based Web application architecture [103] 
 
well as AspectJ advices. As in [103]  Model-View-Controller (MVC) and Apache 
Struts the framework had been adopted to structure the web application.  The pointcut 
targets the execute method of user action because it provides all the information needed 
to evaluate the access control constraints. The privacy–aware access control rules take 
the form” allow or deny action on data categories by user categories for certain 
purposes consented by the data subject under certain condition”. By comparing with 
the traditional access control method, they add the privacy aware rule, referred to as 
privacy preferences through extending the rules required by two kinds of additional 
information “the action and the purpose consented by the data subject”. The authors 
benefited from AOP characteristics through separating the management of privacy 
preferences from the application and linking them to the access control aspects by a 
preference factory. Both static and dynamic aspects are adopted in their proposal, such 
static tasks add a privacy preference field to all classes that included data subject’s PII 
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to protect. While the dynamic one is conducted by an object construction advice, which 
is triggered right after any object is instantiated from those classes with PII. Thus, the 
advice will ask the privacy factory about a proper privacy preferences object which is 
matching the requested PII object and associates the preference object with the PII 
object. Note that each data subject specifies its privacy preferences regarding its PII in 
a consent form which is collected and managed by the privacy preferences management 
module. The preferences aspect will be invoked in both static and dynamic form to run 
the retrieval of the data subject’s privacy preferences and associate them with the 
requested data.  
F. Yang et al. [105] proposed AspectKLAIM which represents the extension of 
KLAIM. KLAIM is a language specially designed to program distributed systems 
consisting of several mobile components that interact through multiple distributed tuple 
spaces or databases. The actions and their permissions will be given as aspects, and by 
having a fixed set of such aspects the access policies specify when an action is 
permitted, thus governing the execution of the proposed net. The proposed aspect 
allows the user to trap both the action and the processes to be executed in future. The 
authors’s point of view is focused on the consideration of “whom should be trusted by 
preventing the means for expressing trust in terms of how data is actually used”.  
K. Chen et al. [106] proposed the analysis of access control approaches from two 
different dimensions: 1) is the granularity level which concerns user requirements, 2) 
is the implementation technology adopted by application developers. With 1 we used 
three tuples <user, function, data> to model the interaction between users and 
application system. With 2 we divided the implementation technology for access 
control into three different levels: hard-wired, adopted and configuration level. 
Afterwards we made the intersection between 1 and 2 to find that most use of AOP will 
be in the adopted level for all users, functions and data. The authors used MVC Apache 
Struts framework to represent the proposal. They considered that the execute method 
will be a proper join point in order to catch and control the forwarding mapping and 
Http Req, and Resp. K. Chen et al defined three aspects: “authentication”, “Precheck” 
and Postcheck” to capture the code structure for enforcing fine-grained access control, 
which is represented by granularity levels namely user, function and data.   
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R. Toledo el at. proposed a modular access control called ModAc, to modularize both 
using and supporting of access control through restriction aspects and scoping 
strategies, even in the existence of untrusted aspects [107]. The authors deal with access 
control, including privileged execution and first-class permission context (like in java, 
class- privileged execution allows a trusted entity to hold responsibility for a certain 
action, while first-class permission allows the programmer to capture a set of 
permissions at a certain point and restore it later on). The restriction aspect is used to 
ensure proper resource protection, and works by adhering to a different, dual pattern: 
the pointcut selects access to a sensitive resource but the aspect advice immediately 
disallows the access by not proceeding with the primitive operations. Whilst scoping 
strategies are used to ensure that the aspect only sees forbidden access through 
permitting fine-grained access control over the scope of the deployed aspect and 
specified by two propagation functions, a call stack specifies how an aspect propagates 
along with method calls and a delayed evaluation, to specify whether or not an aspect 
is “captured” in the object when they are created. In this way they modularized the 
proposal as an aspect: untrusted aspects cannot inhibit access control and trusted 
aspects are able to see any join point. Their implementation relied on R0 and ZAC 
library. 
T. Scheffler  et al. [108] proposed an approach that uses “sticky privacy policies” 
written in the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) to control the 
access rules for protecting resources. They present a privacy scheme associated with a 
reference monitoring implementation using the Java Security Framework. In their 
solution, they mix XACML and the Java Security Framework by implementing a 
client-side reference monitor. They developed a theme park location scenario that 
highlights privacy protection issues based on three main bases: localisation, privacy 
settings and service architecture. In their approach, they allowed for users to get 
benefits from the application without needing to share private information directly. The 
authors fixed some problems in their approach through using JBoss, which represents 
an implementation of AOP for Java. This was achieved by implementing a security 
layer that enforces the data-owner’s defined privacy policies for protected resources. 
The reference monitor uses a set of task-specific advices to monitor access to the 
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resource and interrupt it if necessary. Before granting access to a resource, an advice 
evaluates its sticky policy and if the evaluation is not successful, the advice prohibits 
access by cancelling the method invocation that is trying to do it. 
3.1.2 AOP With Role-Based Access Control  
 
X. Li et al. [109] introduced conditions for adding to the role-based access control 
permission in order to enhance the traditional concept through minimizing the number 
of permissions. They completely separate their concept of access control from the 
application logic by using aspect oriented programming which allows access control to 
be integrated into a legacy 3 tier information system, without the need to change the 
application program.  Their approach can be summarized as follows: when the user 
with role r wishes to perform a specific operation op on a certain data dr1 of a table t, 
the success of this operation will be totally dependent on specific conditions. The 
application will scan the permission table for the entire (r, op, t, somecondition) if any 
of these conditions doesn’t match, then the operation op will be denied otherwise it will 
be allowed. The usage of AOP is enacted by: 
1- The access control developer implements all methods needed to perform access 
control in a special module, called aspect. For instance, an update-check 
method. 
2- The access control developer must first decide which methods in the application 
programs require access control. These methods are defined as join points. 
3- Then, he/she has to group join points that require the same type of access control 
(e.g., update-check). These groups are called pointcuts. 
4- Finally, he/she has to indicate what access control actions have to be performed 
for the join points in the pointcut and when these actions should be performed 
(e.g., before, after or instead of the execution of the join point method). This is 
called an advice. 
They used AspectJ as the most popular AOP tool and applied their proposal on 
Laboratory information system (LIMS). 
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I. Ray et al. [110] proposed Role-based Access control model aspect as patterns using 
UML diagram templates through composing between the aspect oriented model 
(AOM) approach which deals with access control concerns, referred to an aspect and 
functionality application referred to as a primary model. Before the composition the 
aspect model must be instantiated in the context of the application domain. This is 
obtained by binding elements in the aspect model to elements in the application 
domain, therefore producing the context-specific aspect model.  Afterwards, the aspect 
models are produced for each part of the primary model and woven into the base model 
using composition directives.  
J. Pavlich et al. [111] they proposed a formal framework for security software 
applications that is able to support the automatic translation of a new UML artifact 
through translating the role-slice access control policy into an aspect oriented 
programming enforcement code. The authors have shown the power of using AOP to 
intercept every call to the set of classes in which access needs to be controlled, and 
grants or denies access, depending on the permissions stored in the policy database. 
They submitted their proposal formally to enforce it by any programming languages.    
C. Braga [112] deals with RBAC, proposed model driven architecture                      
(MDA) [113]  approach and shows how to transfer the code generator of the access 
control policy from SecureUML, an RBAC modelling language, to the language of 
Aspect for Access Control(AAC). The code generator for access control policies 
represents the transformation contract which specifies the relationships between the 
abstract syntax of the SecureUML and AAC and constrains the two languages. Their 
aspect language especially concentrated on defining pointcuts in the application body 
at any place needing to do a certain function, for example create method in Text Report 
Configuration (TRC) class and apply before advices to gathering with permission for a 
given method, thus dealing with access control processing as a precondition. The author 
used a metamodel to represent the language and to specify the transformation.  
M. Hazaa et al. [114] used aspect for a design for CORBA access control supporting 
the RBAC model. They divided their design into three phases: 
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 Main concern Base design: The main concern of their study is to realize a 
CORBA AC mechanism that supports RBAC0. Afterward, any modification, 
reused in the future will be accounted for by AOD. 
 Aspect1:Role hierarchy (RH) they aggregated the roles that need to be included 
in the base design in role hierarchy concern. By using aspect orientation design 
(AOD) they simplify the tangling and scattering which rely on regular 
modification and updating and reusing of some roles to modify the base design 
of the RBAC0, to produce RBAC1,through transfer of the crosscutting concerns 
into aspects.  
 Aspect2: RBAC2 allows security administrator to set static separation of duty 
constraints on the assignment of users to a role. In other words, the security 
administrator puts the new function that should be executed every time in a 
static aspect. 
 RBAC3 : finally combines role hierarchy and static constraint to produce 
RBAC3. This combination shows the advantage of using AOD through 
applying dynamic (RH) and static aspect with a minor modification of the main 
system. 
S. Kallel et al. [115] deals with the concept of delegation in access control, which 
represents the core that allows users to assign all or part of their permission to other 
users. They combine between the formal method of delegation used in RBAC and AOP 
to enforce their delegation policies. They used TemprolZ as a formal language to 
represent the RBAC model as well as delegation and revocation models. Their 
approach has three steps,1: the specification step (security policies and their 
corresponding constraint using TemporlZ), and verification step, to verify the 
consistency of the system specification using theorem proving and 2: the 
implementation step which used java to implement the functional codes which are not 
including any logic for authorization. 3: the enforcement step, in this step the developer 
uses an aspect generator tool to generate the security module by translating the formal 
policies from TemprolZ to the aspect oriented programming language ALPHA (which 
is an AOP which uses a pointcut language based on logic queries). This language used 
a subset of Prolog queries for pointcut expression. Each delegation operation will use 
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one aspect to enforce the pre-condition and delegation constraints. The pointcut 
constituted by ALPHA predicate “Call” to intercept calls to the method in the 
functional code which holds the formal delegation operation. In the advice body each 
Z constraint is translated to a conditional statement by using a Z-based java package. 
P. Colombo et al. [116] proposed an approach called PuRBAC (Purpose and Role-
based Access control) which is a java application which operates in between relational 
DBMS in order to govern the execution of both SQL queries based on purpose, and 
role based privacy policies. In their methodology, they exploited AOP techniques for 
dealing with the dynamic features of relational DBMS environment, and to do 
precondition evaluation filtering at running time.   
J. Pavlich et al. [117] proposed a role slices method to provide an abstract to collect 
information on the security of roles that cut across all the classes in an application. 
Afterwards they transform the role slices into the application code using aspect oriented 
programming to capture the access control policy (authorized or prohibited) which is 
already defined by role slices.  
The system works by using an aspect-oriented code to control the access control to the 
method, through checking whether the presented method is denied for the active role 
(which the current user has when logged in) and raises an exception if that occurs; 
otherwise the method is allowed to execute. In other words, the AOP advice will be the 
link between the database which holds the security permission (role slices) and the user 
who logs into the system. To summarize the working of the system it includes: security 
policy database and access control aspects which include role slices to represent the 
security method and aspect advice that is woven at the pointcuts, defined by role slices 
and the security database. 
A. Mourad  et al. [118] proposed an aspect-oriented approach for the dynamic 
enforcement of web service security, based on the synergy between AOP and business 
processing execution language (BPEL) of the composed web service. The author used 
Role-Based Access control applied on Flight service (RBAC-FS) to ensure the 
authentication and authorization for accessing the web service resources. The result 
shows how the propsed model can separate the security concerns totally from the web 
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service composition, and how we can apply these concerns in a specific join point in 
the BPEL execution body.  
 
3.1.3 AOP With Organization-Based Access Control 
 
M. S. Idrees et al. [119] they exploited the aspect oriented concept to enforce their 
security policy as Organization Base Access Control (Or-BAC) in dynamic form. Their 
motivated problem revolves around how an evaluation can dynamically modify 
security enforcement with respect to the new rule, especially obligation rules and how 
to manage the obligations and changes during the runtime.  Their contribution is 
showing how different knowledge modelled in the security policies can be extracted 
and translated into security aspectual knowledge that is used to define appropriate 
security aspects. They applied the security policy as a set of rules (permission, 
prohibition, and obligations). Afterwards the module will be responsible for taking a 
decision (allow/deny). They deal with aspects in a generation phase which is based on 
a translation process which translates the concepts used to define a security rule (role, 
activity, view) to the concept used to define the aspects, such as aspect type, advice 
code and pointcuts. Thus, the functional requirement to enforce the security policy will 
be dynamically associated. In this case, any changes at running time will be accounted 
through weaving /unweaving aspects. They proposed “Context Awareness” which is 
used to monitor any change in the system during running time. 
S Ayed et al. [120]  proposed a framework based on the INYER_TRUST project with 
a security model based on the (Or-BAC) to govern the security policy based on AOP. 
This framework presented the whole architecture which describes the loop of security 
aspect generation and weaving, as well as depending on the AOP approach to dealing 
with this loop and making a dynamic control of security requirement. 
S. Ayed et al. [121] proposed a security framework architecture through modularized 
(Or-BAC) by using AOP approach to enforce security policies dynamically on 
distributed systems. They deal with access control and usage control as a security 
requirement to making a link with the deployments of these policies by translated to 
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aspects. The authors combined various security modules (security policy modeling, 
policy engine, policy interpreter, Aspect generation and context awareness) to by 
linking them to clarify the security policy cycle. This cycle will be established during 
the running time and be able to face any security changes during run time. Aspect 
generation is the database of all security policies received from policy interpreter and 
modular by aspect. This generation will be divided into modules: Generic Aspect 
Generation module which deal with the general security policy part which not related 
to the AOP framework. While the second module is Concrete Aspect Generation 
module which is generate during run time and has related to the AOP framework. The 
access control aspect will be generated according to set of permissions relaying on the 
access policy and not depend on prohibitions. The aspect will follow the tuple <subject, 
action, object> which are coming from policy interpreter module. Thus, control the 
accessing by allowing the authorized user (subjects) to perform a specific action on the 
objects (data) in a modularization way by using AOP. 
3.1.4 AOP with Multilevel Security System  
 
Despite all the reviewed solutions, they succeeded to perform their objective’s mission 
by a separate access control concept from the body of their systems by using AOP, and 
thus to achieve the main objectives of what the AOP was designed for. Interactions 
between the system code and AOP code however, to use the latter as the core part to 
control the access and build a simple solution working in a system, has already been 
designed based on the Multi-level security concept.  
García et al. [94] considered the adaptation of security measures of distributed systems, 
even when their sizes and arrangements changed. This is achieved without 
compromising global security, and while attempting to improve flexibility and ease in 
dealing with distributed systems. The proposed approach uses dynamic AOSD to 
implement security mechanisms in distributed systems when the system is running, 
without requiring its execution to be stopped or interrupted. They submitted solutions 
for two common security problems in distributed systems: (i) access control and data 
flow and (ii) encryption of transmissions. In this way, the distributed system is able to 
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adapt to security measures when required, and can vary in size and arrangement without 
compromising security. Their scenario revolves around the ability of flow data between 
distributed system nodes which have different levels of authority. The authors created 
an AOP shield around each individual node used to give allowance to the data to access  
the node or just be discarded. They used this scenario to enhance the access model, 
working on a system based on Multi-level authority by allowing any source node with 
a specific security level to send information, labelled with the same node’s level, to any 
node in the distributed system which has a higher or same level of the source node 
security. Regardless of this transmission, they passed intermediate nodes before 
approaching the distention node as illustrated in Figure 3.23, there is a data flow 
comparing between two distributed systems.  
The first one: (a) is based on object oriented programming concept, shows that the 
Node 1 cannot send information to Node 4 even if they have same level of security 
because data cannot flow from Top Secret (Node 3) to Classified (Node 4). However, 
if a node is shielded by AOP language, the data flow will be handled in an abstract 
level as seen in –(b)- the level will be checked before entering the data to the node. In 
this case, data will flow freely between system nodes. 
               
     
                         -a-                                                                            -b- 
Figure 3.23. -a- OOP distributed nodes, -b- AOP+OOP distributed nodes, (TS, S, C) refers to 
(Top-secret, Secret, Confidential ) security level respectively. 
They used a real client-server FTP scenario to test the proposed system. They show 
that dynamic aspects can be used in order to cipher all messages exchanged between 
the clients and the server when increased communication security is needed, while 
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reverting to the default channel when the exchanged information can be transmitted in 
the clear. We are going to discuss this paper in more depth in the next chapter. 
R. Ramachandran  et al. [122] deal with Multi-level security systems based on the Bell-
La Padula model (BLP) using Aspect-Oriented Programming. Their scenario discusses 
the payroll system which deals with the managers supposed as high security clearance, 
and employees who are supposed as low level. The interaction between high and low 
level will be implemented by using AspectJ. The pointcuts intercept each read or write 
operation. Thus, the manager will be able to view or modify the payroll database while 
the employee will be restricted according to what the pointcuts allow him to use. They 
use JFTPd which is an FTP server implemented in java, to evaluate their proposal. 
U Huseyin et al.  [123] they developed Vigilies as a firewall to apply a Fine-Grained 
Access Control (FGAC) on the MapReduce system. They augmented the cloud’s front-
end API by implementing Vigilies as a middleware layer to work as reference 
monitoring. Vigilies deals with the MapReduce jobs as untrusted to prevent the 
probability of the user who submitted this job having suspect intentions. They used 
AOP to enforce the Vigilies security policy on Apache Hadoop by an injected aspect 
into three pointcuts: 1) initialization aspect used to intercept the initialized () method, 
2) predicate aspect used to intercept the nextKeyValue() method and 3) modification 
aspects used to intercept the getcurrentKey()/ getcurrentValue() methods. They used 
static AspectJ to evaluate their proposal.  
K. Padayachee [124] they explore the ability of enforcing multi-level security concepts 
upon systems by implementing aspect-oriented programing language. They 
concentrated on a simple mode which works as a pre-authorization model where a 
decision is made before allowing access to the data. They claim that they enhanced 
working of [122] by two sides, the first one they used the extended aspect-oriented 
programming to circumvent around the problem of java API, which is not able to permit 
getting back directly the file name which is already intercepted by read and write 
pointcuts. The second problem is embedding the user’s clearance with the original 
implementation, the authors separate this clearance totally from the original data, thus 
the access control model will be totally separated from the original program. Their 
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Aspect classes have two pointcuts methods called Read and Write used to intercept all 
read and write operations associated with the subject trying to access the object to 
perform the operation. They used around advice instant of before advice to proceed the 
accessing rights, only after meeting all the authorization and obligation conditions.  
A. M. Hernandez et al. [125] proposed approach is based on combining between history 
and future sensitive policy in a distributed system. They focused on the concept looking 
to the future by using multilevel access control policies as suited to past analysis of 
how the system reached its current state.  The Bell-La Padula model is presented to 
extend the AspectKB framework in order to allow to express policies that look to the 
past. The aspect is to trap an action, the response will be considered, granting access 
only if the security level of the subject is not lower than that of the object.  This proposal 
gives some power to access information according to the past performance of the 
system.  
S. M. Khan et al. [126] proposed a novel implementation approach, SilverLine (Secure-
information flow verification in lined), that enforced Mandatory Access Control (MAC) 
and information flow security policies on untrusted Java jobs binaries in Hadoop 
cloud.foot, which exploited an AOP to elegantly specify, implement, and put in-line 
reference monitoring (IRM) into untrusted jobs without access to a job source code. 
They used aspect-weaving as a pre-processing step to rewrite automatically untrusted 
java binaries before passing them to the cloud. To enable aspects in the Hadoop 
environment, AspectJ JAR and aspects are distributed to all nodes in the cloud. 
SilverLines’ aspect weaver will intercept the submitted jobs at the cloud edge and in-
lines in the IRM. The aspect weaver may reside on any node inside the cloud, or may 
be deployed on a separate machine outside the cloud. The resulting self –monitoring 
binaries are then dispatched to the cloud for execution.  
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3.2 AOP Intrusion Prevention, Cryptography and Privacy  
 
3.2.1 AOP Intrusion Prevention  
 
E. Kajo-mece et al. [127] the proposal system is based on three parts: 1) Call 
WebAppInputFilter which is used to filter users’ inputs through using the AspectJ 
advice that controls the validation process. 2) Validator used to validate against XSS 
and SQL injection attacks and this is done by AOP devices as well. 3) Finally the 
encoder which is used to encode the dangerous characters by converting them to their 
decimal equivalent to make them harmless.  
The main idea is based on the user’s inputs being validated before use as a part of the 
query. By the way, the authors focused on user’s input without the partial SQL 
statement defined by the developer, in order to speed up the processing, especially 
when they considered that this part is already trusted. The mechanism of the system is 
summarized when the aspect captures the user input string and sends it to the first 
analyser (Syntactic Validator). If the string is not dangerous it is passed on to the second 
validation step (Semantic Validator). If the string is dangerous it is sent to the encoder. 
It encodes the dangerous characters and the result is passed to the Semantic Validator. 
If the string is not considered dangerous, it is passed on to the web application as a 
legitimate request. If it is considered dangerous, it is erased. JMeter is used for 
performance evaluation. 
G. Hermosillo et al. [128] the authors used AspectJ and Jboss AOP to design a security 
aspect called AproSec for detecting SQL injection and Cross Site Scripting (XSS). 
Their proposal application AProSec (aspect security for web application server(WAS)) 
is used by intercepting and validating all the requests from the clients to the WAS and 
from WAS to the database server. The authors considered the SQL and XSS to be in 
the same aspects advice after they divided the advice into two validation parts: 1) HTTP 
request parameters and 2) DB queries. During the implementation, several syntaxes 
should be validated: double and single quotes, SQL injection, and XSS. HTTP request 
should validate the parameter value to void code injection and invalid HTML tags to 
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prevent XSS. For DB queries, the validation is made through analysing the query string 
to prevent “always true” comparisons, semicolons and comments. They used AspectJ, 
Tomcat for web application and MySQL as the database manager. 
Z. Zhu et al. [129] proposed a model-based aspect-oriented framework for building 
intrusion-aware software systems. The authors started the design by identifying the 
vulnerable points in the target system and specifying the probable attacks that may 
exploit the system vulnerabilities. They used Aspect-Oriented Unified Modelling 
Language (UML) to model the attack scenarios and intrusion detection aspects. Their 
framework consists of five stages: identify vulnerabilities and attacks; model attack 
scenarios using UML; generate the intrusion detection aspect (IDA) code using an 
aspect code generator; weave aspects into the target system; test and deploy the 
integrated system.  
M. Coates et al. [130] proposed AppSensor for intrusion detection. Their methodology 
depends on using some metrics to detect malicious use through studying and filtering 
user behaviours. They put some factors in order to distinguish between the suspicious 
(not if the user is attacker or just misuser of application) and the “Attacker” which is 
the real attack. Their application is integrated into business, presentation and data 
layers. This proposal has two modules the “detection module” to detect the attacks and 
malicious use and the “response module” to give an appropriate response for the 
detection at that time. They used AOP to inject their solution into the application 
system. 
V. Schiavoni et al. [131] proposed an annotation toolkit that allows building DoS 
resistant component-based systems. The solution mechanism is able to handle the 
robustness concern as a separated and modularized but yet integrated aspect of the 
system. In typical component based applications, each component exposes a service. 
The key idea is to annotate such services and use the annotations as a means to detect 
an attack. They used Aspect-Oriented Programming techniques for modularizing and 
separating the implementation of annotation processing. The proposal implementation 
relied on the using of AOP techniques with java 1.5 annotation and implement it within 
Fractal, which is a java-based component model and provides an Architecture 
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Description Language (ADL). They show an improvement over a low level approach 
through focusing on a comment-based system, with which it was possible to provide a 
general mechanism to detect DoS attacks.  
The proposal of K. Padayachee et al. [132] is dealing in how to use AOP techniques 
for monitoring the information flow between objects and how to detect vulnerabilities 
and misuse detection of this information. They considered a server application 
comprising of three classes Server, Session and Account, where there was vulnerability 
in that the server allows a malicious client to avoid getting charged for his/her 
connection time. They used AspectJ advices to intercept the vulnerabilities in order to 
detect any misuse of data flow, in which these advices can take a decision to permit the 
information flow or not, after examining the given message and classification of the 
sender and receiver. For example if source object (A) sends data to destination object 
(B), the flow will be intercepted by AOP and tested if it violates the policy of 
information flow. If any abnormal behavior the aspect will perform a specific action to 
deal with, otherwise the flow will proceed smoothly. 
G. Georg et al. [133] proposed a methodology based on aspect oriented modelling 
(AOM) to design a secure application system. They separate between the 
implementation model called the primary model and attack and security mechanism 
which are localized in a different model. Their approach is focused on the impacts of 
the attack (aspect attack), after applying it to the primary model, and indicating whether 
the primary model may be compromised, then the proper security mechanism (aspect 
security) is used against this attack. This proposal has two types of aspect: generic 
aspect and context aspect. The first one is used to represent attack patterns and security 
protocols, while the context aspect is used for instantiating the generic aspect and both 
are modelled by UML models. The execution of this proposal can be summarized by 
two stages: the first stage, the attack aspect applies on a primary model to produce the 
misuse model, the latter will be analysed to determine if the protected resources are 
compromised by attack. For the second stage, if the results are unaccepted, then the 
aspect security will integrate with the primary system to produce the  security treated 
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model. They used Alloy Analyser because it is easy to use and has been used for 
verifying many real-world applications. 
J. M. Horcas et al. [134] proposed an approach based on the Interoperable Trust 
Assurance Infrastructure (INTER-TRUST) framework to deal with enforcing security 
policies in a dynamic form at running time. They used Montimage monitoring tools 
(MMT) security properties to formally specify security objectives and attack 
behaviours related to the application or protocol under test. This proposal has 
concentrated on two sides of the objectives, the first one is dealing with the dynamic 
deployment of security policies, while the second is used for dynamic monitoring of 
vulnerabilities through testing of the operation phases. The first objective is achieved 
by proceeding with the security specification through the Aspect Generation which 
connects with the Aspect Weaver, which in turn is connected with the repository of the 
security aspect. By designing a correct correlation between the security policies aspect 
and security specification, the application will be able to capture the modification of 
the security at running time as well as detecting some kinds of attacks. The second 
objective is the performance of monitoring and this is done through a defined set of 
vulnerabilities point in their approach that may break the correlations and defines a set 
of the kind of attacks which can affect these points.  The authors evaluated their 
approach by applying the proposed system on two real case studies: The Intelligent 
Transportation System (ITS) and e-voting system.  
SQL injection and XSS web attacks are used as examples of attacks that might be 
prevented this way. Hermosillo et al. [135] deal with SQL injection and XSS web 
attacks through design, and implement a security aspect called AProSec to harden a 
website against these attacks. Their design is based on a mixture of both AspectJ and 
JBoss using AspectJ at compile time to validate and filter the user information, and by 
implementing an SQL analyser to intercept and validate all the database queries before 
they are processed. Moreover, they used JBoss to weave aspects at runtime. They 
established the advantages of their approach by testing it with a vulnerable online 
bookstore, and their achieved objectives through preventing any query that contains a 
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commentary inside it, or any statement that is always true being passed to the database 
manager. 
L. K. E. Mece [136] also suggested defending web services against SQL and XSS web 
attacks., The difference with this approach however, is that it can abstract through this 
system and will analyse the user input directly before it is used as a part of an SQL 
query, and the SQL validator checks the presence of SQL keywords in the user input. 
This processing will help check if there is any malicious injection. 
K. Kawauchi et al. [137] suggested an aspect detect cross-site scripting. Their solution 
depends on sanitizing, i.e changing special characters for quoted ones, the input 
information being submitted by clients to web applications. They considered the 
scenario of servlet-based web applications. When information is submitted to a servlet, 
one of the subjects which occurs consists in determining whether it comes from an end 
user, or whether it occurs from a different servlet which delegates the request by means 
of the transfer mechanism supplied by the servlet container. In the latter case, data is 
assumed to be trustworthy as it simply grows from another section of the application. 
In such cases, the sanitizing can be skipped to be able to save computation time. To 
accomplish this, the authors propose to extend the syntax of the AspectJ pointcut 
language with another construct to detect data flows: the servlet input is sanitized if, 
and only if, it is written back to the servlet output stream. 
G. Fan et al. [138] focused on service authorization, implementation traceability, data 
protection and fault handling through proposing a formal aspect-oriented approach 
used to analyse secure service composition. They used Petri1 (Petri net is a 
mathematically based technique for modelling and verifying software artifact) net for 
formalising their model and describe the behavioural features of service composition. 
Through the integration between the advantages of using AOP and Petri net, they have 
shown how this integration reflects good results to observe the behaviour of service 
composition. Their proposal has two main processes: 
Implementation phase: used Petri net for the modelling tool and AOP to separate 
crosscutting concerns and core concerns of the system. They integrated these two 
modules into a complete model.  
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Analysis stage: analysis of the security and fault handling of service composition by 
using the operation of Petri nets. 
The result of this paper achieved security service composition and to reduce the effect 
of the single Web service’s fault on service composition as much as possible.  
P. Falcarin et al. [139] focused on ensuring that the software is not maliciously 
tampered with prior to and during the execution. They used an aspect to encapsulate a 
function that is used to generate an idiosyncratic signature which is associated with 
data transmission. Their proposal is based on the TrustedFlowTM protocol which in turn 
is based on the cooperation between Trusted Flow Generator (TFG), Trusted Tag 
Checker (TTC) and some network interfaces (e.g. firewall, gateway) as well as 
Message Authentication Code (MAC) all working cooperatively to detect the 
tampering software. 
H. Ulusoy  et al. [140] proposed TrustMR, in order to detect attacks with a high 
probability while minimizing the overheads, TrustMR  decomposes MapReduce tasks 
into smaller computations by means of aspect-oriented programming and replicates a 
subset of these tasks to verify the integrity of computations. TrustMR initiates multiple 
replicated map tasks on the replicated input splits. Some outputs of the map phase are 
randomly selected at runtime, and replicated map tasks only generate these key–value 
pairs. The results of replicated and original map tasks are verified at a map verifier by 
using a voting system. The results of replicated and original reduced tasks are also 
verified in the same manner as a reduce verifier. 
P. Falcarin et al. [141] proposed an approach to dealing with secure messaging in 
Client-Server application. Their methodology is based on using Aspect Oriented 
programing tools in both client and server to control the transmitted messages from 
client to server, as well as to provide evidence to the remote server that the client code 
is authentic. The prototype of implementation is called TrustedFlow is held in the 
chatting server and contains three main aspect components: Aspect Manager, Aspect 
factory and Code Checker, while the client side holds the Tag Generator aspect. 
Through the cooperation between client and server aspects, the latter will be able to 
evidence that the code which has been sent by the user is authentic by checking the tag 
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values after each sending. They used the PROSE platform for the implementation part. 
Their system limits the possibility of some attacks like Discovery, disablement and 
replacement.  
3.2.2 AOP Privacy  
 
K. Chen et al. [142] designed an Aspect-base privacy management framework used to 
collect and manage patients’ preferences independently yet can integrate with Health 
Information System (HIS) to support patients’ privacy. The proposed framework is 
based on three main components: action purpose manager, privacy aspect and patient 
preference manager. The privacy aspect interacts with the Policy Decision Point (PDP) 
as the join point for advice weaving. The main task of the privacy aspect is to monitor 
the result of PDP and perform the enforcement and audition of the patient preference 
if necessary. The result summarizes that if the PDP grants an access request, the privacy 
aspect will then take responsibility to ensure that the intended use of the data matches 
those consented to by the patients.  
C. Hankin et al. [143] used Belnap Logic to deal with aspect-oriented coordination 
language AspectK in order to apply security policy in each location, and then combine 
the relevant security policies when an interaction between locations takes place. Their 
framework is based on a four-valued logic for solving the conflicts such as: the value 
tt is interpreted as permitting the access,  ff is interpreted as denying the access, ⊥⊥ is 
interpreted as missing information, and TT is interpreted as conflicting information. 
They are “attaching” aspect advices to each location to make the system more 
understandable and scalable. 
P. Yu et al. [144] deals with the implementation of privacy-aware services in a Platform 
as a Service (PaaS) context. Their privacy enforcement mechanisms use AOP such that 
the aspects can be manipulated in the process and at the platform level. In this scenario, 
they adopted three main bundles managed by the cloud providers (JDBC Wrapper, 
Annotation Detector and SQL Filter) and one additional bundle (Policy Handler) 
providing privacy translation. All of these bundles increase scattering and tangling 
problems, thus they used AOP to address this and for better modularization. 
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C. Vanden et al. [145] introduced the Privacy Injector which also relies on AOSD to 
modularize and encapsulate privacy enforcement. The approach is based on a privacy 
metadata tracking part and a privacy policy enforcement part. Each piece of collected 
personal data will be associated with privacy metadata in the system, and any 
operations in the system should work only in compliance with what the metadata 
dictates. The proposed architecture manages the data using the sticky policy paradigm 
to enforce the privacy rule on the data before disclosure. 
3.2.3 AOP Cryptography  
 
H. Mestiri et al. [146] used SystemC and AspectC++ together to design an AOP-based 
system-level fault injection/detection environment to evaluate the robustness of the 
cryptographic design against fault injection attack. The fault injection/detection system 
has three AOP modules: fault controller specialization (FCS), fault injector 
specialization (FIS) and fault analysis specialization (FAS). FCS is a state controller 
that drives the synchronization between the other models. FIS is used to specify the 
injecting faults in times and locations and finally, FAS provides a report about the 
effects of the faults on the functional design. To show the capability of their solution 
they made a comparison between pure SystemC and SystemC with AspectC++ when 
applying the proposal fault injection/detection system into two types: single faults and 
multiply faults. The results show that the AOP does not have significant impact on both 
simulation time and size of the executable file.  
A. A. Thulnoon et al. [147] utilized AOP features to control cryptography algorithms 
that used to ensure security and privacy of distributed system works based on 
choreography network. They proposed a super node called Judgment Node (JN) to 
control the processing starting from the source node to destination node. The main 
functionality of this node is to divide the distrusted nodes according to trustworthiness 
level to trusted and untrusted node as well as divide the sending file into portions 
according the process that required to finish the task. This file will be encrypted using 
different keys and algorithms (symmetric and asymmetric).  JN will distribute the 
public and private keys to each node in the system as well as the symmetric key. 
Encryption/decryption operation are totally controlled by AOP (encrypt before sending 
80 
 
and decrypt after receiving). The scenario her, JN will create a balance of using 
cryptography algorithms be selecting the proper routing path to do the process and try 
to select the trusted path. If the processing routing path’s nodes are trusted, then 
symmetric algorithm will be considered. However, if there are any untrusted nodes in 
the processing path then AOP will change working form symmetric to asymmetric 
algorithm because it more hard to be broken.   
 
3.3 Non AOP Multi-Level Security Solutions 
 
In this section we will review some of the projects that have been done by organizations 
and companies which are based on MLS concept to handle their data, and we will be 
concentrating on how they dealt with the “cross-domain” problem which is the major 
pivot of the proposed solution. 
1- AXIOMATICS [148] is a company located in Stockholm, Sweden. Its premier 
vendor used Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) as a dynamic authorization 
adopted by more than 500 companies in a variety of fields such as healthcare, 
finance, manufacturing, and federal government agencies.  
AXIOMATICS presents “SmartGuardTM for Big Data 1.1” to show the high 
flexibility and the true full ability and dynamic behavioural variety of Attribute-
Based Access Control (ABAC) when dealing with big data. This guard stratifies 
fine-grained access control principles for the data centre in Hadoop by using SQL-
on-Hadoop engines HIVE and HAWQ. The basis of the guard working can be 
summarized through the following points: 
1- An application sends an access request to the data stored in Hadoop. 
2- An intercept agent which is appendixed with the application will intercept the 
SQL query and send it to SQL Transformer. 
3- Depending on the authorization policies which are associated with the 
application which sent the SQL query, the SQL transformer will do 
modifications to the query according to these policies. 
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4-  According to the access policies, the SQL filter service will do the filtering 
and masking of the data which has been classified as sensitive.  
5- Afterwards, the modified SQL query will return back to the SQL Transformer 
which is forwarded to the Application. 
6-  Now the Application sends the SQL query to a data store with the associated 
policies and rights to access only to the right data as can be seen in Figure 3.24 
 
 
Figure 3.24. SmartGuardTM [148] 
Although this guard has features like applying fine-grained access control for big data, 
masking the sensitive data, automatic modification of SQL query and applying all of 
these in dynamic manner, this guard however is a specialist only with environments 
that deal with databases and SQL queries. Moreover, this guard uses the Many-to-one 
relationship when one or more applications send SQL requests to access the data store. 
As has been mentioned before, the guard deals with the clients who want to access the 
data store, by ensuring that he/she will have access only to the permitted data. This 
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guard forgot the side of probability processing and flowing of data between distributed 
applications, and what sudden changes will happen to the access policy upon this data.  
2- Trusted RUBIXTM [149] is the outcome of results of a collection of researches 
carried out by Infosystems Technology, Inc. (ITI) to achieve high assurance 
database software for clients who work in sensitive environments and need 
integrity and confidentiality for their data.  The general model of Trusted 
RUBIXTM  consists of  three mandatory access control layers: 1) The abstract layer 
is Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC), 2) the intermediate layer is Type 
Enforcement/RBAC (SELinux), 3) and the internal layer is Multilevel Security 
(MLS), so we can say the information is shielded by three Mandatory Access 
Control (MAC) policies as can be seen in Figure 3.25. 
 
Figure 3.25. Trusted RUBIX Model [149] 
For the cross-domain solution, the developers of Trusted RUBIXTM have adopted 
the Trusted RUBIX Security Markup Language (RXSML) policy to apply security 
policies. In fact RXSML policy consists of four major sub-policies  (xdomain-
select, mac_check, deny and xdomain-open), associated with two policy sets called 
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(table-obj and open-obj). In the following we describe the function of each policy 
individually as well as the two policy tasks: 
The mac-check policy: applying OS-Mac security concept to control access to the 
data resource. The work basis of this policy is to use MLS principles by activating 
the relationship between the subject clearance (domain) and object classification 
(security label).   
The deny policy: this policy uses “Catch-all” policy to enforce denial for the 
operations, when no more policies associated within the policy sets are permitted 
in the operations. 
The xdomain-open policy: This policy allows the user in domain1 to open a session 
with domain2 to use data subject in domain2 and has been created by the user in 
domain1. In this case, domain1 and domain2 have the same security classification.  
The xdomain-select policy: this policy will focus only on the “SELECT” 
operations from subject to object and both in different domains (even if the 
domains have the same security clearance but in different compartments). If the 
decision is permitted, then the subject will be able to have access to the selected 
parts of the object. 
The open-obj policy: this is the set of all policies that is required for the subjects in 
different domains. 
The table-obj policy: this is the set of all policies that is required for the objects in 
different domains. 
To sum up the Trusted RUBIXTM  is how to deal with the cross-domain solution. 
By applying MLS, the subject in one domain has the right to access data only if it 
was in a different domain, but has the same security label. They ignored the 
possibility  if the data need to flow from high to low level node. 
   
 
3- Raytheon SimShieldTM [150] Raytheon is a company specialising in technologies 
related to defence, civil governments and cybersecurity solutions. Raytheon 
SimShieldTM is a commercial-off-the-shelf solution, allowing bi-directional data 
flow between two different security domains through providing a smart guard that 
84 
 
controls access to the data. Compared with the previous two solutions, 
SimShieldTM has a comprehensive meaning to deal with the data in different 
formats like text, images, and video and so on.  Moreover, it is presented as a two-
way communication and sanitization of data flow. SimShieldTM depends on the 
Trusted Operating System to create the trusted bridge that is used for ensuring 
security for data moving between different domains as illustrated in figure 3.26. 
 
 
Figure 3.26. SimShieldTM [150] 
4- Forcepoint [151] is a company dealing with cybersecurity solutions for different 
companies and governments.  Forcepoint provides high speed guards that can be 
located between different domains to ensure the right access to data resources. As 
in Raytheon SimShieldTM, Forcepoint deals with varieties of data file types with 
more speed. This type of guard has the capability to do automatic sanitization on 
data before access by the subject to achieve high assurance security. Most 
consumers of this software set it up between two big networks to ensure security 
by filtering as well as to ensure high speed of performance as shown in Figure 3.27 
85 
 
 
Figure 3.27. Forcepoint Security Guard [151] 
The last three ways have presented high level solutions of CDS. However, through my 
understanding of their work I have arrived at the general idea that all these solutions 
are based on how the subject in the domain can access data in different domains 
(different here does not necessarily mean different in security label but also different 
in compartments), like in Raytheon SimShieldTM when there are two different domains 
and each has two communicated subjects (PC) trying to send and receive information 
between the domains; they need to set up a smart guard to do the sanitization of the 
sensitive data and files. The drawback of this guard is they need a trusted operating 
system to build a trusted bridge between the domains. If we see Forcepoint in depth, in 
spite of it providing a high speed guard, it is the same position between two different 
networks. Indeed, these big projects and others, and sharing with some other proposed 
papers which are not mentioned here, the general concept of the systems that use MLS 
as a basis of working, is dependent on the clustering concept in which all the system 
entities (nodes) will be clustered according to the security clearance that they belong 
to. In this case, the security guard will be in the middle way between the clustering 
groups only, and the data will move more freely between nodes related to the same 
cluster; high security outside cluster barriers and low security inside as can be seen in 
Figure 3.28. 
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Figure 3.28. MLS Clustering 
In fact, this is not practical with the enterprises that wish to upgrade their software to 
base on the MLS concept to ensure more security and integrity of data, since adding or 
updating the security side of the software, it is not necessary to change major concepts 
and principles of the software or start again from scratch. What the researcher wants to 
say here, is that not all enterprises or governments wish for the system to enforce what 
they should do. On the contrary, the enterprise or government should enforce what the 
system should do, and work to be more satisfactory.  
Moreover, these projects forgot the intermediate processing and what will happen with 
the data and labels and what will happen if the data needs to complete the processing 
after sanitization. 
 
3.4 Summary  
This chapter has presented a review of related works which adopted Aspect oriented 
language as a basis for their solutions. It has provided a general perception of using 
AOP concepts in four major areas in security: Access Control Models, Intrusion 
Prevention, Privacy and Cryptography.  This outline has shown the effect of the Aspect-
Oriented technique for modularizing security concerns and changing the execution 
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behaviour of existing codes with only the minimal need to change existing software 
implementations. It has also reviewed how the AOP tool can be used to modulate the 
same problem but in different respects of view, for example, Role-Based Access 
Control has been modulated in different forms, but all give the same objectives, and 
this belongs to the power of this tool to deal with these concerns with more flexibility 
and maintainability.    
During the reviewing the related works, it can be summarised that there are no current 
existing method can cover the requirement of DDS security  In the following we review 
some of weaknesses points in current works: 
Lack of implementation: in some proposals, the authors are satisfied by just building a 
framework to simulate their solutions using UML and some formal languages. We 
argue that because we apply the solution practically we will discover some gaps which 
were not taken into account at the time of framework design. 
Apply partial solution: some papers provided a partial solution or modelling. For 
example, in the context of Access Control models, some papers take a part of the 
module and model it using Aspect-oriented language and ignore many roles related to 
this model. 
Lack of Scalability: some papers do not care about the extension problems and what 
suggested solutions should be taken, as well as not working in distributed 
environments. 
This chapter presented the inadequacies of the existing solution to deal with the security 
requirements of DDS. This is due most of them adopt point-to-point security and this 
sufficient for DS only. In addition, with the solutions that used MLS concept, they have 
weaknesses to deal with all model and DS requirement. This chapter shows why the 
proposed solution in this thesis is important to address the security weaknesses of the 
distributed systems in general and decentralised distributed systems in specific. 
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Chapter 4 
3AC_AOP Model 
 
Traditionally, allowing or denying access to the data resources is required as a direct 
controlling from the administrator to design the structure to give an access decision 
according to some roles and conditions. This scenario however is inadequate for some 
environments especially with those which are based on the distributed system concept. 
Most of the papers that we explored in the related work chapter focused on the 
relationship between the client and servers, service consumer and service providers and 
between the user and administrator. They identified their solutions to deal with the user 
who wants to access the data resource by granting him or just decline his access. If look 
carefully at these solutions, most of them forgot the whole figures of distributed system 
environments and what may impose on the data when flowing between the system 
entities. This motivated us to propose an access control model called (3AC_AOP) 
which aggregated the Attribute-Based Access Control, Identity-Based Access Control 
and Multi-Level Security (MLS) to fulfil the security gaps in distributed systems. These 
models will be modularized by using Aspect-Oriented Programming language to deal 
with all access control issues with more flexibility and manageability. 
This chapter presents the proposed access control model 3AC_AOP and how it can 
deal with weakness points of the existing solutions.  Besides, AOP cryptography aspect 
is presented as a method to achieve data integrity. The chapter explains how we utilized 
AOP to build AOP automatic security guard associated with 3AC_AOP model to 
ensure high cooperation between system nodes synchronized with achieving high 
security. To show the advantage of using the DDS environment, this chapter has 
presented a comparison study between two different processing in distributed system, 
Separation of Duty (SoD) and Service Function Chain (SFC) which is the adopted 
process. Finally, this chapter provides the analysis of how the proposed system works. 
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4.1 3AC_AOP Model 
3AC_AOP is a security mechanism combined three fundamental security solution 
methods, access control (Attribute, Identity and MLS)-based access control models, 
cryptography (AES symmetric algorithm) and security guard. All these components are 
modularized by AOP to produce 3AC_AOP security model as illustrated in             
Figure 4.29. 
 
Figure 4.29 3AC_AOP security model components 
Before diving deeply into model’s components, it is important to have a general 
understanding of the model and the interactions between the model’s parts.  In general, 
there are four main types of nodes according to the processing requirements as 
following: 
1- Source node: the node that the process request initiated from. Access control 
conditions are set in and the information (messages and files) are classified and 
tagged according to information sensitivity.  
2- Bridge node: or hop node is the node where the receipt access conditions do not 
match with the node’s accessing conditions. The processing with this node is 
just to re-send the encrypted information to the next node. 
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3- Processing node: is the node where the receipt access conditions match with 
the node’s accessing conditions. This node will perform its own function and 
delete the current attribute. 
4- Destination node: is the latest node in the processing path. According to the 
source node’s request and after the final process is done in this node, the 
processed request is sorted in the node or will be sent back to the source nodes 
as a response. Figure 4.30 shows theses nodes according to their missions. 
 
 
Figure 4.30. Types of Distributed Systems Nodes 
Each node in the distributed system can have one of the above nodes types. Figure 4.31 
shows 3AC_AOP model, the process starts from the source node by establishing a new 
request, the information associated with access control conditions will be sent to the 
next node. AOP encryption pointcut will intercept the sending process by encrypting 
the access conditions and the information separately. Before the information is received 
by the next node, the AOP decryption pointcut will decrypt the receipt information 
sequentially, by decrypting the accessing conditions first to implement the authority, if 
granted then decrypt the information otherwise re-encrypt the access conditions and re-
send it with the information to the next node. If the access is granted then the node will 
perform its own function and delete the executed attribute. This process will continue 
until the attributes list is empty. There are two cases discussed in this model, the first 
one, is sending a request to the destination nodes while the second case is sending the 
request and waiting for the response. The second case just includes dealing with the 
file, however, if the sending information is messages, then only the first case will be 
applied. Figure 4.32 presents the flow chart of the proposed model in detail. 
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Figure 4.31. Design of 3AC_AOP Model
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Figure 4.32.  3AC_AOP Model Flow Chart
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4.2 3AC_AOP Access Control 
As mentioned before, the proposed Access control is comprised of three access control 
models, Attribute-Based, Identity-Based and Multi-Level Security access control 
models. Figure 4.33 shows the orders of the models starting from ABAC as the abstract 
level, followed by IBAC as optional (use in special cases) as intermediate level and 
ending by MLS as a core level of the model. 
 
Figure 4.33. Proposal Model 
1. Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) 
As mentioned in section 2.7.5 (background chapter), in the MLS system some 
organizations have been adding “compartments” as extra elements to strengthen the 
access restrictions when they composite with Multi-level security concepts.  These 
compartments can be considered as services and functions associated with both subjects 
and objects. 3AC_AOP mode is dependent on separating these compartments from the 
MLS’s body and using them as attributes in ABAC.  
There are different perspectives to deal with ABAC, some of these views use attributes 
as services and others deal with these attributes as approaches, and all of these models 
are correct, see Figure 4.34. The ABAC part of the model is based on the definition by 
NIST 800-162 [59].  
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 “An access control method where a subject requests to perform operations on objects 
are granted or denied based on assigned attributes of the subject, assigned attributes 
of the object, environment conditions, and a set of policies that are specified in terms 
of those attributes and conditions”  
 
 
Figure 4.34. Attribute-Based Access Control  
2. Identity-Based Access Control (IBAC) 
This part of the  model is optional and will be controlled by the source node which has 
the freedom to use this part of the model or not. In other words the naturalism of making 
a decision of using this section of the model or not is based on what the source node 
needs to do on its own sending data. For instance, assume an enterprise administrator 
wants to send information to any user having associated with attributes {att1,att2} as 
can be seen in Figure 4.35, where the data has been sent to only users id1 and id2 who 
associated with {att1,att2} and ignored the other users. 
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Figure 4.35. Identity-Based Access Control 
On the other hand, if the source node activates the IBAC model, then the information 
will flow only to a specific user who has been selected by the source node as 
demonstrated in Figure 4.36 where the data goes only to user id2, even if he/she has 
the same attributes as user id1. 
 
Figure 4.36. Identity-Based Access Control 
Making a decision is a responsibility of the source node, whilst AOP has the 
responsibility of controlling the access of this data to the right direction according to 
the decision taken, as we will illustrate in the next lines in this chapter.   
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3. Multi-Level Security System 
In this part of the model we will use the Bell-La Padula model and how it deals with 
both subjects and objects to control the access to the data. Furthermore, this model will 
be supported by dominance relationship. This relationship focuses only on subjects, 
regardless of objects, as it is considered to relate totally on subjects that own them.  
The dominance relationship is: 
 We say A is dominate B IFF security label of A is Bigger than or equal of B 
 We say B is dominated By A IFF security label of B is Lower than of A 
The order of subject clearances are: 
Top Secret > Secret > Confidential> Unclassified  
The order of sensitivities of data are: 
TS > S > C > U 
Data Attribute  
This is what the source subject associates the sending data with the function name that 
needs to be accomplished by another subject. 
Subject Attribute  
This is what the subject can offer for functions and services. 
Sample intersections between data attributes (compartments) and subject’s attribute 
are: 
Data attribute Subject Attribute Intersection 
{A,B,C} {A,B,N} {A,B} 
{A,B} {B,C,D} {B} 
{A,B,D} {X,Y,Z} {θ} 
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Rule  
Let D= Data and Sub=Subject. 
1- Low to --- 
 If D{d.atts} ∩ Sub{s.atts} ≠ {θ} then  
   If D{d.atts} ⊆ Sub{s.atts} then  
        If  D{d.atts} ∩ Sub{s.atts}) = {d.atts}then  
              allow all D 
       else  
       If  (∃ a ∈ {d.atts}) ⋀ (a ∈ {s.atts}) then  
              allow only a 
Else  
          Decline  
2- High to – 
 If D{d.atts} ∩ Sub{s.atts} ≠ {θ} then  
If D{d.atts} ⊆ Sub{s.atts} then 
  If ( D{d.atts} ∩ Sub{s.atts}) = {d.atts}then  
    If Sub.lable=Data.label then  
       If Sub.id= D.id then /* optional*/ 
         Allow all D 
   If Sub.lable< Data.label then  
       If Sub.id= D.id then /* Mandatory*/ 
         Do sanitation of D then  
         Allow only the intersection set 
Else 
    If  (∃ a ∈ {d.atts}) ⋀ (a ∈ {s.atts}) then  
    If Sub.lable=Data.label then  
       If Sub.id= D.id then /* optional*/ 
         Allow all a 
   If Sub.lable< Data.label then  
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       If Sub.id= D.id then /* Mandatory*/ 
         Do sanitation of D then  
         Allow only a 
Else 
Decline 
  
4.3  3AC_AOP Operations 
After talking about the elements of the system, this section concentrates on the 
operations that are enforced on data by both source nodes or processing nodes 
according to what the AOP is designed for.  
 Node labelling: Each node in the distributed system will be associated by an 
integer number between (1-4). This number represents the security clearance 
label of the node such that {4, 3, 2, 1} correspond   {Top-Secret, Secret, 
Confidential, Unclassified} respectively.   
 Data labelling: As explained in section 2.5.3, the data will be divided into four 
parts according to the sensitivity of the information. D (Identifiers, Quasi-
identifiers, Sensitive-attribute, Non-sensitive-attributes) Data labelling will be 
{4, 3, 2, 1} respectively. The source node or the owner of the data will assign 
these labels to his own data as follows:  
 
          Identifiers  label = 4 
          Quasi-identifiers  label = 3 
          Sensitive-attribute  label =2 
          Non-sensitive-attributes  label = 1 
          Identifiers ∪ Quasi-identifiers  label =4 
          Identifiers ∪ Sensitive-attribute  label =4 
          Identifiers ∪ Quasi-identifiers ∪ Sensitive-attribute  label =4 
          Quasi-identifiers ∪ Sensitive-attribute  label =3 
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In this case any piece of information will be labelled according to the level of sensitivity 
as well as if this piece is associated with another piece of information and the latter has 
a higher label, then all the mixers will be labelled as the higher label as demonstrated 
in the Figure 4.37.  
 
Figure 4.37. Privacy Preserving Division 
4.4 3AC_AOP Cryptography  
To ensure the integrity of the data transmission between system nodes, a symmetric 
cryptography algorithm has been adopted to accomplish this mission. The encryption 
process will be included both data, and access conditions individually. The process 
starts after authorization and authentication is granted, then decrypt the data file, 
otherwise keeping it in encrypted form and sending it associated with encrypted access 
conditions to the next node in the system.  
The encryption and decryption processes will be controlled totally by AOP where they 
intercept the encryption process before the data leaves the source node and decrypt the 
data after the success of all authentication and authorization processes and before going 
to the receipt node as shown in Figure 4.38. 
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Figure 4.38. Cryptography 
4.5 3AC_AOP Security Guard  
AOP security guard is used to ensure the integrity of the data during the processing, 
and moreover to prevent the low level clearance node reviewing the sensitive 
information that has been sent by the high level node. We argue that not all information 
in high security nodes has a high security level, otherwise it would not have been treated 
with the information coming from low level nodes. With the purpose of achieving high 
levels of cooperation between system entities and high security assurance, we include 
the sanitization method to deal with the data that is going to be processed inside the 
node.  
Similarly with the cryptography methods, the data sanitization method will be totally 
controlled by AOP in which it will be the intermediate phase between AOP-
authorization process and AOP- encryption process. Because the sanitation process will 
only be used when data flows from high to low levels of security, the dynamic AOP 
security guard will be adopted to do this task. In other words, if the network is working 
in a correct form and data flows just from low to the same or to a high level, then the 
AOP which is used for the sanitization will be off and will not occur just if the flow 
was from high to low.  
Dealing with sanitation methods falls into two ways: 
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1- Temporary sanitation (intermediates nodes): 
In this method, AOP will erase the sensitive data temporarily by keeping them 
in a temporary storage device before the rest of the data goes to the node. After 
the intended node did the process on the clean data and before sending it to the 
next node, AOP advice will append the sensitive information with the processed 
data, to recreate the whole data file before going to the encryption process also 
by AOP.  This type of sanitation method is used only with the intermediate 
processing nodes (the nodes that need to do process on data before approaching 
the destination node as can be seen in Figure 4.39. 
 
Figure 4.39. Temporary sanitation 
2- Full sanitation (destination node ):  
This type of sanitization method has two faces:  
1- If the destination node is the final processing station and the source node 
did not ask for a response, then the sensitive data will be erased totally and 
deleted by the AOP sensitive data remover as shown in Figure 4.40. 
2- If the destination node needs to respond to the source node request then 
AOP will work like in point1. All these scenarios will be explained at the 
end of this chapter. 
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Figure 4.40. Full sanitation 
4.6 Declassification: 
Customarily, declassifying security labels of information is a complex task because it 
could have serious consequences, especially for the system using MLS principles as 
the basis of work. In this model, the domination relationship gives the higher 
classification node the ability to declassify their data only as necessary. In our   view, 
declassifying data does not require that all data files will be declassified, but only the 
piece of data that the source node wishes to process in the lower node. Indeed, the 
declassification process is considered as the next process after the sanitation process, 
and it is controlled by AOP pointcuts.  
 
4.7 Separation of duties and service function chain 
 
This model provides a flexible handling of the data. The major challenge, however, is 
how to control the accessing and security policy when the data flows and processes 
between distributed nodes. For this reason, this model and the outcome result 
concentrate on how to do sequential processing on data rather than separate processing 
tasks between different nodes at the same time. In the following example, we show the 
benefits of using the sequential process beside the separation of duty:  
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Let’s suppose a client sends a query as a table with 10 names and some other 
identification information to checking:  
“How many of these names, suffering from heart disease, get a benefit from city council 
and have no crime record”. 
Traditionally, the main server will divide this query into three parts depending on 
separation of duties concepts. Firstly, “suffering from heart disease” this part of query 
will be sent to the Healthcare system server. Secondly, “get a benefit from city council” 
this part will go to the city council server and finally “have no crime record” this part 
is a police officer server’s task.   
Let’s suppose each record in the table needs 1s for processing and matching, then the 
result simply will be:  
3 servers x 10sec = 30sec  is the only time needed to process in all servers and follows with 
the time that is needed to handle the results in the main server before returning the 
response to the client, as can be seen in the Figure 4.41–a-. 
  
                        -a-                                                          -b- 
Figure 4.41. -a- Separation of Duty (SoD), -b- Sequential Processing 
In comparison, with the sequential processing concept as be seen in Figure 4.41 –b-, 
the latter has many features which make it more efficient and reliable, because only the 
first server in the processing path will receive the whole data. While the remaining two 
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servers will receive only the outcome results from the first server, in which the second 
server will receive the first server’s outputs and the third server will receive the second 
server’s result, and so on. Thus this reduces the execution time and there is no 
processing required from the main server, as the result from the final server is the same 
as the client’s response. Let’s return back to our example, the execution time can be 
calculated by doing an addition operation between execution time for each server as 
follows:  
Running time = (execution time –Server1)+ (execution time –Server2)+ (execution 
time –Server3) 
As explained above, server2 will use the output of server1 and so on. Let’s suppose 
that each server ignores 2 records as there is no matching, then the total time will be  
Running time = (10sec) + (8sec) + (6sec) = 24sec 
To sum up, the sequential process (sometimes called service function chain) is more 
efficient compared with the separation of duty process. In fact, there is no matching 
between their execution times except if there is a comprehensive matching between the 
income and the output of each server. Even then, the sequential process still has the 
foreground because the result from the last server will not need any other maintenance 
in the main server before returning the result to the client. 
All these previous factors prompted us to choose the sequential processing system as a 
basis to enforce the  proposed to ensure the security and privacy of information in both 
data flow and data processing in distributed system environments.  
Figure 4.42 shows the whole figure of the proposed distributed system working and 
illustrated how the data processed and travel between system nodes. 
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Figure 4.42. The Final Model 
4.8 System analysis 
 
Despite the increasing consolidation between access control models becoming more  
common recently, the execution and running of those consolidations however remains 
a hard task to do, and most of these models are placed in the proposed systems box.  
The main reasons for combining between access control models is to strengthen the 
features of each model at the same time reducing the weakness points which are 
associated with some models. There are many challenges which should be solved 
before doing the combinations between access controls: 
1- Are the consequences of the consolidation meeting the customers’ (companies’) 
requirements?  
 
2- Is the combination able to keep the features of individual models or will they 
be removed to produce a new hybrid feature? 
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3- What side effects will occur if the final access control model is applied to 
existing software? 
 
4- Do the companies or customers need to change their software and follow what 
the new software with access control will dictate to them? 
 
5- Does the new model take into account the dynamic behaviour of the distributed 
system? 
 
6- Is the scalability of the model able to meet that of the company’s software? 
 
7- How does the model deal with the software’s users, as trusted, untrusted or mix 
(need TCB)? 
 
8- What attention should be paid for converting from an insecure system to a 
secure system, and adopting Access control as a security basis? 
 
9- Is the consequent model able to satisfy the security requirements (C, I, and A) 
[152]? 
 
10- How much should the cost be if the organization uses high cost software or 
depends on new hardware to do the task? 
 
11- Does the new model affect the performance of the software? 
In fact, all of these points should be taken into account before trying to combine 
between two or more access control models. Moreover, applying the consequences 
model practically is totally different from dealing with it as a framework, because in 
practice the reality will be simulated, and the real outcomes will be studied to produce 
a final version free from errors ACAP.       
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In the following we will explore the features and the capability of the model and we 
will show how it deals with the above concerns and what suggested solutions are to be 
adopted:  
1- The combination of Access control models (Attribute, identity, MLS)- based 
Access control is done in a sequential manner. In other words, the access 
restrictions and conditions will start from the Attribute model and forward down 
to the Multilevel Security model. In case the access condition does not satisfy 
any model layer except the last layer then the access will be declined. 
Otherwise, access to the information will be allowed, after taking all 
precautions to prevent any types of intended or unintended penetration as the 
task would require at that time. We utilised AOP to design these models 
separately to prevent the occurrence of any tangling during the design and 
processing, after that we combine them together by using AOP as well.  
 
2- We applied the  access control model by using AOP. This helps to keep the 
original software the same, just as AOP has selected some pointcuts to intercept 
the execution of the software by injecting the model to control access to the 
information, without affecting the original software. Indeed, this is what 
motivated us to design the model using AOP. 
 
3- The model will be able to face the dynamic changing behaviour of the system 
during the execution. Because of using AOP, it will be able to monitor system 
working, and change the working as to what the task requires at that time. 
 
4- The nature of networks and distributed systems must be flexible and scalable to 
keep pace with the frequent development of these environments. Security is one 
of the major challenges that should be taken into account in these systems, 
because adding or updating security requirements will be a hard task for system 
developers and programmers. They need to check all the software codes to 
select which piece should do the security task, thus raising tangling and 
scattering problems of software codes. AOP solves this problem by keeping the 
108 
 
original without changing or just needing a tiny change, and the whole security 
software will be designed as a separate package. This will increase the stability 
and flexibility of distributed system environments. 
 
5- The consequence model supports the sequential processing (SP), when the 
information is required to be processed by the intermediate node(s) before 
arriving at the destination node. This feature is totally controlled by AOP 
through doing all the required access control operations dynamically, and 
during the running time. 
 
6- In addition to supporting sequential processing (SP), proposed model supports 
the separation of duty (SoD) concepts. In this case, the source node is able to 
separate its own tasks between some distributed nodes and get the result back 
after processing.  
 
7- Information confidentiality is being achieved by adopting MLS concepts as 
access control layers in  the proposed model, in which no one can have access 
to the data file or even a piece of information without appropriate permission. 
This permission is the consequence of comparing between the node clearance 
and security label of information, and this is done by AOP also.       
 
8- Data integrity is being achieved by using cryptography algorithms to encrypt 
data during travelling between system nodes. Encryption and decryption 
operations are being controlled by using AOP advices. ‘Before advice’ will be 
used to encrypt the data before leaving the node, and ‘after advice’ will decrypt 
the data after satisfying all conditions of the access control layers.  
 
9- Bidirectional data transition; by using AOP as a shield to protect the 
information in the context of the node by using access control and cryptography 
as well as in the context of the data flow by encrypting the transmitted 
information. The information now is free to move and travel between system 
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nodes, regardless of the security label of the information or security clearance 
of the nodes. The AOP shield will check the information, if it matches the 
access control requirements (as the source node wishes) then it allows the 
information to pass inside the node after decrypting the permitted part of the 
information; otherwise it uses the node as a router (bridge) to transmit the 
information to the next node in the distributed system. 
 
10- To achieve high flexibility and cooperation between the distributed system 
nodes, as well as to satisfy the high level of security and information safety to 
the system, we use AOP security guard.  In the proposed solution related to this 
side of the model, we adopted the “domination relationship” to restrict the 
allowance of the low clearance node to access unclassified information within 
a file which has been classified as a higher level than the node. This decision 
will be taken by high level nodes upon the lower ones, to allow the low level 
nodes to get only information classified as low, after sanitization of all sensitive 
and high importance information.    
 
11- In the context of the sequential process (SP), sometimes the information needs 
processing accomplished by the intermediates nodes and this (these) node(s) 
have lower clearance than the information. In the proposal we solved this 
problem by sanitizing the information before it arrives at the node processer 
and saving the sanitized information in temporary storage. After finishing 
processing, the sanitized information will be added to the processing outcome 
to recreate the file, before the sending information process in the model. In this 
case we ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the sensitive information by 
saving it in encrypted form, to prevent anyone trying to retrieve the information 
by using the lower nodes in future.       
 
Figure 4.43 shows the data flow inside the node. 
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Figure 4.43. Data Flow in the Model 
  
4.9 Summary  
This chapter has provided a comprehensive description of the proposed access control 
model to be presented as a powerful model to prevent unauthorised access to data 
resources in distributed system. Beside, all fundamental topics that construct the 
solution have been explained in depth.  The chapter started with the proposed access 
control model in 3AC_AOP , we have explained the elements of the model, ABAC, 
IBAC and MLS. Moreover, we have detailed the problems that are associated with 
MLS and we presented the appropriate solutions. Cryptography was also presented in 
this chapter as a second support solution. We have shown how we utilized AOP to 
create a security guard setup between system nodes to secure the communication and 
data flow from high to low. 
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Chapter 5 
The Implementation of 3AC_AOP 
This chapter provides an explanation of the details about the implementation of the 
proposed system. Firstly, we developed a general decentralized distributed system 
(DDS). This system comprises N number of distributed machines (for ease we will use 
nodes2 rather than machines) connected by TCP/IP protocol. We have designed each 
node to play the role that an individual node should have in a DDS, in which each node 
has both status (Client and Server) simultaneously. Thus, each node has the same ability 
to send request, receive, respond and to do its own function.  
In this chapter has focused on DDS and how to apply the proposed solution to ensure 
high security and privacy protection.  
5.1 Methodology   
 
In this section, the experimental results of the proposed solution have been evaluated 
by comparing the appropriateness of using the proposed model to develop a secure 
scheme and the traditional development by using OOP. Each node has been developed 
by OOP to perform its own function, sending, receiving information and other methods 
which are designed to coordinate the essential methods. We have held all these methods 
in the same class, in which accessing conditions have been added to the code to 
associate sending, receiving and handling the node function. With cryptography 
concerns we developed external classes to reduce the scattering and tangling caused by 
accessing conditions as well as the cryptography algorithm. On the other side, with 
AOP, the pointcuts will intercept all required methods inside the main classes without 
needing to recreate  new classes dealing with the sending, receiving and 
implementation functions of the node, thus decreasing the need to modify the main 
code as illustrated in Figure 5.44.    
                                                          
2 It’s a term referring to individual server, workstation, or any network terminal. This thesis deals with 
node as independent code can be represented by PC. However, we include all nodes in one workstation 
PC but this not prevent each node can setup in individual PC. 
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Figure 5.44 Intercept node methods using AOP 
 
The evaluation is based on runtime performance between OOP and AOP to accomplish 
the required mission. This time is calculated by millisecond and different from time to 
time according to CPU status and the process function. The proposed solution used java 
eclipse Oxygen 2017 to develop the system and AspectJ to deal with AOP. The 
properties of the operating system are: 
 Windows10 
 Processor: Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4770 CPU @ 3.40GHz  
 RAM: 16.0 GB 
 System type: x64 based processor   
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5.2 Decentralized Distributed system  
 
DDS has been described in the background chapter (Chapter2) however, this section 
re-describes it from the aspect of the coding perspective. In DDS the naturalism of the 
networking is slightly different from CDS. There are no central server(s), each node 
has both statuses (Client-Server) at the same time as shown in Figure 5.45 –b-. In 
comparison with the CDS this network is considered as an unstructured network and it 
might be that there are no direct connections between nodes, thus sending a request to 
the intended node(s) may require a multi-hop concept to approach the node(s) as 
illustrated in Figure 5.45 a. Node1 sent a request to Node4  
 
 
 
Figure 5.45. Decentralized Distributed System Adopted Scenario 
 
there are no direct connections between these nodes. To accomplish this process, the 
request query would hop between Node2 and Node3 to approach Node4. This will be 
fine from the perspective of DDS. However, if DDS adopted security concepts, then 
the data transmission between nodes would be more restricted or even impossible. For 
example, with the system that is based on multi-level security (MLS) concepts, if the 
security clearance of the node and security classification of the transmitted data are not 
meeting MLS conditions, then the data transmission will be impossible. In the proposed 
solution we solve this problem by utilizing the characteristics of aspect-oriented 
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programming to create a shield around the node. Thus, the security processes will be 
implemented in the abstract level of the node’s code. The proposed security scheme 
compromises of three main solutions: access control, cryptography and security guard. 
This chapter reviews the implementation details of the proposed solution, by starting 
with AOP and how it intercepts the code body in a specific join point. Next we are 
dealing in depth with the proposed solution in three phases: 1) access control 2) 
cryptography and 3) AOP guard.  
5.3 Aspect-Oriented Programming. 
 
More importantly, to choose carefully the relevant join points within the original code 
to be intercepted by the pointcuts, the objective of the  proposed solution is to ensure 
the security and integrity of the data and the node itself. For this reason AOP pointcuts 
will intercept the sending and receiving operations only when a node sends a request 
or receives a response from other nodes. If the request however, is directed to the same 
node then the AOP’s join point will be suspended and the code will proceed normally. 
Access control policies and encryption/decryption operations will be organized and 
applied as Aspect pointcuts moreover, access control actions will be performed by 
Aspect advice.  We have used around() an AspectJ advice to intercept the 
communication because it represents the meaning of both before() and after() AspectJ 
advices, so we achieve a high encapsulation of the data which is transmitting between 
system nodes. Instead of intercepting the sending and receiving methods by method 
names, the pointcuts intercept the internal java reserved methods of both sending and 
receiving methods.  The next code shows sending (creatRequest())  method in the 
proposed system. 
Java Code : Sending method 
public void createRequest(String server, int port) { 
 try { 
  socket = new Socket(server, port); 
  dout = new DataOutputStream(socket.getOutputStream()); 
     
  int counter = 0; 
   while ( counter < REQUEST_PROCESS.length) { 
   dout.writeUTF(REQUEST_PROCESS[counter]); 
   dout.flush(); 
         if(counter == 0) { 
     dout.writeUTF(sender); 
     dout.flush(); 
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    } else if(counter == 1) { 
     dout.writeUTF(attributeList); 
     dout.flush(); 
    } else if(counter == 2) { 
     dout.writeUTF(path); 
     dout.flush(); 
    } else if(counter == 3) { 
     dout.writeUTF(processingPath); 
     dout.flush(); 
    } else if(counter == 4) { 
     dout.writeUTF(ID); 
     dout.flush(); 
      
     dout.writeInt(totalFile); 
     dout.flush(); 
  for(int i = 0; i < totalFile; i++) { 
         dout.write(Files.readAllBytes(fileStack[i].toPath())); 
         dout.flush(); 
   
    if(fileStack[i].getName().contains(TEMP_FILE)) { 
  fileStack[i].delete(); 
  fileStack[i] = null; 
    } 
    } 
    } 
    counter++; 
    } 
   socket.close(); 
  } catch (UnknownHostException e) { 
   System.out.println("No neighbor found."); 
  } catch (IOException e) { 
   System.out.println("Response problem."); 
  } 
 } 
 
Instead of selecting a createRequest(..) as a join point to be intercepted by Aspect 
pointcuts, the proposal pointcuts intercept the processing methods which are related to 
TCP/IP protocols in java language. The main reason to do this, is to eliminate the need 
to do matching between pointcut parameters and the method signature, furthermore 
dealing with the sending method data as a whole package, which sometimes has 
difficulty manipulating the code and thus, affects the code’s performance,  and  
moreover to increase the generality of applying AOP by focusing on the functionality 
side of the method rather than the method name. By espousing this implementation, the 
pointcut intercepts only (.writeUTF () ) method, so we achieve a high level of 
controlling the sending method, as well as not needing to intercept any unnecessary 
methods or data. The pointcut is designed based on the following pointcut expression  
call (Method-Type writeUTF(Type)) 
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 And it is represented in code perspective as:  
 method-call(void java.io.DataOutputStream.writeUTF(java.lang.String)) 
The following pointcut and aspect advice will be adopted by the proposal to intercept 
all writeUTF methods  
AspectJ code: pointcut 
pointcut ReqIntercept(String message):call(public final void writeUTF(String))&&args(message); 
 
Figure 5.46. shows the cross cutting of the pointcuts over  (.writeUTF () ) method  
 
Figure 5.46. Cross Reference for a New Request 
As explained on how to use pointcut to intercept the sending method, we deal with the 
receiving method in the same way. The pointcuts intercept (.readUTF()) method instead 
of method name. The following code shows what the code will receive from the source 
node:  
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Java Code: Receive method 
public void receiveResponse(DataInputStream din) throws IOException 
 { 
 String serverResponse = "OK"; 
 while (!serverResponse.equals(“finish”)) {  // Stop Condition 
  serverResponse = din.readUTF(); 
    if(serverResponse.equals(“sender”)) { 
   sender = din.readUTF(); 
   } else if(serverResponse.equals(“attributeList”)) { 
    attributeList = din.readUTF(); 
   } else if(serverResponse.equals(“path”)) { 
    path = din.readUTF(); 
   } else if(serverResponse.equals(“processingPath”)) { 
    processingPath = din.readUTF(); 
   } else if(serverResponse.equals(“file”)) { 
    requester = din.readUTF(); 
    totalFile = din.readInt(); 
     
    for(int i = 0; i < totalFile; i++) { 
   byte [] byt = new byte[MAX_FILE_SIZE_MB * 1024]; 
   din.read(byt); 
      
 fileLocation = DATA_FILE_LOCATION + DATA_FILE_OUTPUT + TEMP_FILE + i; 
    Files.write(new File(fileLocation).toPath(), byt); 
     fileStack[i] = new File(fileLocation); 
    } 
   } 
  } 
 } 
 
The pointcut designed based on the following pointcut expression  
call(String readUTF());  
AspectJ code: pointcut 
pointcut RespIntercept():call(String readUTF()); 
 
Figure5.47 shows the cross-cutting of the pointcuts over  (.readUTF()) method  
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Figure 5.47. Cross Reference for Receiving a Response 
 
5.4 3AC-AOP Solution 
 The proposed model deals with the security and privacy concerns as three phases: 
1- Access control and data flow. 
2- Cryptography. 
3- Data sanitization (AOP security guard). 
 
5.4.1 3AC_AOP Access Control Solution 
 
This section details the development of the access control model policies in OOP and 
AOP.  Instead of using XACML to write the access control policy which sometimes 
leads to complicating the coding, and may increase the tangling and scattering problem 
by needing to add some extra lines of codes, which in turn has a negative effect on the 
performance of the code, we embedded the policies within the main code in OOP and 
within the aspect pointcuts within AOP. As demonstrated by the previous section, the 
access control policy would be applied between sending and responding methods. 
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Within the same node, there are no access restrictions if the request is directed to the 
same node to do its own function as shown in Figure5.48. 
 
Figure 5.48. Access Control dealing with the node 
However, when Nodei sends or receives a request to/from any other node(s), then the 
access control policies will be activated. The next subsections discuss the design and 
enforcement of the access control model policy in DDS for both cases, OOP and AOP.  
 Access control model 
 
As explored in Chapter 4, the proposed access control model is combined between three 
access control models to produce a powerful access control model called (3AC_AOP). 
This combination comprises ABAC, IBAC and MLS. In the following, we deal with 
each model separately from a coding perspective, afterwards these models will be 
aggregated together in one model. 
1. Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) 
ABAC may represent the characteristics of the node, distributed system or even the 
environment around.  This will help to add extra space to express each node as job 
nature, role within enterprise, node’s function and so on, in addition to the 
environment of the distributed system which it works with, for example the period 
time and date of working. All these factors are aggregated to create the model.  
The proposed solution focuses on the function side of the node as a restricted 
condition, to allow or deny accessing to the transmitted data. The system 
administrator will be responsible for distributing the attributes among the 
distributed nodes as a JSON file to represent each node separately, as shown below: 
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[  
     {  
           “Name”: “Node1” 
            “Node_Fucntion”: “NodeFucntion” 
     }, 
    {  
           “Name”: “Node2” 
            “Node_Fucntion”: “NodeFucntion” 
     }, 
    {  
           “Name”: “Node3” 
            “Node_Fucntion”: “NodeFucntion” 
     } 
. 
. 
   ] 
 
 
Algorithm 1 shows how the node will check the incoming file(s) associated with 
attributes with the node attributes. If the conditions are satisfied, then the file(s) will be 
sent to the node function to perform the mission. Afterwards, the executed attribute(s) 
will be deleted from the attribute list as a step of stop condition.  
Algorithm1: ABAC 
Input: file, attributeList 
Output: processed file or denied 
1. Start 
2. Nodei Send (file+ attributeList)  
3. int k=0; 
4. While (k<DDS.length) && (attributeList !=θ) // DDS.length is node numbers 
5.    If ( Nodek.attribute ⊆ attributeList ) 
6.          Nodek.function  
7.          attributeList= attributeList.Remove(Nodek.attribute) 
8.     EndIf  
9. k++ 
10. EndWhile 
11. End 
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Hence, accessing the data file by the node will be dependent on the node’s function. In 
the case of broadcasting without processing the file, the stop condition will convert to 
be (While (k<DDS.length) ) only and we delete line 7. This will expand the broadcast 
concept through the ability to share the data between some nodes sharing with the same 
attributes.  
                    (k<DDS.length)  share data between match attribute nodes (no processing)                                                                                                                    
ABAC  
                    (k<DDS.length) && (attributeList !=θ) process data and stop when no more attrs                
                                                                             
AspectJ code: Attribute Access Control Coding (ABAC) (processing side) 
 
String nodeAttribute; 
String attribute; 
 
 
pointcut InterceptResq():call(String readUTF()); 
String around() throws IOException:InterceptResq(){ 
attribute= proceed();  
if (attributeList.contains(nodeAttribute)) 
  { 
   nodeFunction(); 
   attributeList.replace(nodeAttribute) 
   } 
 
  return (proceed()); 
} 
 
 
To conclude, the ABAC model, the source nodes set the required attributes and then 
sending file to be processed by different nodes in DDS according to the attributes. 
Figure5.49. shows the process of this model and how to distinguish between the routing 
path and the processing path. 
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Figure 5.49. ABAC in 3AC_AOP working 
2. Identity-Based Access Control (IBAC) 
Complementary to ABAC, IBAC adds more restrictions to the access processing. This 
model forwards the data files to the intended node or nodes in case the source node 
sends more than one identity. Using this model is optional and would only be 
compulsory if the source node needed to apply a domination relationship according to 
the node’s clearance.  Similarly, with ABAC, the system administrator will be 
responsible for distributing the roles of this model among the distributed nodes in the 
form of a JSON file as seen below:  
[  
     {  
           “Name”: “Node1” 
            “Node_ID”: “NodeID” 
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     }, 
    {  
           “Name”: “Node2” 
            “Node_ID”: “NodeID” 
     }, 
    {  
           “Name”: “Node3” 
            “Node_ID”: “NodeID” 
     } 
. 
. 
   ] 
 
The proposed model adopted ABAC as the higher layer and MLS as the lower layer 
and both must be applied to satisfy our objective to save the data. Based on this idea, 
IBAC can be represented by the intermediate layer used to support the security when 
the source node would enforce access control policy according to the domination 
relationship. For this reason we cannot separate MLS from ABAC, thus the Algorithm2 
will have the same orientation, adding only the IBAC restricting condition as illustrated 
below:  
Algorithm1: ABAC+IBAC 
Input: file, attributeList, IdList 
Output: processed file or denied 
1- Start 
2-  Nodei Send (file+ attributeList+ IdList)  
3- int k=0; 
4- While (k<DDS.length) && (attributeList !=θ)   // DDS.length is node numbers 
5-    If ( Nodek.attribute ⊆ attributeList )&& ( Nodek.Ids ⊆ IdList) 
6-          Nodek.function  
7-          attributeList= attributeList.Remove(Nodek.attribute) 
8-     EndIf  
9- k++ 
10- EndWhile 
11- End 
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The processing will therefore include only the intended nodes in which their Id’s match 
the receipt Id’s. Figure5.50 shows the implementation of this model combining with 
ABAC. 
 
Figure 5.50. ABAC and IBAC in 3AC_AOP model 
The implementation has shown, that using IBAC with ABAC will increase the 
reliability of the system by improving the efficiency through forwarding the file only 
to the intended nodes. 
                              IdList = θ share data between match attribute nodes (no processing)                                                                                                                    
ABAC+IBAC  
                             IdList ≠ θ forward data only to the intended nodes. 
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AspectJ code: ABAC+IBAC 
 
String nodeAttribute; 
String attribute; 
 
 
pointcut InterceptResq():call(String readUTF()); 
String around() throws IOException:InterceptResq(){ 
attribute= proceed();  
if (attributeList.contains(nodeAttribute) && IdList.contains(nodeIDs) 
  { 
   nodeFunction(); 
   attributeList.replace(nodeAttribute 
   } 
 
  return (proceed()); 
} 
 
 
A question may arise here about why we need to use the ABAC policy, if IBAC can 
forward data only to an intended node. The answer is that ABAC provides a more 
comprehensive meaning by achieving a means of sharing, without the need to 
determine which node will do this.  
                                                                                          
3. Multiple Level Security 
This model represents the infrastructure of the proposed model. The access granted 
depends on the security clearance of the node in addition to the security classification 
of the file, to prevent data spill through the access processes. In order to obtain high 
efficacy of this model, the node should have a security clearance, as well as the 
transmitted file being tagged by a security classification tag. For this reason, we have 
designed a DDS to give the ability to the individual node to tag its own data according 
to the clearance level of the node. This will give more flexibility and cooperation 
between distributed system works. As demonstrated in the previous models the system 
administrator will be responsible for distributing the security clearance of each node 
separately. The difference here however is that the clearance level is set up within the 
node interface, such that each node has a constant parameter representing the clearance 
level of the node. Security clearances of the DDS nodes and security classifications of 
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the data transmitted between distributed nodes, are represented as integer numbers 
between 1-4 , such that 4 is the top secret and 0 is unclassified level, 3 is secret level  
and 2 is classified level. This will cover both security clearance and classification. The 
method which is used to classify the data file will be discussed in the cryptography 
section.  
5.4.1.1 Access Control Combination   
As we mentioned before, IBAC is an option and can be used just in some special cases. 
This section shows the combination between ABAC and MLS, and ABAC, IBAC and 
MLS, and when we need to use it.  
1. ABAC and MLS 
This combination allows the source node (sender) to send a request to other nodes after 
enforcing restrictions on the file. These restrictions are different from one node to 
another, according to the security clearance of the node. The scenario of this 
combination mode will take the following forms: 
1- Normal sending, if the source node sends a file to other nodes normally, then 
each node in the distributed system has access only if they meet the attributes, 
and security clearance is greater than or equal to the source node clearance 
level. 
Node(i)attr+SL  Node(j)attr+SL authorized iff attr[j]=attr[i] & SL[j]>=SL[i]. 
2- Each node has the ability to divide the file into portions according to its own 
security clearance and restrict access to the sending file, in which each 
processing node has an allowance to access to part of the file not the whole, if 
they meet the attributes of this part and security clearance. The security 
clearance has one number between (1-4) when 1 is the lower level and 4 is the 
top secure node as shown in Figure 5.51 
3- If the node has a high level of security clearance, then it will be able to divide 
the file between 1-4 and using the domination relationship to send the file to 
other nodes. In this case we need to use IBAC. 
127 
 
Figure 5.51 shows the ability of each node to divide the file according to the security 
clearance of the node. 
 
Figure 5.51. Authority to Classify the Files and Messages According to Node Security 
Clearance 
2. ABAC, IBAC, MLS 
This combination is the consequence of the need of the node with high clearance to 
allow lower levels to process on its transmitted file, or when the source node wishes 
to do the process in specific nodes.  This makes the model more flexible and 
cooperative by achieving a high level of security and reliability. The model supports 
the fact that not all the information in high clearance domains is classified as highly 
sensitive.  
The JSON file will take the form  
[  
     {  
           “Name”: “Node1” 
            “Node_Fucntion”: “NodeFucntion” 
            “Node_ID”: “NodeID” 
     }, 
    {  
           “Name”: “Node2” 
            “Node_Fucntion”: “NodeFucntion” 
            “Node_ID”: “NodeID” 
     }, 
    {  
           “Name”: “Node3” 
            “Node_Fucntion”: “NodeFucntion” 
            “Node_ID”: “NodeID” 
     } 
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. 
. 
. 
   ] 
 
We have seen that, invoking a method called AccessControl() by the pointcuts is better 
than if we do all the processes inside around() advice, in order to keep a high level of 
separation to reduce the tangling problem.  
AspectJ Code: ABAC,IBAC and MLS 
pointcut InterceptRes():call(String readUTF()); 
String around() throws IOException:InterceptRes(){  
   return Accessing(proceed());} 
   
public static String Accessing(String string) throws IOException { 
 if (string.contains("ID")){     // To check of source node used ID
 if (string.contains("Node_ID")) {  // To check if ID is available  
  Id_verify ="okay";         // public parameter 
   } 
   } 
    
 if(string.contains("nodeAttr")&&( Id_verify =="okay")) { 
        if (Sdr_SL<=Node.SL) 
  { 
  fileHandeling(); 
  string=string.replace("nodeAttr", ""); 
    } 
  return string; 
 } 
  
 
5.4.2 3AC_AOP Cryptography  
 
In order to ensure the integrity of data transmission among distributed system nodes, 
and to prevent any type of eavesdropping attacks, the proposal system has utilized AOP 
to encrypt and decrypt the data transmission only when it is required. We used the AES 
cryptography algorithm with key 128 bits. However, adding the cryptography basement 
to the distributed system will add burdens that may affect the effectiveness of the 
system in the near and long term. To minimize the encumbrance of using cryptography 
processing, encryption and decryption in respect of AOP will be applied on both static 
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and dynamic. The AOP advice will encrypt the access conditions and file separately . 
In the context of the file, this will be tagged previously by the source node. In the receipt 
node, AOP decryption advice will be applied on access condition; if there is a matching, 
then AOP advice will decrypt the file according to the security level, otherwise it will 
be re-forwarded to the next connected node(s) in an encryption form. By applying this 
scenario, we eliminate the need to decrypt and re-encrypt the file if this is not necessary. 
Moreover, the decryption process may be applied only on a specific portion of the file 
that matched the attribute of the source node and node security clearance as well.  The 
3AC_AOP model will interact with the cryptography model to support the security 
processes and achieve a high level of confidentiality.  
One of the major objectives in this thesis is the privacy preservation. This is done by 
restricting the access to the whole file data by authorizing each node to arrive only to 
the authorized portion of the data, not all the file, while the rest of the file will still be 
in an encrypted form. In this case, this portion will be treated as a separate file. After 
the process is done then the result will be appended to the original file to recreate the 
whole file, before sending to the next node.       
Achieving security does not necessarily mean fulfilling the privacy protection 
requirements. For example, if the system adopts ordinary access control and this 
restricts unauthorized users to modify the information but not prevent viewing the file, 
we achieve the security by keeping the information integrity, but the privacy side will 
be violated. Thus, this would lead to leaking the privacy. In the rest of this chapter 
cryptography will be associated with the access control model.  
1. File encryption 
The implementation of the cryptography side has two cases:  
1. Before processing: this phase is performed when any node classifies their files 
and tag them to be saved in its own storage before doing any processing. For 
example, some system scenarios need to implement the processing in some 
specific time periods like payroll system (monthly), annual profit report 
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(annually). In this case, the source node (sender) will prepare the file in a tagged 
form. 
   
2. During processing: this phase happens at run time when any source node wishes 
to send a file to other nodes in the system, then AOP encryption advice will 
intercept the send method to encrypt access conditions and file separately.  
 
 Cryptography cases: 
1- Normal case: the source node sends the file(s) associated with Access 
conditions. We assume that the processing required the whole file to do the 
processing. In this case, the access authorization is only granted if the receipt 
node’s clearance is greater than or equal to the source node level. Thus, AOP 
will decrypt the whole file to perform the requested process. This case includes 
performing the process in one node, or even in more than one node if the process 
needs multiple stages to complete the process, as illustrated in Algorithm3. 
 
Algorithm3: Normal case 
Inputs: encrypted file, attributes list , identities list. 
Output: processed file save in source node. 
1- Start  
2- S.N sends Encrypted AC and File                              // S.N= source node 
3- For each R.N  
4- AOP. Decrypt (AC) 
5-   If (R.N.attribute= S.N.file.attribute)            // if identities list is empty 
6-      If (R.N.attribute= S.N.file.attribute)&& (R.N.id= S.N.file.id) 
7-        AOP. Decrypt (file). 
8-         R.N.Function(file)  file* 
9-        AOP. Encrypt(file*) 
10-        AOP. Encrypt (AC) 
11-      End if  
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12-    Send to next node(s) 
13-   End for 
14- End 
      
 
2- Dominate case: this case is based on the level of security clearance of the source 
node, see Algortihm4.  
 
Algorithm4: Dominate case, (Cryptography and tag) 
Inputs: File, S.N.level 
Output: Encrypted and tagged file 
1- Start  
2- Enter the file                            
3- Within the source node 
4- Review the header of the file (file attributes)    // file (.csv, .sql, 
.JSON….) 
5- Classified the attributes in sets according to security/privacy 
sensitive  
6- AOP Encrypt and tag each set according to classification level 
7- Output: encrypted and tagged file. 
8- End 
      
 
The key aspect discussed is that according to the domination level, the node can divide 
the file in the context of a column. Let’s return back to the payroll system when the 
source node (salary database) would send a data file including identities and other 
attributes like (Id, Name, Address, No.Hrs, Hrs.Price, Salary, S.C, Acc.No  …). The 
source node has been classified as Top secret clearance (4), thus, the node has the 
ability to divide the file into 4 tags {Top Secret, Secret, Confidential, Unclassified} or 
{4, 3, 2, 1}. In our example the source node will send the file to calculate the salary, 
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and after that make money transactions to the employees. Salary calculations will be 
done in a node classified as top secret, and its function is to set the price of working 
hours and calculate the salary. This node needs some identities to do matching between 
the employees in the file and the employees in its own database, to determine the price 
of working hours and calculate the salary for each individual employee. Afterwards, 
the third node will make the money transaction to the employee. Finally, the whole file 
will reply back to the source node as a handled file. 
Salary node will divide the file into two portions, the first one is { Id, Name, Address, 
No.Hrs, Hrs.Price, Salary}, the part tagged as top secret (4), the first four attributes 
represents the identifiers of the employees, the last two attributes represent the function 
of the Node2. 
The second portion is { S.C, Acc.No} which are sort code and account number 
respectively, which will be tagged as a secret (3) in which the receipt node will use this 
information to make a money transaction. The function of the current node will not 
need to use the identifier attributes.   
According to the above algorithm, these two portions will be encrypted by different 
keys and tags. 
The processing case of the cryptography section will be discussed in the next section.  
 
2. Message encryption 
1. Before processing: this phase is performed when any node classifies and tags 
their messages and save them in its own storage before doing any processing. 
In this case, the source node (sender) will prepare the message in a tagged form. 
   
2. During processing: this phase happens at run time when any source node wishes 
to send a message to other nodes in the system, then the sending method will 
be intercepted by AOP advice to encrypt the message(s) and access conditions 
separately.  
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 Cryptography cases: 
1- Normal case: the source node sends the message(s) associated with access 
conditions. We assume that the processing required the whole message to do 
the processing. In this case, the access authorization is only granted if the receipt 
node’s clearance is greater than or equal to the source node level. Thus, AOP 
will decrypt the whole message to perform the requested process. This case 
includes performing the process in one node, or even in more than one node if 
the process needs multiple stages to complete the process, as illustrated in 
Algorithm3. 
 
Algorithm3: Normal case 
Inputs: encrypted Message, attributes list , identities list. 
Output: processed file save in source node. 
15- Start  
16- S.N sends Encrypted AC and Message                  // S.N= source node 
17- For each R.N  
18- AOP. Decrypt (AC) 
19-   If (R.N.attribute= S.N.Msg.attribute)        // if identities list is empty 
20-      If (R.N.attribute= S.N. Msg.attribute)&& (R.N.id= S.N.file.id) 
21-        AOP. Decrypt (Msg). 
22-            R.N. Receive (Msg) 
23-        AOP. Encrypt(Msg) 
24-        AOP. Encrypt (AC) 
25-      End if  
26-    Send to next node(s) 
27-   End for 
28- End 
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2- Dominate case: this case is based on the level of security clearance of the source 
node, see Algortihm4.  
Algorithm4: Dominate case, (Cryptography and tag) 
Inputs: encrypted Message, S.N.level 
Output: Encrypted and tagged Message 
9- Start  
10- Enter the Msg 
11- Within the source node 
12- Classified the attributes in sets according to security/privacy 
sensitive  
13- AOP Encrypt and tag each set according to classification level 
14- Output: encrypted and tagged Message. 
15- End 
      
 
In Message level, the scenario will be slightly different from that in the file level. With 
the files, we have two scenarios: 1) when the source node sends a request (file) and 
waits for a response (Processed file), 2) when the source node sends a request (file) to 
destination nodes without waiting for the response. This might include intermediate 
processing or just sending and receiving between the source and destination nodes. 
With the message we will adopt the second scenario as most times the messages do not 
need to be processed by other nodes, and the other nodes can send the reply to the 
source node by different messages. This processing is called one-dimension process. 
In fact, in the  evaluation chapter we included one-dimension processing to deal with 
images, to evaluate the efficiency of the model and to show the ability to deal with 
different types of computer files. 
5.4.3 3AC_AOP Access Control with Cryptography 
This section discusses the combination between the Access control model and 
cryptography model. The outcome is a powerful, fixable, high integrity and privacy 
protection model. Algorithm5 shows the processing in detail:  
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Algorithm 5: Dominate case, (processing) 
Inputs: encrypted, tagged file/ attributes list, identities list 
Output: processed file 
1- Start  
2- Enter the file  
3- AOP. Encrypt (AC). 
4- Send the encrypted file associated with AC 
5- While(DDS.has more nodes) && attributeList!= null) 
6- For each Node in DDS 
7-   AOP.Decrypt(AC) 
       8-      If (attributeList) = (Nodei.attribute)// & (identityList) = 
(Nodei.id) 
8-           AOP. Decrypt (file) 
9-             Nodei.function(file) 
10-            file.attribute.remove(attribute)  
11-           AOP. Encrypt (file) 
12-        End If 
13-     AOP .Encrypt(AC) 
14- Send the file to next Nodei 
15- Output: reply the accomplished file to source node. 
16- End 
      
 
The combination starts when AOP encrypts the access conditions before sending with 
the associated encryptedfile(s) see step 3. In receipt node, AOP advice will decrypt 
these lists (see step 6) to activate the access control stage to check the willingness of 
the current node to deal with the file (see step 7). If the access control conditions are 
satisfied, then AOP decryption advice deals with the file according to the model policy 
En/De 
file 
En/De AC 
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(see step 8). After, finishing the function, the file and the attribute lists will be re- 
encrypted sequentially (see steps 11 and 13).  
Figure5.52 shows the infrastructure of the security and privacy model interacting 
between two nodes. 
 
Figure 5.52. Infrastructure of Security and Privacy Concerns in the Model 
5.4.4  3AC_AOP Security Guard 
 
One of the major challenges that faces the systems which are based on MLS is to 
prevent data spilling during transmission between different security domains. Many 
solutions have been suggested to address this problem, for example clustering of 
distributed nodes into main clusters according to the node security domain. Data 
transitions between the nodes within the same cluster will work in less secure 
processes, whilst data transmission between different clusters will be under MLS 
policies (no-read up, no-write down), and may need to insert devices to run these 
conditions.  
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The problem that might arise when a node has been classified with a security clearance, 
is if you wish to send a file to perform a certain mission on a node that has been 
classified as lower, this increases the likelihood of data leakage from a high level to a 
lower level. One of the most widely accepted solutions is to inject a security guard 
(automatic, human or hybrid) between different clusters as we mentioned in chapter 4.  
In the proposed system we suggested using dynamic AOP as a security guard to filter 
the file before sending to lower nodes. Instead of collecting the nodes in clusters and 
forcing the system to change the original connections between nodes to ensure high 
security, in the proposed solution we adopted the data sanitization method to filter the 
sensitive data, and get high assurance and integrity of data transmission between 
distributed nodes. 
The data sanitization model is totally based on the domination relationship, such that 
only the nodes that are classified with high security clearance can authorize the nodes 
classified as lower clearance to perform a limited process. The consequences of 
applying this model are to eliminate the need for trusted computing based (TCB), and 
the original connection between system nodes will be same, rather than adding a heavy 
process over the system.  This model will be invoked by aspect advice after checking 
the attributes and identities of the processing nodes, as explained in Algorithm6. 
 
Algorithm6: Data Sanitization, message level 
Input: message(s), attributeList, indentitiList. 
Output: sanitized message(s). 
1- Start. 
2- Source node sends the message(s), attributeList, indentitiList. 
3- For each Nodei in DDS 
4- If  (Nodei ⊆ attributeList) && (Nodei ⊆ indentitiList) then    // intended node 
5-     If (Nodei.SL >= message.CL) //  SL=security level, CL=classification level 
6-        DE(message) 
7-      Else { 
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8-        DE(message) 
9-       Sant(message) } 
10-      End if 
11-     Send the clear message to the node. 
12-  End if 
13- End 
  
 
The sanitization process at message level will take a horizontal path by sterilizing the 
message according to some sensitive words which have been saved in the AOP 
repository. In this case the source node will be responsible for how to tag the texts 
inside the message, and the AOP monitor will work from the other side to ensure none 
of sensitive words will be released. This case has a benefit, in case the source node 
might send a broadcast to the other nodes, and each node will see just the authorized 
words of the message, according to their level of security clearance. Figure5.53 shows  
the proceedings of the process. 
 
 
Figure 5.53. AOP Guard in Term of Messages 
However, dealing with the file is different, see Algorithm7. 
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Algorithm7: Data Sanitization, file level 
Input: file(s), attributeList, indentitiList. 
Output: sanitized file(s). 
1- Start. 
2- Source node sends the file(s), attributeList, indentitiList. 
3- For each Nodei in DDS 
4- If  (Nodei ⊆ attributeList) && (Nodei ⊆ indentitiList) then    // intended node 
5-     If (Nodei.SL >= file.CL) //  SL=security level, CL=classification level 
6-           DE(file) // according to compartment or attributes 
7-     Else { 
8-             DE(file) 
9-            Sant(file) } // send only the matching portion of the file 
10-      End if 
11-     Send the clear file to the node. 
12-     Perform Nodei function  
13-    Appended the handled portion to the original file  
14- Send the result after encrypted to the next node  
15-  End if 
16-  Next for 
17- End 
  
 
  The sanitization process at file level will take a vertical path by sterilizing the file in 
the context of columns, and according to security tags which associate with each 
column. In this case, the source node will be responsible for how to tag the file, and the 
AOP monitor will work from the other side to ensure none of sensitive information will 
be released. The processing of the second case can be briefly explained as when the 
node receives the file, AOP advice will do decryption to the attribute and identity lists 
to perform access control policy. If the attribute is sufficient and identity is matching, 
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then the AOP will realize that the receipt node is the intended node. Afterwards, the 
aspect program will do a comparison between the security classifications of the file and 
the node’s clearance. If the access control policies are matched and the file is already 
divided into different tags, which may be greater than the node clearance, then the 
sanitization method will be invoked.  
The function of the sanitization method is to generate a new sub file created from the 
original file, and hold only the columns that need to be handled in the receipt node. The 
security tags of the column(s) are equal to the node’s security clearance. In this case 
the node will apply the function only on the authorized portion. After finishing the 
process, this file will be replaced with the portion in the original file to regenerate the 
whole file with the updated values, then re-forward it to the next node as shown in 
Figure 5.54. 
 
Figure 5.54. AOP Guard in Terms of Files. 
This case has a benefit, in case the source node might send a broadcast to the other 
nodes and each node will see just the authorized word of the message, according to 
their level of security clearance.  
5.5 Summary  
 
This chapter has described the implementation side of the 3AC_AOP. It has detailed 
three processing cases: 1) access control, 2) cryptography and 3) the automatic AOP 
security guard. All these cases have been designed and implemented as AOP pointcuts 
and advices. This chapter has also shown the power of the aspect-oriented 
programming language and how we can utilize this tool to not only separate the non-
functional process from the code, but even to control the functional side, in order to 
141 
 
increase the effectiveness and performance of the code. It has provided algorithms for 
each model to generalize the model to be applied by different programming languages, 
as well as to show the easiest way to apply or update the security and privacy concepts 
to an existing system with only minor changes . 
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Chapter 6  
Evaluation of 3AC_AOP and 
Comparison with Existed Solution  
 
This chapter provides the numerical evaluation aspect of the proposed solution. Both 
OOP and AOP are used to design and implement the proposed solution. This chapter 
shows the methodology that has been used to minimize the heaviness impact when 
injecting AOP into the code by optimal utilization of the main code. The results which 
has been evaluated in this chapter will be divided into three portions: 1) access control 
model 2) cryptography 3) AOP guard. The implementation sections of this chapter will 
deal with two types of decentralised distributed system networks, the ring network and 
unstructured network (internet setup) and both used the flooding algorithm to distribute 
and processing data.   
Finally, this chapter will be concluded by comparing between 3AC_AOP model and 
existing solution.   
6.1 3AC_AOP Time Performance 
To calculate the implementation time and get accurate results we need to identify some 
terms that need to clarify execution time calculation as follows: 
  
 Let 𝛾 is a set of nodes that include all nodes in the distributed system. 
 
 Let 𝜆 is a set of nodes that include all nodes required to accomplish the task 
(bridges and processing nodes) such that: 𝜆 ⊆  𝛾. 
 
 Bridges node (hop): is the node that is used to transfer information to the next 
node in the network after being denied by access control policies.  
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 Processing node: is the node that been granted by the access control model and 
can perform its own function on the receipted data. Let 𝜌 is a set of the 
processing nodes such that: 𝜌 ⊆  𝜆, and can be accounted as following:  
∑ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝜌−1
𝑗=0
 
 
 Transmitted Time (𝜔): is the time that is needed to transfer data from node A to 
node B and can be calculated as following: 
∑ 𝜔
𝜆−1
𝑖=0
 
 Access control Time (𝐴𝐶𝑇): is the time that is needed by the access control 
model to check the access conditions for each single node and this includes both 
bridges and processing nodes and can be calculated as following: 
∑ 𝐴𝐶
𝜆−1
𝑖=0
 
 
6.2 3AC_AOP Access Control  
 
As been demonstrated in chapters 4 and 5, the proposed access control model consists 
of three access control models; Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC), Identity-
Based Access Control (IBAC) and Multi-Level Security (MLS) Access Control. The 
evaluations deal with these models as ABAC + MLS and ABAC+IBAC+MLS in both 
OOP and AOP paradigms. The proposed distributed system will be 10 nodes connected 
by a ring network in which each node has connection with two neighbours nodes before 
and after as shown in Figure 6.55.   
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Figure 6.55 Decentralized nodes, ring distributed system 
Each individual node has a unique identity (Ni) and different attributes and security 
level which might change according to the evaluation requirements as explained 
below  
Node set       ={ N1,  N2,  N3,  N4,  N5,  N6,  N7,  N8,  N9,  N10} 
 
Attribute set = {At1,    At2,    At3,    At4,     At5,    At6,    At7,    At8,    At9,    At10} 
 
Security.L    = { 2,     4,     3,     4,      3,     1,    3,     4,     3,      2  } 
 
 
6.2.1 ABAC & MLS 
 
In this section, the access control model will be evaluated by the composed Attributed-
Based and Multi-level Security Access controls models. The consequences model will 
be applied on the distributed system by using two case files, messages and images. In 
the case of files, the transmitted information has two directions which are sending 
requests and receiving responses. The source node sends the information to the 
intended nodes to perform their functions and replies with the final result to the source 
nodes. In another case, with messages and images, the source node will send these files 
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to the intended nodes without need to waiting for a response. For this reason, the 
transmitted information will have only one direction to complete the requested task.  
1. Two Directional Experiments  
This evaluation will deal with files. In this case, the source node will send the request 
to the intended nodes associated with the file and all required access control conditions. 
The file will travel between system nodes and if access conditions match on any node 
then the node will implement its own function according to the access control policy 
(i.e. match the attributes and security level of node is greater than or equal to 
information classification level). As mentioned before, with file level the source node 
will await the response of the requested task and that means the transmission will take 
two directions and the performance time will be as following: 
𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑥𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 = 2 ∑ 𝜔
𝜆−1
𝑖=0
+  ∑ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 +  ∑ 𝐴𝐶 … . . exp (1)
𝜆−1
𝑖=0
𝜌−1
𝑗=0
 
In order to ensure accurate results, we have simulated five cases as a way to exclusive 
most of cases which might be used and monitoring the system in case of any unintended 
incidents during real time. Table 3 shows the cases and the consequences result as well 
as how many hops needed to complete the task for each case. 
Table 3: ABAC and MLS processing cases 
Case Request Result 
A 𝑓𝑢𝑛 = {𝐴𝑡1, 𝐴𝑡3} 
𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 = 2 
R={N1,N2,N3} 
P={N1,N2}                                   hops=1 
B 𝐹𝑢𝑛 = {𝐴𝑡1, 𝐴𝑡4} 
𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 = 2 
R={N1,N2,N3,N4} 
P={N1,N4}                                  hops=2 
C 𝐹𝑢𝑛 = {𝐴𝑡2, 𝐴𝑡4, 𝐴𝑡6 } 
𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 = 3 
R={N1,N2,N3,N4,N5,N6} 
P={N2,N4,N6}                            hops=2 
D 𝐹𝑢𝑛 = {𝐴𝑡1, 𝐴𝑡3, 𝐴𝑡5, 𝐴𝑡8 } 
𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 = 4 
R={N1,N2,N3,N4,N5,N6,N7,N8} 
P={N1,N3,N5,N8}                      hops=4 
E Fun={At2,At4, At6,  At8,  At10} 
𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 = 5 
R={N1,N2,N3,N4,N5,N6,N7,N8,N9,N10} 
P={N2,N4,N6,N8,N10}              hops=4 
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According to the table , each case will be tested with different numbers of transmitted 
files (50, 100, 200, 400, and 800). These doubled files number ranges will help to 
ensure fairness and accuracy evaluation in both OOP and AOP paradigms as shown in 
Table 4. 
Table 4. ABAC and MLS File level, OOP and AOP runtime performance. 
No.Files 
A B C D E 
OOP AOP OOP AOP OOP AOP OOP AOP OOP AOP 
50 
1070 1114 1946 2127 3403 3580 3998 4112 7112 7654 
100 
2138 2188 3780 4238 6661 7245 8024 8214 13817 15326 
200 
4281 4384 7554 8477 13089 14673 16247 17498 25984 30398 
400 
8778 8841 14868 16902 25748 29227 32755 33252 56124 60862 
800 
17598 17606 13294  33796 53833 58961 65645 66799 114564 121941 
 
The following figures represent the numerical evaluations for each case. 
 
Figure 6.56. ABAC and MLS File level with OOP and AOP runtime performance CASE "A". 
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Figure 6.57. ABAC and MLS File level with OOP and AOP runtime performance CASE "B". 
 
 
Figure 6.58. ABAC and MLS File level with OOP and AOP runtime performance CASE "C". 
 
 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
50 100 200 400 800
Ex
ec
u
ti
o
n
 T
im
e
Number of files
OOP
AOP
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
50 100 200 400 800
Ex
ec
u
ti
o
n
 T
im
e
Number of files
OOP
AOP
148 
 
 
Figure 6.59. ABAC and MLS File level with OOP and AOP runtime performance CASE "D". 
 
 
Figure 6.60. ABAC and MLS File level with OOP and AOP runtime performance CASE "E". 
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2. One Directional Experiments 
A. Message Experiments 
This evaluation will deal with messages. In this case, the source node will send the 
message to the intended nodes associated with the all required access control 
information. The message will travel between system nodes and if access conditions 
are granted on any node then the node will receive the message. As mentioned before, 
with message level the source node will not await the response of the requested task 
and that means the transmission will take only one direction and the performance time 
will be the time that is needed to finish the task in the last intended node as follows: 
𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑥𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 = ∑ 𝜔
𝜆−1
𝑖=0
+  ∑ 𝐴𝐶 … … . exp (2)
𝜆−1
𝑖=0
 
Table 5 presents all cases of transmitted messages and results and the number of the 
required hops. 
 
Table 5. ABAC and MLS Message level 
Case Request Result 
A 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒 
SecLevel= {4, 2, 4, 2,2 , 3, 1,2, 1, 3 } 
R={ N1,N2,N3} 
P={ N3}                                        hops=1 
B 𝑡𝑤𝑜 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑏𝑖𝑢𝑡𝑒 
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 ={ 4, 4, 3, 2, 4, 4, 2, 1, 1, 4}  
R={N1,N2,N3,N4,N5,N6,N7,N8,N9,N10} 
P={ N2,N5,N6,N10}                    hops=2 
C 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑏𝑖𝑢𝑡𝑒 
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 ={ 4, 4, 3, 2, 4, 4, 2, 1, 1, 4}  
R={N1,N2,N3,N4,N5,N6,N7,N8,N9,N10} 
P={ N2,N5,N6,N10}                   hops=5 
D 𝑓𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠 
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 ={4, 3, 4, 2, 3, 2, 4, 4,4,3}  
R={N1,N2,N3,N4,N5,N6,N7,N8,N9 } 
P={ N3,N7,N8,N9}                      hops=4 
 
According to the above table, each case will be tested with different numbers of 
transmitted messages (5000, 10000, 20000, 40000 ). These doubled message number 
ranges will help to ensure accurate evaluation in both OOP and AOP paradigms as 
shown in Table 6. 
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 Table 6. ABAC and MLS Message Level, OOP and AOP performance time 
 
In the following the evaluations figures for each case individually are shown 
 
Figure 6.61.ABAC and MLS Message level with OOP and AOP runtime performance CASE 
"A". 
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Figure 6.62. ABAC and MLS Message level with OOP and AOP runtime performance CASE "B". 
 
Figure 6.63. ABAC and MLS Message level with OOP and AOP runtime performance CASE 
"C". 
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Figure 6.64. ABAC and MLS Message level with OOP and AOP runtime performance CASE 
"D". 
 
B. Image Experiments 
The evaluation of this section deals with the image according to message experiments, 
in which the image will be sent to different intended nodes without processing the 
contents. The process in this case will take one direction, thus the execution time will 
be calculated in the same way as with the message. The adopted table for this evolution 
is Table 5 and the number of transmitted images will be (10,20,40,80) and the image 
size is 100KB. Table 7 shows the results of this evaluation. 
Table 7. ABAC and MLS one direction image Level, OOP and AOP performance time 
In the following the evaluations figures for each case individually are shown 
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80 60637 63157 239512 242456 566153 569784 507884 510743 
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Figure 6.65. ABAC and MLS Image level with OOP and AOP runtime performance CASE "A". 
 
 
Figure 6.66. ABAC and MLS image level with OOP and AOP runtime performance CASE "B". 
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Figure 6.67. ABAC and MLS image level with OOP and AOP runtime performance CASE "C". 
 
 
Figure 6.68. ABAC and MLS image level with OOP and AOP runtime performance CASE "D". 
 
6.2.2 ABAC & IBAC & MLS  
 
In this section, IBAC will be injected as an intermediate access model between ABAC 
and MLS. This model will help the source node to identify the intended nodes 
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according to the identities. As mentioned in chapters 4 &5, this model is optional and 
will be compulsory when adopting a domination relationship or when the source node 
asks specific nodes to do the process even if there are other nodes having the same 
attributes. The following evaluation is based on the second option when there are some 
nodes sharing the same attributes and security clearance.     
 
1. Two Directional Experiments 
The evaluation of this section deals with all proposed access control models. We used 
Identity-Based access control in addition to ABAC and MLS. In order to grant the node 
access to information, the associated access information which was sent by source node 
with the file must be filtered by the three models starting form ABAC followed by 
IBAC and finally MLS model. The performance of this section has been evaluated 
according to the Table 3 and execution time will be same as in exp (1). Table 7 shows 
the numerical results of the combined access control model. 
Table 7. ABAC, IBAC and MLS, File level, OOP and AOP runtime performance 
No.File
s 
A B C D E 
OOP AOP OOP AOP OOP AOP OOP AOP OOP AOP 
50 1181 1263 2021 2133 3577 3955 4536 4840 10958 11125 
100 2316 2489 4053 4275 7156 7842 8923 9861 22426 24152 
200 4679 4777 8293 8664 14523 15824 17862 19697 45241 47373 
400 9578 9637 16721 17472 28873 31577 35389 39167 89782 93637 
800 19140 19983 33296 34906 57558 63686 70291 78260 178845 182496 
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Figure 6.69 .ABAC, IDAC and MLS File level with OOP and AOP runtime performance CASE 
"A". 
 
 
Figure 6.70.ABAC, IDAC and MLS File level with OOP and AOP runtime performance CASE "B". 
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Figure 6.71.ABAC, IDAC and MLS File level with OOP and AOP runtime performance CASE 
"C". 
 
 
Figure 6.72.ABAC, IBAC and MLS File level with OOP and AOP runtime performance CASE 
"D". 
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Figure 6.73. ABAC, IBAC and MLS File level with OOP and AOP runtime performance CASE 
"E". 
 
2. One Directional Experiments 
A. Message Experiments 
The evaluation of this section deals with all proposed access control models. We used 
Identity-Based access control in addition to ABAC and MLS. In order to grant the node 
access to information, the associated access information which was sent by source node 
with the file must be filtered by the three models starting from ABAC followed by 
IBAC and finally MLS model. The runtime performance of this section has been 
evaluated according to the Table  5   and execution time will be calculated the same as 
in exp (2). Table 8 shows the numerical result of this experiments.    
Table 8. ABAC, IBAC and MLS, Message level, OOP and AOP runtime performance  
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Figure 6.74. ABAC, IBAC and MLS Message level with OOP and AOP runtime performance 
CASE "A". 
 
 
Figure 6.75. ABAC, IBAC and MLS Message level with OOP and AOP runtime performance 
CASE "B". 
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Figure 6.76. ABAC, IBAC and MLS Message level with OOP and AOP runtime performance 
CASE "C". 
 
 
 
Figure 6.77. ABAC, IBAC and MLS Message level with OOP and AOP runtime performance 
CASE "D". 
B. Image Experiments 
As the same with section 6.1.1.2.2 the experiment deals with images by applying the 
combined access control. Table 9 shows the consequence result of this experiment. 
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Table 9. ABAC, IBAC and MLS, Image level, OOP and AOP runtime performance. 
 
The graphical representation of these results according to the cases are as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.78. ABAC, IBAC and MLS Image level with OOP and AOP runtime performance CASE 
"A". 
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Figure 6.79. ABAC, IBAC and MLS Image level with OOP and AOP runtime performance CASE 
"B". 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.80. ABAC, IBAC and MLS Image level with OOP and AOP runtime performance CASE 
"C". 
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Figure 6.81. ABAC, IBAC and MLS Image level with OOP and AOP runtime performance CASE 
"D". 
 
 
 
 
6.2.3 Comparing ABAC+MLS with ABAC+ IBAC + MLS 
 File Experiments 
In this section, we have compared between the evaluated results in section 6.1.1 
and section 6.1.2 to see the heaviness of using IBAC. The fifth case in the file 
level is used to evaluate this comparison as shown in Figure 6.82 with AOP, 
and Figure 6.83 shows the comparison between the evaluations using OOP. 
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               Figure 6.82. Comparing between AOP in File level with ABAC+MLS and ABAC+ IBAC 
and MLS. 
 
Figure 6.83. Comparing between OOP in File level with ABAC+MLS and ABAC+ IBAC and MLS. 
 
 Message Experiments 
In this section we have compared between the evaluated results in section 6.1.1 
and section 6.1.2 to see the heaviness of using IBAC. The fourth case in the file 
level is used to evaluate this comparison as shown in Figure 6.84 with AOP, 
and Figure 6.85 shows the comparison between the evaluations using OOP. It 
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is worth mentioning that in case of broadcasting the message or images, if the 
system nodes have the same attributes then adding IBAC will decrease the 
execution time because the process will be directed to a specific node, 
regardless of the attributes. In evaluation, the system nodes have different 
attributes, so using IBAC will increase the load of execution time. 
 
  
Figure 6.84. Comparing between AOP in Message level with ABAC+MLS and ABAC+ IBAC and 
MLS. 
  
Figure 6.85. Comparing between OOP in Message level with ABAC+MLS and ABAC+ IBAC and 
MLS. 
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 Image Experiments 
In this section we have compared between the evaluated results in section 6.1.1 
and section 6.1.2  image level to see the heaviness of using IBAC. The fourth 
case in the image level is used to evaluate this comparison as shown in         
Figure 6.86 with AOP, and Figure 6.87 shows the comparison between the 
evaluations using OOP. 
 
Figure 6.86.Comparing between AOP and OOP in Image level with ABAC+MLS and ABAC+ 
IBAC and MLS. 
 
Figure 6.87. Comparing between AOP and OOP in Image level with ABAC+MLS and ABAC+ 
IBAC and MLS. 
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6.3 3AC_AOP Cryptography 
 
In order to prevent unauthorized nodes from accessing the transmitted information as 
well as to keep the information in unreadable form to ensure the integrity of transmitted 
information between distributed system communication channels which may attacked 
by eavesdropping attacker, we will adopt a cryptography system. The proposed system 
used the AES cryptography algorithm with key size 128 to encrypt the information 
before sending and decrypting it after satisfying the accessing conditions. The crypto 
keys will be distributed by the distributed system manager in the form of a JSON file 
associated with access control rules or by assigning this task to a special node working 
as a key distribution centre (KDC). Both solutions are accepted, however the next 
evaluations are based on the first choice when the system manager distributes the keys 
between distributed nodes.  
Because of inserting cryptography concerns in the system, this will lead to increasing 
the heaviness of the system working, thus increasing the rate of consumption of the 
system resources e.g batteries if we use mobile devices as nodes in the system. For this 
reason, we module the cryptography algorithms as dynamic aspect pointcuts in which 
adding, deleting or updating the crypto algorithm is carried out dynamically in real 
time. Hence, applying the cryptography method only when the task needs it, otherwise 
the system will work smoothly and this is called dynamic clustering. In another 
meaning, each node with its next neighbours have the same security level, this mean 
that they are related to the same security cluster and we supposed that the transmitted 
information doesn’t need to be encrypted within the same cluster. Nevertheless, this 
cluster can change dynamically, for this reason aspect advice will be ready to deal with 
any incident changes in real time. 
The next evaluation shows the comparison between static and dynamic cryptography 
aspects with both files and messages to show the ability of the model to deal with both 
cases. 
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6.3.1 Static Cryptography Aspect with Message. 
 
Table 10 shows that the performance time of using AOP is more than the time of using 
OOP. 
 
Table 10. Static cryptography aspect with message, OOP and AOP performance 
 
The performance time will be calculated as follows: 
𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑥𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 = ∑ 𝜔
𝜆−1
𝑖=0
+  ∑ 𝐴𝐶 +
𝜆−1
𝑖=0
 ∑ 𝐶𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑜 … … . exp (3)
𝜌−1
𝑖=0
 
 
Figure 6.88. Static cryptography aspect, Message Level, CASE "A". 
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Figure 6.89. Static cryptography aspect, Message Level, CASE "B". 
 
 
Figure 6.90. Static cryptography aspect, Message Level, CASE "C". 
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Figure 6.91. Static cryptography aspect, Message Level, CASE "D". 
 
6.3.2 Static Cryptography Aspect with Files. 
Table 11 shows the numerical results of applying static cryptography aspect with files 
Table 11. Static cryptography aspect with files, OOP and AOP performance 
No.Files 
A B C D E 
OOP AOP OOP AOP OOP AOP OOP AOP OOP AOP 
50 1518 1913 2453 3062 4045 4762.5 5057.5 5917.5 8261.5 9028 
100 2946 3829 4910 6017 7915 9412 10038 11548 16486 17945 
200 5824 7416 9624 11978 15690 18440 19896 29563 32756 35604 
400 11460 14412 18636 22692 30892 36580 39512 45380 64992 71024 
800 22192 28184 36840 44128 60704 72720 77808 89248 128712 139472 
 
The performance will be calculated as follows: 
𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑥𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 = 2 ∑ 𝜔
𝜆−1
𝑖=0
+  ∑ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 +  ∑ 𝐴𝐶 +  ∑ 𝐶𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑜
𝜌−1
𝑖=0
… . . exp (4)
𝜆−1
𝑖=0
𝜌−1
𝑗=0
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Figure 6.92. Static cryptography aspect, File Level, CASE "A". 
 
 
Figure 6.93. Static cryptography aspect, File Level, CASE "B". 
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Figure 6.94. Static cryptography aspect, File Level, CASE "C". 
 
Figure 6.95. Static cryptography aspect, File Level, CASE "D". 
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Figure 6.96. Static cryptography aspect, File Level, CASE "E". 
6.4 Dynamic clustering with cryptography  
 
The evaluation with this section adopts dynamic AOP to deal with clustering the system 
nodes according to the level of security clearance. This clustering will put the 
neighbour nodes in a cluster if they have same clearance level. In this case, there is no 
need to implement encryption/ decryption processing within the same cluster, thus 
decreasing the heavy load of the implementation which is caused by the cryptography 
processing, see Figure 6.97 . In fact, dynamic clustering is dependent on the clearance 
level of the source node in which the encryption/decryption operation will not work if 
the level of the cluster is greater than or equal to the source level, otherwise, the system 
will work normally as before. Hence, saving information from illegal access. 
 
Figure 6.97. Dynamic cluster of distributed nodes, use 2 different clearance level. 
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Table 12 shows the numerical results of dynamic cryptography evaluation followed by 
the cases figures. This evaluation dealt with files only. 
Table 12. Dynamic cryptography and clustering aspect with files, OOP and AOP 
performance 
No.Files 
A B C D E 
OOP AOP OOP AOP OOP AOP OOP AOP OOP AOP 
50 1411.5 1609 2073.5 2310.5 3460.5 3919.5 4434 5005 7549 8121.5 
100 2759 3153 4011 4572 6970 7748 8711 9987 14982 16030 
200 5406 6208 8038 9246 13670 15258 17504 19544 29660 31740 
400 10584 12100 15744 17744 26880 30052 34752 38140 58692 63516 
800 20624 23408 30680 33832 53552 58552 68104 74904 116784 125112 
 
 
Figure 6.98.Dynamic cryptography aspect, File Level, CASE "A". 
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Figure 6.99. Dynamic cryptography aspect, File Level, CASE "B". 
 
Figure 6.100. Dynamic cryptography aspect, File Level, CASE "C". 
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Figure 6.101. Dynamic cryptography aspect, File Level, CASE "D". 
 
Figure 6.102. Dynamic cryptography aspect, File Level, CASE "E". 
 
6.5 3AC_AOP Security Guard  
 
This section deals with all the 3AC_AOP’s components, access control model, 
cryptography and AOP security guard. In spite of the fact that the access model and 
cryptography have created a secure system, the cooperation between the system’s 
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nodes are still restricted. In another meaning, all the previous evaluations have 
considered that the information (file and messages) are received and processed by the 
receipt nodes if the security clearance level of receipt nodes are greater than or equal 
to the source node level. Otherwise, the processing is declined and sent to the next 
node. This section has presented the numerical evaluations based on the domination 
relationship, in which the source node (sender) has the ability to ask the intended node 
to perform its own function even if the security clearance of the intended node is lower 
than that of the source node level. This is done, after allowing the receipt node to handle 
only the authorized portion (sanitized portion) which was classified with a level equal 
to the intended node’s level. As we mentioned in chapters 4&5, the sanitization process 
with messages will be applied horizontally, while with files will be applied vertically.  
In order to ensure the fairness in the proposed model’s evaluation as well as trying to 
include various cases as much as possible, we have used the model to deal with two 
different decentralized distributed systems, ring connection see Figure 6.55 and random 
connection (internet setup) see Figure 6.103. With the latter, execution time will 
include the time of the sort path algorithm which been used with this setup.        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.103. Random connection decentralized distributed system 
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1. Message Experiments 
We discuss the case in which the source node sends messages to different nodes 
simultaneously. The receipt nodes might have security clearance lower than the source 
node. Indeed, the IBAC will play a significant role when the source node identifies 
the intended nodes according to the attributes and identities regardless of the security 
level. AOP security guards will be responsible for ensuring that the receipt information 
will be sanitized from any sensitive information and the intended nodes will receive 
only the messages that been classified with the same intended nodes levels.  
In this evaluation we will use a different comparison table and we will include 4 cases 
only, 2 cases with ring connection and 2 for random connection as shown in Table 13. 
 
Table 13. Ring and random connections sanitization cases, Messages level 
Case Request Result 
Ring connection 
A 
 
Source=N1 
Sec.Clearance= 4 
 
R={N1,N2,N3,N4,N5,N6} 
 
P={N2,N4,N6}                              hops=2 
 
En=5, Dec=5, Sanitization=2 
Receipt nodes= {𝐴𝑡2, 𝐴𝑡4, 𝐴𝑡6} 
Sec.Clearance= { 3, 4,2 } 
B 
 
Source=N1 
Sec.Clearance= 4 
 
 
R={N1,N2,N3,N4,N4,N5,N6,N7,N8,N9} 
 
P={N3,N5,N7,N9}                         hops=4 
 
En=8, Dec=8, Sanitization=3 
Receipt nodes= {𝐴𝑡3, 𝐴𝑡5, 𝐴𝑡7, 𝐴𝑡9} 
Sec.Clearance= { 3, 4,2,1 } 
𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑥𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 = ∑ 𝜔
𝜆−1
𝑖=0
+  ∑ 𝐴𝐶 + ∑ 𝐶𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑜 + ∑ 𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖
Ω−1
𝑖=0
𝜌−1
𝑖=0
… … . exp (5)
𝜆−1
𝑖=0
 
Random Connection 
C 
 
Source=N1 
Sec.Clearance= 4 
 
R={N1,N2,N3,N4,N7,N8,N7,N6} 
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 P={N2,N3,N6}                            hops=5 
 
En=7, De=7, Sanitization=2 
Receipt nodes= {𝐴𝑡2, 𝐴𝑡3, 𝐴6 } 
Sec.Clearance= { 4, 2,2 } 
D 
 
Source=N1 
Sec.Clearance= 4 
 
Receipt nodes= {𝐴𝑡2, 𝐴𝑡7, 𝐴8 } 
Sec.Clearance= { 4, 3,2 } 
 
R={N1,N2,N3,N4,N7,N8 }or { N1,N2,N5,N6,N7,N8 
 
P={N2,N7,N8}                            hops=4 
 
En=5, De=5, Sanitization=2 
𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑥𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 = ∑ 𝜔
𝜆−1
𝑖=0
+ ∑ 𝐴𝐶 + ∑ 𝐶𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑜 + ∑ 𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖
Ω−1
𝑖=0
𝜌−1
𝑖=0
+ ∑ 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ
𝜆−1
𝑖=0
… … . exp (6)
𝜆−1
𝑖=0
 
 
Table 14 shows the execution time results for both cases with message level as follows: 
Table 14. Execution Time Result for Ring and Random Connections with AOP Guard. 
Message level 
 
The next figures show the evaluation results for each case in Table 14 
No.Msg 
Ring Connection Random Connection 
A B C D 
OOP AOP OOP AOP OOP AOP OOP AOP 
5000 63500 87400 75960 93800 85600 104300 102800 131000 
10000 119480 158300 133800 168900 148800 185400 183700 233400 
20000 205600 262000 243600 276600 271300 336000 339700 425300 
40000 374600 436000 436600 498000 525900 610500 623200 786100 
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Figure 6.104. Evaluation of Sanitization aspect, Ring Connection, message level, CASE "A" 
 
  
Figure 6.105. Evaluation of Sanitization aspect, Ring Connection, message level, CASE "B" 
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Figure 6.106. Evaluation of Sanitization aspect, Random Connection, message level, CASE 
"C" 
 
  
Figure 6.107. Evaluation of Sanitization aspect, Random Connection, message level, CASE 
"D" 
2. File Experiments 
With the file level, the source node will send the file(s) to the intended node according 
to their attributes to implement the required functions on the authorized portion only, 
whilst, the rest of the file will be encrypted. In this case the source node will receive 
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the processed response after handling the file in different security clearance nodes. The 
execution time here will include replay time (only hops time). Table 15 discusses four 
cases of evaluation scenarios, the first two deal with ring connections and the last two 
cases deals with random connections.  
Table 15. Ring and random connections sanitization cases, Files level 
Case Request Result 
Ring connection 
A 
 
Source=N1 
Sec.Clearance= 4 
 
R={N1,N2,N3,N4,N5,N6} 
 
P={N2,N4,N6}                              hops=8 
 
En=6, Dec=6, Sanitization=2 
Receipt nodes= {𝐴𝑡2, 𝐴𝑡4, 𝐴𝑡6} 
Sec.Clearance= { 3, 4,2 } 
B 
 
Source=N1 
Sec.Clearance= 4 
 
 
R={N1,N2,N3,N4,N4,N5,N6,N7,N8,N9} 
 
P={N3,N5,N7,N9}                         hops=14 
 
En=9, Dec=9, Sanitization=3 
Receipt nodes= {𝐴𝑡3, 𝐴𝑡5, 𝐴𝑡7, 𝐴𝑡9} 
Sec.Clearance= { 3, 4,2,1 } 
𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑥𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 = ∑ 𝜔
𝜆−1
𝑖=0
+  ∑ 𝐴𝐶 + ∑ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 +
𝜌−1
𝑖=0
∑ 𝐶𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑜 + ∑ 𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖
Ω−1
𝑖=0
𝜌−1
𝑖=0
… … . exp (7)
𝜆−1
𝑖=0
 
Random Connection 
C 
 
Source=N1 
Sec.Clearance= 4 
 
 
R={N1,N2,N3,N4,N7,N8,N7,N6} 
 
P={N2,N3,N6}                            hops=12 
 
En=7, De=7, Sanitization=2 
Receipt nodes= {𝐴𝑡2, 𝐴𝑡3, 𝐴6 } 
Sec.Clearance= { 4, 2,2 } 
D 
 
Source=N1 
Sec.Clearance= 4 
 
Receipt nodes= {𝐴𝑡2, 𝐴𝑡7, 𝐴8 } 
 
R={N1,N2,N3,N4,N7,N8 }or { N1,N2,N5,N6,N7,N8 
 
P={N2,N7,N8}                            hops=9 
 
183 
 
Sec.Clearance= { 4, 3,2 } En=5, De=5, Sanitization=2 
𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑥𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 = ∑ 𝜔
𝜆−1
𝑖=0
+ ∑ 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ +
𝜆−1
𝑖=0
 ∑ 𝐴𝐶 + ∑ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 +
𝜌−1
𝑖=0
∑ 𝐶𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑜 + ∑ 𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖
Ω−1
𝑖=0
𝜌−1
𝑖=0
 . exp (8)
𝜆−1
𝑖=0
 
 
Table 16 shows the execution time results for both cases as follows: 
Table 16. Execution Time Result for Ring and Random Connections with AOP Guard. File 
Level 
 
 
Figure 6.108. Evaluation of Sanitization aspect, Ring Connection, file level, CASE "A" 
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No.Msg 
Ring Connection Random Connection 
A B C D 
OOP AOP OOP AOP OOP AOP OOP AOP 
50 4232 6940 6782 9130 5302 8851 4680 6261 
100 8410 11373 12345 16473 9780 14531 8936 10402 
200 17693 22174 21463 27614 19406 25420 16730 19830 
400 32466 36598 36410 43153 35572 44941 31210 35571 
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Figure 6.109. Evaluation of Sanitization aspect, Ring Connection, file level, CASE "B" 
 
 
  
Figure 6.110. Evaluation of Sanitization aspect, Random Connection, file level, CASE "C" 
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Figure 6.111. Evaluation of Sanitization aspect, Random Connection, file level, CASE "D" 
 
6.6 Comparing with existing solution  
 
Although many solutions have adopted AOP based on modularizing various access 
control models as aspect pointcuts and advices, these solutions lack idealism in taking 
into account the unexpected possibilities which may occur during real time and related 
to the nature of the environments used like distributed systems. After reviewing most 
of the past and current solutions, we find that DSAW [94] is the closest solution to our 
proposed solution, because most other solutions utilized AOP to deal with access 
control and cryptography between two nodes of the centralized distribution system and 
the solution will be coordinated and controlled by the central node (server). In spite of, 
reference [94] has given a problem case which used four nodes, however, their 
numerical evaluations used only three nodes, source, destination, and one intermediate 
node and dealing with FTP client and server which is connected between only two 
nodes. In order to get a fair comparison, we will apply their solution and ours on their 
problem case (4 nodes) as shown in Figure 6.112. We will start with the solution 
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algorithms and runtime performance calculation; to show the power of the proposed 
solution we will dealing both messages and files. 
6.6.1 Algorithms Comparison 
DSAW Solution  3AC_AOP 
1- Tag and encrypt message 
2- While (Node i !=destination ) 
3- Decrypt message 
4- If ( SLNodei > message.Tag) then 
5- Granted else declined 
6- Encrypt message 
7- Move to Nodei+1 
8- End While   
 1- Tag and encrypt message/file 
2- While (Node i !=destination ) 
3- Decrypt Attribute,ID,SL 
4- If (true) Decrypt, granted, process,  
encrypt 
9- Else Move to Nodei+1 
5- End While  
6- Mover  
 
Figure 6.112. Algorithms Comparison. 
As illustrated in Figure 6.112 the 3AC_AOP, firstly, decrypt the attributes, ids and 
security level to check the access conditions; if it matches then the next step is to 
decrypt the file or message, otherwise the processing does not need to decrypt the file 
each time. However, with DSAW solution, encrypting-decryption processes will be 
repeated each time before reaching and leaving a node even though it is not the 
authorized node. Obviously, DSAW injects information classification with the node 
clearance. However, in our solution we separated information security classification 
and node clearance.  
6.6.2 Runtime Performance  
 
Although, the numerical evaluation of DSAW adopted only messages as transmitted 
information between system nodes, our solution adopted both messages and files. For 
this reason, the time needed to implement the task will take into account both messages 
and files.  
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1. Message Experiments 
With messaging, the performance time will be the time that is needed to accomplish 
the task starting from sending by the source node and finishing after receiving by the 
destination node. The relation here is between two different nodes (source and 
destination) as shown in the next formalization  
 
     A - DSAW  
𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑥𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 = ∑ 𝜔
𝜆−1
𝑖=0
+  ∑ 𝐴𝐶
𝜆−1
𝑖=0
+ ∑ 𝐶𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑜
𝜆−1
𝑖=0
 
 
B- 3AC_AOP  
See Exp (5) 
As illustrated above, with SDAW, the processing needs to encrypt and decrypt a whole 
message at each node, however with our solution the access conditions only will 
decrypt at each node while the message is still in an encrypted form and will not decrypt 
only the access control granted the accessing. 
2. Files Experiments  
With the file level, there are two expected cases, the first, when the source node sends 
file(s) to the destination, in this case the execution time will be the same as with the 
message level. The second case is when the source node sends a request as a file and 
waits for the responded (processed file). In this case, the relation will be related to the 
same node. In both message and file levels, the solution deas with end-to-end in 
addition to point-to-point security. The following formula is linked with the second 
case  
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A- DSAW 
𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑥𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 = 2 ∗ (∑ 𝜔
𝜆−1
𝑖=0
+ ∑ 𝐴𝐶
𝜆−1
𝑖=0
+ ∑ 𝐶𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑜
𝜆−1
𝑖=0
 ) 
 
B- 3AC_AOP 
See Exp(7). 
As with the message, our solution will encrypt and decrypt the accessing condition 
parameters while the file is still in an encrypted form until it reaches  the intended node. 
The final result will return back to the source node as responded to the request, in this 
case the last processing node will encrypt the file and send it back to the source node. 
Throughout, the returning way the process will find there are no more attributes or 
functions needed to be dealt with, so all nodes will work as a bridge until reaching the 
source node, for this reason we use z rather than z-1.   Whilst, with SDAW, as  with 
the message, the file will be encrypted and decrypted at each hop as well as this 
processing being repeated after the end of the processing in the destination node. For 
this reason we multiply the formula by 2.  
3. File Integrity. 
As explained above, our solution will not grant any access to the information both in 
message and files level. This is done by, keeping the information in an encrypted form 
as well as adding AOP security guard to ensure it will not spill any sensitive 
information to unauthorized nodes, in which each node is granted to do a required 
process on a specific part of the file while the rest of the file will still be in an encrypted 
form. With DSAW, there is a big opportunity to release sensitive information by: 
 Encrypting /decrypting operation which needs to repeat at each node even it not 
the intended node. This will give a chance to attack the information during this 
processing. 
 Injecting the security tag directly to the information, thus needing to decrypt the 
information each time to check the security tags with the node clearance. 
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DSAW 3AC_AOP 
Inject security tag with the message  Classified file by security tag, send 
access condition as a separate concerns 
Encrypt/ decrypt process apply on each 
node between the source and destination 
Encrypt/ decrypt process apply only if 
the access control  meet the condition  
Information spill is high  Information spill is too low 
Need TCP Don’t Need TCP 
Non dynamic information classification  Dynamic classification  
No domination relationship  Domination relationship 
No security guard AOP security guard  
    
6.6.3 Numerical Evaluation Comparison  
 
As mentioned before, the comparison study in this section used the example case of 
adopting four nodes and each node has a security clearance as {Node1-Confidential, 
Node2-Secret, Node3-TopSecret, Node4-Confidential ). The evaluation will use 
messages and files as transmitted information between system nodes.    
1. Message Experiments 
Figure 6.113 shows the processing case, -a- is DSAW processing while –b- is the 
3AC_AOP solution. The task is to send message(s) from Node1 to Node4. With –a- 
the processing required 3 Enc/Dec with message to complete the task. However, with 
–b- only 1 Enc/Dec operation need with the message while 3 Enc/Dec with the 
attributes and security level. 
 
                          
 
 
 
Figure 6.113. Message Comparison, -a- SDAW, -b- 3AC_AOP. 
-a- -b- 
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Table 17 shows the runtime performance for both cases, followed by Figure 6.114. 
Table 17. Evaluation Result of comparison study, Message Level 
No.Msg 3AC_AOP DSAW 
5000 19300 25200 
10000 37600 48800 
20000 69300 84200 
400000 131800 159200 
 
 
Figure 6.114. Evaluation Result, Massage Level 
 
2. File Experiments 
The evaluation result with files has two forms. The first one, when the processing sends 
the file to the destination without waiting for a reply as shown in Figure 6.115.-a- while 
–b- evaluated the case that the source node will wait for the response after processing 
the file in the intended nodes. Because file will travel through different security levels 
nodes, we will apply sanitization AOP guard to ensure the high integrity of data. 
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CASE 1 
Figure 6.115 shows case of sending file(s) from Node1 to Node4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.115. File Comparison, -a- SDAW, -b- 3AC_AOP. 
With –a- the file needs the 3 Enc/Dec operations to finish the task, however with –b- 
the source node sends the file to the node only has {A,B} as required attributed, while 
with Node2 and Node3 the process will Enc and Dec the attributes, if not matched then 
the file will travel to the next node until reach to Node4. In this node the accessing 
conditions will grant the access after matching the node’s attributes. In this case only 
the file will be decrypted to the node. Table 18 shows the evaluated results and presents 
the difference in runtime performance between the two solutions 
Table 18. Runtime Performance, File level, Case1 
No.Files 3AC_AOP DSAW 
50 1921 2782 
100 3525 4760 
200 6863 8218 
400 12342 15542 
800 20368 26587 
  
Figure 6. 1116 shown the evaluated result between the two solutions 
-a- -b- 
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Figure 6.116. Runtime Performance, File Level, Case1 
 
CASE 2 
Figure 6.117 shows the case of sending file(s) from Node1 to Node4. The processing 
here needs to do an intermediate operation on the file before sending it to Node4. With 
–a- the file needs  3 Enc/Dec operations to finish the task, however with –b- only 2 
Enc/Dec operations are needed and this is because, Node1 sends the file with {A,B} 
attributes. The Attribute {A} is in Node2 so the file will encrypt in Node2 to implement 
its own function and only to the authorized portion, the result file will re encrypt and 
send it to the next node. In our case the file has been processed in a node which has a 
security clearance greater than source node level. For this reason if the next processing 
or destination node has a security clearance lower than the latter node, then AOP 
security guard will face this case by sanitizing the receipt information to ensure not 
spilling any sensitive information.    
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Figure 6.117. File Comparison, -a- SDAW, -b- Proposed solution, CASE 2 
Table 19 shows the runtime performance result of file level case1, followed by the   
Table 19. Runtime Performance, File level, Case2 
No.Files 3AC_AOP DSAW 
50 2302 2782 
100 4228 4760 
200 7680 8218 
400 13800 15542 
800 23564 26587 
 
 
Figure 6.118 shows the evaluated result between the two solutions 
 
-a- -b- 
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Figure 6.118. Runtime Performance, File Level, Case2. 
CASE 3 
This case discusses when Node1 sends a request to Node4 to handle a file and is waiting 
for a response. The file will travel in two directions one for sending the request and the 
second for receiving the response. With SDAW,-a- in Figure 6.119 Node1 sends a file 
to Node4 to perform its own function and send the result to Node1. This operation 
needs 6 Enc/Dec operations for sending and receiving. While in case –b- we just need 
2 Enc/Dec operations with files and 0 sanitization because the file does not need any 
intermediate processing.  
 
Figure 6.119. File Comparison, -a- SDAW, -b- Proposed solution, CASE 3 
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Table 20. Runtime Performance, File level, Case3 
No.Files 3AC_AOP DSAW 
50 2011 5100 
100 3860 9720 
200 7020 14930 
400 12980 25800 
800 22150 46320 
 
 
 
Figure 6.120. Runtime Performance, File Level, Case3. 
 
CASE 4 
With this case, Node1 send a file to destination Node4. This file needs two intermediate 
processes before being delivered to Node4, in Node2 and Node3 as shown in          
Figure 6.121. In case –a- (DSAW ) the processing will be done like previous cases. 
However, in case –b- the processing required 3 Enc/Dec operations as well as 2 
sanitization processes. This is because the file will be transformed from Node2 as 
TopSecret to Node3 as Secret and from Node3 to Node4 as confidential. So, the process 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
50000
50 100 200 400 800
Ex
ec
u
ti
o
n
 T
im
e
Number of Files
3AC_AOP
DSAW
196 
 
has to transmit from high to low.  Table 21 shows the runtime performance of DSAW 
is better than the proposed solution due to extra sanitization processing.   
 
 
Figure 6.121. File Comparison, -a- SDAW, -b- Proposed solution, CASE 4 
Table 21. Runtime Performance, File level, Case4 
No.Files 3AC_AOP DSAW 
50 3010 2782 
100 5220 4760 
200 8995 8218 
400 16240 15542 
800 27980 26587 
 
 
Figure 6.122.Runtime Performance, File Level, Case4. 
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6.6.5 Comparison Summary  
According to the numerical evaluation results for four different experiments, the 
proposed model has shown its efficiency of runtime performance and information 
integrity. To ensure the fairness of the comparison, DSAW outperforms on the 
proposed model only if the message length is shorter than the required attributes as is 
also the case in experiment5. However, on the other side, information integrity is 
greater than DSAW because the process in the proposed solution does not need to 
perform Enc/Dec each time on file or message, but with DSAW these operations are 
repeated on each node even if the information is transmitted from high level to low. 
This case opens the opportunity for the lower nodes to display some sensitive 
information form highest nodes especially if the highest nodes are complicit with the 
lower level nodes. Indeed, to establish a distributed system working according to the 
DSAW solution, we need to use Trust Computer Based (TCB) see section 2.7.7. Whilst, 
AOP security guard in the proposed solution will be responsible for addressing all these 
issues and controlling the access to the authorized portion only.   
6.7 Summary 
This chapter has provided the numerical evaluation of the proposed system. The 
outcome of this evaluation showed the power of the solution and how it can be adopted 
to develop a security system in an easier and trusted way.  To ensure fairness, the 
evaluation is based on comparing between process performance by developing a 
security policy in both OOP and AOP paradigms. We have tried to include all 
possibilities which may appear during running time or even before initiating the 
process. Evaluation of the proposed access control model, started with ABAC and 
MLS, followed by ABAC, IDAC and MLS. The consequences were highly efficient 
with a difference range between ~0.1 −  ~0.2  with both message and file levels, and 
this is relevant to perfect usage and applying AOP pointcuts to the original codes to use 
the entire methods with tiny changes. However, performance difference has changed 
obviously, when adding cryptography as security aspect shielding so we dealt with this 
case by employing AOP characteristics to create a dynamic clustering of system nodes. 
This decreased the gaps  between the different performance times for OOP and AOP 
by applying encryption/decryption processing only when the information travels 
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between different clusters or the cluster security clearance is lower than the source node 
clearance. The third section of this chapter presented our novel security model by 
utilizing AOP to work as a bidirectional automatic security guard. Multi-Level security 
domination relationship was adopted to allow a node with high security clearance to 
dominate other nodes lower than or equal to it. Thus, the highest nodes can ask the 
lower ones to do a requested task in a secure and private manner. Finally, this chapter 
provides, a comparison study between the proposed solution and other existing 
solutions. The outcome results show the power of the proposed solution through 
fulfilling a high level of security and privacy with high flexibility, manageability and 
scalability.    
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion and Future Work  
Achieving security and privacy concerns with all various requirements remains a major 
challenge which needed to be faced by software programmers and developers. This 
thesis has focused on the security and privacy concerns in decentralized distributed 
systems to ensure safe communications and processing of data transmission between 
system nodes. Thus, it has achieved end-to-end security requirements as well as 
covered point-to-point security 
3AC_AOP combined access control, cryptography, security guard and was developed 
using OOP and AOP to achieve DDS security. This thesis proves important points as 
follows: applying the proposed access control model’s components individually cannot 
fulfill the security requirements of DDS. This is because each component focuses on 
certain aspects of security requirements. For instance, dealing with the main AC models 
in the 3AC_AOP (ABAC and MLS), using ABAC only, will ensure that the distribute 
data over nodes have the same attributes, but will not prevent data spilling from high 
to low. However, using MLS only will prevent sensitive data spilling, but it will add 
more restrictions on the system through restricting data flow between system entities. 
IBAC has been inserted as an intermediate level to enhance the performance of the 
proposed access control model by limiting the processing only to the intended nodes. 
Combining these models together will eliminate the individual weaknesses and 
achieving a high-security solution can deal with DDS.  
Modularizing the access control model by using AOP has no significant impacts in 
terms of runtime performance comparing with OOP. This relies on the way that the 
modularized model is applied to the original code by ignoring calling the main 
method’s signature (Sending and Receiving methods) and focusing only on java 
reserved methods that are used with both methods. Thus, it gives the priority to convert 
the access control model from traditional development using OOP to advance 
developments using AOP. Because, with AOP, the access control model will be 
separated from the original code of the system, it, therefore, increases the modularity 
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and manageability of the code and at the same time decreases the scattering and 
tangling problems. 
With cryptography model, nevertheless, there are obvious differences between 
applying this solution using OOP or AOP statistically in which AOP needs more time 
to execute the task. However, the dynamic AOP cryptography enhanced the efficiency 
of using cryptography processes in DDS. This is done by applying dynamic clustering 
of system nodes to be clustered according to the security clearance of the node. Thus, 
it decreased the number of En/De processes between clusters, not nodes and the data 
will travel through a cluster without a need to encrypt/decryption operations. This will 
give the priority to use AOP to modularize the cryptography algorithm.  
Finally, applying AOP security guard (which automatic software) is more 
advantageous than inserting hardware security devices or using human resources to 
monitor the data flow between system entities. AOP security guard will ensure 
monitoring data flow and allow high clearance nodes to do processing in low clearance 
one by sanitizing the information from any sensitive data.  
In addition, applying the 3AC_AOP solution on DDS by using AOP has the advantage 
of comparison to apply the same approach using OOP. This is because unlike OOP, the 
solution uses AOP can be applied dynamically that any incident occurs during runtime 
does not need to switch off the node, but only updates the aspect code immediately 
according to the situation need. Hence, it prevents any disconnecting between system 
nodes during the runtime. 
Through the experimental and evaluation chapter, it has been shown that using 
sequential processing to deal with the task that needs several processes to be 
accomplished will be better than dealing with this process using separation of duty. 
This is due to several reasons such as, the intermediate processing will receive the 
results of the previous processes and the final processing will hold the final results.  
According to the comparison between 3AC_AOP with DSAW, it has been shown that 
3AC_AOP is more efficient than DSAW through separating the file from access 
conditions. Therefore, accessing control model will be applied first if matching then 
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decrypting the file for processing otherwise keeps it in an encrypted form. Hence, this 
ensures file integrity as well as decreases the execution time.   
  
7.1 Future work  
 
The presented solution in this thesis has various domains to apply on e.g service 
function chain (SFC) and sequential processing. Our vision in future work for the 
proposed solution is as follows: 
1- The proposed model could be developed to be a plugin software tool, which can 
be applied directly to the distributed system. 
 
2- As we have seen in the literature review, some progress has been made on how 
to achieve security and privacy concepts by solving a specific problem, but 
questions remain especially about the generality of these solutions. Thus, the 
next future contribution will be how to deal with aspect advices when moving 
from a specialized to a more generalized approach. In other words, how to apply 
the aspect advice to existing applications depends on the functionality of the 
application rather than the specific implementation of the application code. This 
will enhance the generality concept to achieve the security and privacy 
principles in general not only for a specific problem or software 
implementation. 
 
3- Implement and evaluate the proposed model in a real world distributed system 
environment e.g. cloud computing and web service compositions. 
 
4- The proposed system can be enhanced to deal with the concurrence problem. 
This problem is a significant issue of the systems that deal with MLS. When 
the node needs to handle different information receipt from different resource 
at the same time 
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5- The proposed model could be extended to deal with different types of 
transmitted information e.g. audio and video.  
 
6- The proposed model could be enhanced to include AOP alarm to warn the 
system in case of any types of illegal complicity between different nodes. 
 
7- The proposed AOP security guard could be developed to filter and detect some 
types of malicious code that uses steganography and watermarking to hide dirty 
data during the processing or transmitting. 
 
8- Evaluate the proposed model within LAN machines to check the CPU and 
power consumption of the machine e.g mobile based, raspberry pi machines 
and sensor network. 
 
9- Design an application based on the proposed model to work within the 
enterprise, taking into account maintaining the enterprise hierarchy without the 
need to cluster nodes according to the level of security clearance.  
 
10- The proposed model could be enhanced to develop a reputation system by 
utilizing AOP to monitor the communications channels and nodes of the 
distributing system to make a right decision about the reputation of the channels 
and system nodes. 
 
11- In evaluation chapter we used AES 128 key size as a cryptography algorithm to 
ensure data integrity during transmitting between system nodes. However, this 
not prevent that we can use different other algorithms. In future, we will 
reevaluate the model using key size 256 or different algorithm in addition with 
asymmetric algorithms.  
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